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Many people have supported the writing and research of Queering	 Cold	
War	Poetry. The three chairs of my department at the University at Albany, 
SUNY—Gareth Griffiths, Steve North, Mike Hill—and their assistant, Liz 
Lauenstein, all helped secure small funds in the form of travel awards from 
the College of Arts and Sciences and the Department of English. The depart-
ment also granted me a writing leave in fall 2006 that allowed me to com-
plete the initial manuscript.
 The now unrecognizable origin of Queering	Cold	War	Poetry was my dis-
sertation on passivity and the modernist baroque poetics of the authors dis-
cussed here, as well as a few others (Hart Crane, Reinaldo Arenas). Robert 
Caserio, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, and Larry Venuti enthusiastically supported 
that project. Although this book has moved far beyond that largely aesthetic 
study, their stamp still can be read here. Lázaro Lima served as the disserta-
tion’s outside reader, and I am indebted to him for his continuing encourage-
ment.
 Since those early days, many friends and colleagues have contributed to 
the project’s evolution. My colleagues and students at SUNY Albany have 
offered valuable insights about, and encouragement of, my research; but I 
want to single out Branka Arsić, Bret Benjamin, Helen Regueiro Elam, and 
Tara Needham for graciously reading portions of this manuscript. Tom 
Cohen, Terri Ebert, and Charlie Shepherdson also offered strong advice at a 
critical stage. I am especially indebted to Rosemary Hennessy for several years 
of guidance, dear friendship, and strong criticism while she was at SUNY 
Albany. Pierre Joris and Don Byrd have joyfully shared their Duncan stories 
with me; and my conversations with Nicole Peyrafitte and Carol Mirakove 
about vulnerability, the role of the artist, and aesthetic politics continue to 
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be a wellspring for me. Over many years, Angus Cleghorn, Ellen McCallum, 
Dana Luciano, Steven Bruhm, Scott Herring, and Laura Moriarty invited me 
to participate on various panels, colloquia, and symposia about queer theory 
and modernist poetry that have been useful, indirectly and directly, for 
shaping and revising the ideas explored here. This book’s theoretical frame 
owes much to Susan Strehle, Ernesto Martínez, and Thomas Glave’s lively 
engagement at my invited lecture for SUNY Binghamton’s Department of 
English in October 2005. Thanks also to Paisley Currah, who invited me to 
offer a CLAGS public seminar in spring 2007, and to Sara Ganter, who took 
care of that operation’s pragmatics. I am still learning much from my reflec-
tions on the eye-opening, stimulating, and challenging contributions by all 
the attending activists, artists, and academics; but I especially extend my 
thanks to Belkin Gonzalez, Patricia Meona-Picado, Ulrike Mueller, Oren Sil-
verman, Josh Thorson, and Virgil Wong. Anonymous press readers offered 
invaluable suggestions that helped me streamline the manuscript, and the 
editorial guidance and enthusiasm of Sandy Crooms and Eugene O’Connor 
at the The Ohio State University Press have been heartening. Other friends 
and colleagues have supported me with food, drink, and intangibles: Rick 
Barney, Margie Byrd, Jason Cooke, Joanna Cooper, Sharon and James 
Danoff-Burg, Suzanne Gauch, Jen Greiman and Barry Trachtenberg, Glyne 
Griffith, Sue-Im Lee, Shelly and Alan Lependorf, Chris and Jenn McCreary, 
Shannon Miller, my extended Omi family (including Ruth Adams, John 
Davis), Anand Pandian, Jo Park and James Ker, Marjorie Pryse, Clare Rob-
inson, Helene Scheck, Ed Schwarzschild, Stan Shire, Lisa Thompson, Lynne 
Tillman, Laura Wilder, and David Wills. All my other colleagues at SUNY 
Albany have been very supportive. And everyone who has populated my city 
life has offered reality checks and has shown reassuring signs of interest in 
my work: Lisa and Lucy Iacucci, Daniel Simmons, Bob Kirsch, Jay Nicorvo 
and Thisbe Nissen, Jamie Schwarz, Rob Casper.
 Most important of all, though, is Jeffrey Lependorf. He patiently endured 
my prolonged disappearances into studies and libraries. When I reemerged, 
he grounded me with cocktails, treats, or gourmet meals while lovingly 
reading aloud poetry, Diana Vreeland’s autobiography, Harry Mathews’s 
short stories, or just pulpy smut. Jeff is the one who has taught me about 
vulnerability’s personally transformative possibilities.
 An earlier version of chapter 4 appeared in Journal	of	Modern	Literature	
28.4 (Summer 2005). I want to extend my gratitude to the editors of JML for 
permission to publish that article here, in revised form.
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 1 
ueering	Cold	War	Poetry	 is a book about vulnerability: what it is, 
how it structures our lives, why it’s imperative that queer theory and 
critical theory revalue its significance. Not only does it provide a 
key for reconstituting how we think about identity, difference, and 
community, but it also might ameliorate skepticism about theory’s 
political potential. Although this study is the product of my longtime engage-
ment with passivity in modern gay male writing from up to a half-century 
ago, only recently has the centrality of vulnerability to such literary passions 
become apparent to me. The post-9/11 preoccupation with the “security 
state” put a contemporary pressure on my growing interest in the political 
viability of vulnerability. In this book, I discuss four Cold War poets from 
Cuba and the United States—Wallace Stevens, José Lezama Lima, Robert 
Duncan, and Severo Sarduy—who struggled against similar state and cul-
tural mandates that foreclosed any positive estimation of vulnerability so as 
to favor an attitude of nationalistic and identitiarian security. Their writings 
suggested to me that vulnerability can be appreciated as an ethical relation 
to one’s world, a mode potentially viable for queer scholarship and activism 
today. Therefore, it seems appropriate to provide a few framing prefatory 
remarks that historically locate my reading of these writers in our contem-
porary moment, at the time of my own writing.
 In the most colloquial of senses, queer subjects know all too well what 
it means to live “insecurely.” Security also has a longstanding history in 
modern nation-states’ political and ideological discourses. Those frames 
have structured, and continue to structure, how gay, lesbian, transgender, 
and other subjects have experienced their vulnerabilities differently, at spe-
Q
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cific historical junctures. The paradigm of security facing us today, in an age 
when globalized capitalism is in a standoff with international terrorism, is 
quite unlike the distinct schemas of national, collective, or human security 
emerging after the Second World War, schemas that affected how my literary 
subjects understood the idea of security.1 Nonetheless, much can be learned 
from the past. During the protracted historical “moment” of the long Cold 
War, homosexual subjects in the Americas were constructed as outsiders, 
even traitors, to their national communities. At that time, risk and vulner-
ability bore much ideological weight. In his recent history of McCarthyism, 
David K. Johnson claims that U.S. governmental rhetoric rendered homo-
sexuals and communists virtually coterminous. He even argues that the 
former may have been regarded as more of a “security risk” than the latter 
because homosexual citizens’ politics were indeterminable, unreadable, and 
uncontainable (The	Lavender	Scare, 8–9). In Cuba, a parallel history of sexual 
and (trans)gender minorities’ construction as counterrevolutionary security 
risks (the official term was gusanos, or “worms”) was an explicit feature of the 
Castroist regime’s Stalinism, especially in the early 1970s. That rhetoric con-
tinued an earlier, pre-Revolutionary moment’s stereotyping of homosexual 
men. Ian Lumsden notes that during the 1940s and 1950s, one “factor con-
tributing to the denigration of maricones	[faggots] was their association with 
cowardice—maricón	means coward as well as homosexual—in a country 
that has had to fight hard and long for its national liberation” (Machos,	Mari-
cones,	and	Gays, 53). Often living in urban centers where sexual tourism and 
queer culture were booming, homosexual men were imagined to be traitors 
who threatened the integrity of Cuban national culture because they con-
sorted with norteamericanos.2
 In more recent years, in the country where I write about and teach these 
issues, queer life increasingly interfaces with security primarily through neo-
liberal economics and a corresponding inflated sense of a need to protect 
and guard individuals’ privacy. Lisa Duggan usefully describes this devel-
opment as “a kind of right-to-privacy-in-public—a zone of immunity from 
state regulation, surveillance, and harassment” (The	Twilight	of	Equality? 52). 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision Bowers	 v.	Hardwick	 (1986) proved that 
queer citizens’ private lives were vulnerable to the watchful eyes of the State 
and its enforcers. Since that decision, the condition of securing inviolable 
zones of privacy for queer subjects has continued to be a grave concern. 
“The legal tradition . . . tends to protect sexual freedom by privatizing it,” as 
Michael Warner has noted; and those freedoms and “privacy protections” are 
secured only “for those whose sexuality is already normative” (The	Trouble	
with	Normal,	174). Warner cautioned about this predicament a few years 
prior to the Court’s overturning of its earlier decision with Lawrence	v.	Texas	
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(2003); but, as Duggan notes, the situation has not abated due to the rise of 
“the new homonormativity,” a conservative and mainstreamed gay and les-
bian political movement that seeks to “redefine gay equality against the ‘civil 
rights agenda’ and ‘liberationalism,’ as access to the institutions of domestic 
privacy, the ‘free’ market, and patriotism” (Twilight, 50, 51). The vulnerable 
space of the home is extended into the public sphere. This fragile condition, 
wherein the public and the private overlap, must be secured at all costs, usu-
ally with the exclusion of those who can’t pass for the norm.3
 Since 9/11, all	homes and all zones of privacy, whether they are domestic 
spaces or the neoliberal public’s “complexly remap[ped] zones of collective 
autonomy,” are imagined to be equally precarious (Duggan, Twilight, 52). 
Consequently, a quickly evolving sense of what constitutes privacy pro-
foundly affects those structures that frame how all queer citizens—homo-
normative or not—imagine their relationship to the state and the nation. In a 
bold-faced subtitle, the U.S. Office of Homeland Security’s National	Strategy	
for	Homeland	Security (NSHS) proclaims that “Our Free Society Is Inherently 
Vulnerable.” “The American people and way of life are the primary targets of 
our enemy, and our highest protective priority,” the anonymous authors warn. 
“Our population and way of life are the source of our Nation’s great strength, 
but also a source of inherent vulnerability” (NSHS,	7). Under the pressures 
of a perceived threat, this view reductively defines the nation as a population 
with a single “way of life” in order to promulgate a narrative justification of 
the state’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such stories wield a quite real 
historical and political force in shaping our experiences of nationhood. “A 
nation is not only a piece of land but a narration about the people’s relation 
to the land,” Donald Pease reminds us (“Global Homeland State,” 5). Today’s 
stories provide what Pease terms a “foundational fantasy” that reinforces a 
nationalist climate by stressing the “governing metaphor” of the homeland 
(6). It would do us well, though, also to remember the second term adding 
force to that metaphor and tempering that narrative. Conceived as a narra-
tive constructing our collective experience of nationhood, Homeland Secu-
rity actually functions as a cultural	effort	for which the American people are 
ultimately responsible. This cultural mode of defense is distinguished in the 
NSHS	from its “twin concept” of state security (NSHS,	5). Citizens are called 
upon to tactically use identificatory narratives to counteract genuine fears 
about their vulnerabilities and to complement militaristic means of securing 
state sovereignty. In the process, nationalism has become something more 
than a jingoistic love of country. It is a state’s and a culture’s encouragement 
of egotism: Care	for	your	self,	for	the	good	of	the	population. This biopolitical 
mandate has a corollary: Be confident	in	your	own	identity,	so	as	to	ensure	the	
stability	and	security	of	the	collective	with	which	you	identify.
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 What, then, does this nationalism ask of queer subjects, especially those 
who are activism-minded? In spring 2007, I had an opportunity to directly 
bring to my desired audience the ideas informing and growing out of my 
research for this book. I organized and led “Queer Nationalism and the 
Homeland Security State,” a series of public lectures and seminar-style dis-
cussions sponsored by the City University of New York’s Center for Lesbian 
and Gay Studies (CLAGS) and held between February and May 2007 at 
Greenwich Village’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Community 
Center. Those who attended varied from week to week. They came from 
many different backgrounds—activists, students, lawyers, artists. Despite 
the participants’ changing faces and multiple interests, attendees at any 
given meeting were consistently committed to engaging one another’s ideas 
thoughtfully. Repeatedly, many would confess that they were disillusioned 
by the present state of activism. The neoliberal context where queers must 
make themselves visible and heard has resulted in competition for scarce 
resources, volunteers, and contributions. This climate has had damaging 
effects on activism’s coalitional possibilities. Seminar participants repeatedly 
complained about the particularly pernicious attention devoted to same-sex 
marriage, adoption, and partner-care rights. Even though almost everyone 
qualified their criticisms by noting how “important” these issues are, several 
also expressed frustration with how marriage and family rights are presumed 
to be the common political denominator for the so-called “community” 
(too often problematically described in the singular). These concerns have 
become mainstream gay and lesbian politics’ spotlight issues because they 
can be easily pitched and sold. Working with a fair degree of financial secu-
rity, middle- or upper-class gays and lesbians, most of whom are white and 
all of whom have economic resources at their disposal, seek to augment their 
relative safety at the expense of those in other queer communities (in the 
plural). Receiving less attention are problems concerning: sexual segregation 
of toilets and other facilities; transgender and transsexual subjects’ access 
to reassignment therapies and surgeries; universal healthcare, housing, and 
job security; assistance for people living with AIDS, including partners and 
survivors as well as the infected and the ill; immigration and naturalization 
rights; and the intersectional inequities experienced by queers of color.
 Several participants noted that they were drawn to political efforts outside 
“the community.” Nearly unanimously, the seminar participants felt that the 
sociopolitical climate produced by the so-called “War on Terror” demanded 
a critical reappraisal of the possibilities for coalition and its anti-imperialist 
potential. Since interest in such coalition was found lacking in much queer 
politics, they opted to work in migration movements, citizenship rights organ-
izations, and antiwar political groups. There they rediscovered the often 
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   4 11/13/2008   12:51:56 PM
P r o L o g u e   
forgotten anti-imperialist and antinationalist spirit of early Gay Liberation 
and later queer activism during the Persian Gulf War. They may feel more 
disconnected from direct action politics, but at least they knew that their 
new affiliations would let them advance their interests in working toward a 
general commonality that includes—but is not limited to—queer subjects. 
In such efforts, they explained, others are more open to differences as they 
look toward global horizons. To them, this quality seemed especially neces-
sary in the face of everyone’s ineluctable political vulnerability to an injurious 
capitalistic imperialism.
 Over the months, our conversations about rethinking queer politics and 
culture had several breakthrough moments. One in particular stands out, 
though, and it set the tone for how I’ve recast the literary studies and the the-
oretic frame that follow. In the last hour of our second meeting, the group’s 
self-identified activists concurred that how I delineated different historically 
overlapping constructions of security,	from the Cold War to the present, was	
useful. But they asked a crucial question: If security is articulated in histori-
cally different ways, mustn’t we distinguish between different forms of vul-
nerability, too? I had been promoting an idea of vulnerability as a laudable 
sort of de	 facto	openness to others.One attendee cautioned, though, that 
in the heyday of Gay Liberation, vulnerability had less political and ethical 
gravitas. At that time it even read as symptomatic of the citizen’s failure to act. 
Other members of our group proceeded to argue that that sense has changed 
over time, for they felt that some sense of vulnerability was at the heart of 
their experiences in the later coalitional politics of HIV/AIDS activism. In 
the same space of the Center where our seminar met, the AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power (ACT UP) was founded in 1987. That organization continues 
to reach across class, racial, sexual, and gender divides; and its pedagogical 
campaigns have done much to heighten citizens’ consciousness of the inter-
connection of various domestic institutions (education, medicine, NGOs, 
government) on which our lives depend.4 The political actions of the now-
defunct Queer Nation, also originating in New York City’s Center, sought 
to heighten, in different ways, consciousness about the networked nature of 
public space. By interjecting same-sex eroticism and queer visibility into the 
heteronormative public sphere at malls, restaurants, and other commercial 
spaces, activists attempted to bring queer bodies and queer desire into cir-
culation as articles fit for consumption.5 As these activists narrated it, par-
ticipation in these organizations translated into exposing oneself to injury 
either by bringing same-sex eroticism into the public eye (Queer Nation) 
or by opening oneself to prioritize others’ contextually defined needs (ACT 
UP). These quite different forms of vulnerability involved setting aside the 
immediate wants of oneself or one’s group so as to demonstrate and act on 
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the interconnectedness of North American life. Such an idea offset the equa-
tion of democratic living with competitive meritocracy and laissez-faire 
individualism. Coalitional openness is a kind of vulnerability growing out of 
a belief in the existence of a networked or ecological frame of mind, of the 
idea that everyone’s actions are conditioned by, and contribute to the condi-
tioning of, others’ actions.6
 The consensus was that politicized perceptions of vulnerability have 
changed. As two put it at that exciting March meeting, though, even when 
queer activists are interested in coalitional actions now, they tend to be wary 
of thinking about or expressing that necessary openness as vulnerability. 
However, this distrust is unlike gay revolutionaries and radicalesbians’ sus-
picion of the term decades ago as symptomatic of an undesirable inaction 
and passivity. Now vulnerability is associated with a conservative nation-
state’s intrusion	 into queer life and affairs. A defensive	 identity politics has 
emerged at the levels of both national and minority communities, and one 
must fight to protect oneself against invasive policies and laws by securing 
group-specific rights and welfare interests. Alternatively, on the side of a 
conservative homonormativity that advocates the mainstreaming of the 
movement, one secures oneself from this exposure by disappearing into a 
national heteronormative cultural fabric.7 Yet, if we reflect on how we differ-
ently experience our historically variable vulnerable condition, we can arrive 
at a new, less defensive attitude. We might turn exposure to possible harm 
into a political asset.
 Collectively, we worked out three ways of understanding vulnerability 
today. First, it is a construct deployed by the state as an excuse for beefing up 
national security measures. Ultimately, these measures fuel the twin motors 
of an imperializing globalization: the state’s military-industrial complex and 
corporate capitalism. There was some disagreement as to whether or not 
these vulnerabilities are real or imagined. After all, these New Yorkers could 
attest to the realities of 9/11 and its continuing material effects on their lives. 
Several, however, were also skeptical of official governmental rhetoric. They 
believed that a discourse sensationalizing the country’s exposure to harm is 
used largely as a veil to facilitate a presidential administration’s self-interest, 
as well as the interests of its corporate investors and lobbyists. Ironically, the 
second form of vulnerability we identified is produced by the security mea-
sures deployed to safeguard the nation-state. As a consequence of the sus-
pension of civil liberties and the creation of a xenophobic climate, those who 
do not identify themselves with mainstream American values, or who are not 
identifiable as such, are more susceptible to injury. Queers of color are par-
ticularly subject to these developments, although white male queers, such as 
me, also feel unsettled by a pervasive loss of civil liberties and other personal 
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securities. The third type of vulnerability enumerated by the CLAGS group 
is what I explore in Queering	Cold	War	Poetry. Characterizing a particular 
sort of interpersonal relationship wherein one lets one’s guard down, as in 
coalitional politics, it is an ontological—yet historically variable—condition 
of being open to others. If vulnerability now comes in three forms (at least), 
and two of those are injurious, it is worth reassessing the third’s political 
viability. I concluded that meeting by noting that, even though we appreciate 
its merits, we now apparently lack a critical vocabulary for understanding 
vulnerability’s progressive political potential.
 Already existing theoretical investigations can help us begin to articulate 
such a politicized vulnerable attitude. Growing out of her writings about 
power and the necessity of conditionality, Judith Butler’s recent work per-
haps offers the most sustained engagement with questions akin to the ones 
we discussed in the CLAGS forum.8 In similar ways, other theorists have 
reexamined passion or passivity, subjects’ less guarded and less rational con-
dition, to arrive at different understandings of the citizen-subject’s agency. 
For example, Shane Phelan notes that “queering citizenship will require a 
refocusing of the passions of citizenship” and a blurring of the lines between 
the private and the public, the affective and the rational (Sexual	Strangers, 
17). With these shifts, she believes, we can more effectively challenge an 
entrenched liberalist tradition that privileges the private citizen who is self-
contained and possesses inalienable rights. Similarly, Iris Marion Young 
argues that an inclusive democratic public cannot depend on rational delib-
eration and communicative action because certain groups, including but not 
limited to queers, lack or shun such discursive and social resources that are 
preconditions for full enfranchisement (Inclusion	and	Democracy, 52–80). 
According to these thinkers, new democratic possibilities are imaginable 
through an incorporation of passions, emotions, and affect into political dis-
course. These traits not only counter Western rationalism but, in drawing 
attention to bodies, they also heighten awareness of our connection with—
and, consequently, our vulnerability to—others.
 Because today’s security tactics are “cultural,” we can draw on cultural 
and intellectual predecessors to extend an already rich critical discourse 
about passion and passivity to enhance and update our vocabulary of vul-
nerability. Simply by emphasizing this often overlooked or shunned term, 
we can continue the critique of a	priori agency carried out in the name of 
passion; yet, we can do so without wholly negating or dismissing citizens’ 
need to act. Vulnerability provides a crucial key for countering the illogics 
of what I define in my introduction as “liberalism,” the ontological condition 
defining biopolitical regimes that privilege individuals who care for them-
selves seemingly of their own accord in order to safeguard the security of 
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the people. Too often maligned, vulnerability actually can ground a new lan-
guage for rethinking and challenging the binary divide between identity and 
difference, an ethical project central to queer theory, much critical theory, 
and queer coalitional politics. Queering	Cold	War	Poetry	explores how two 
Cuban and two U.S. poets thought seriously about the ethicopolitical pos-
sibilities of different kinds of vulnerability. Their writings began as histori-
cized and theoretic responses to their own epochs, but they crucially inform 
the general theory I elucidate below. These studies are my small contribution 
to what I hope will be a continuing revaluing of vulnerability as a remedy 
for past and present imperatives to maintain the state and its population’s 
security, no matter the cost.
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 hile sitting in a theater, have you ever noticed an elderly couple 
exchanging discreet, barely visible touches, or whispering quiet 
words that actually don’t say much? When in a train station, 
have you felt called by a baby burbling and cooing as she extends 
her hand? On the street, have you appreciated the kindness of a stranger 
who steps into your world with a simple hello, a look, a meaningful brush 
in passing? In such moments, others reach out to ask “Are you still alive?” 
or “Are you there?” or “Will you still be there when I finally touch you?” We 
take these ephemeral scenes of contact for granted, but they are significant 
because they illustrate how we locate our selves by verbally and physically 
touching what is outside. They are moments when we reflexively recognize 
we are at risk because the other may already have left us or may elude us 
in the future. Ironically, at those times we live affirmatively and presently. 
The other’s being close by, now and in the future, is necessary. We need the 
other near so as to continually rediscover the joys of sharing and becoming, 
together.
 Such a mode of living depends not only on a notion of corporeal or 
phenomenological proximity but also on an ontological principle residing 
somewhere between identity and difference: similarity. When we reach out 
to make contact, we do not look for what is the same or for what can replace 
us. Nor do we look for what is removed from our selves or for what is abso-
lutely different. Instead, we look for what is like	us, for what is metaphori-
cally close	 to us. Because of our bodies, our trajectories of living intersect 
W
toward a Queer Ethic 
of vulnerability
i n t r o d u C t i o n
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with others who, in the process, come to share their defining qualities with 
us. Such commonality makes new collectives imaginable. The recognition 
that we share in living—and that that allotment is predicated on existing 
somewhat vulnerably and in dependence on others—bears an ethical force. 
It can transform how we think about political collectives and how we imagine 
national possibilities. Subscribing to this kind of vulnerable and queer sense 
of nationhood entails moving between publics which intimate foldings that 
connect and invaginate our individual experiences with those of others. It is 
to search for intimacies that will redefine our public lives.
 If similarity is the chief product of such intimacy, this condition should 
affect how we experience, if not always how we talk about, cultural iden-
tity. Not a language of I	am; instead, a language of I	 live	 like. I live like a 
white American, like a gay man, like a professor, like a poet, like a theo-
rist. What if we were to imagine identification as not occurring according 
to an individualized aspiration for equality? Equality, the rubric of a civil 
life and polity, is predicated on an arithmetical substitutability in which 
one doubles for or represents another, the generalized self or transparent 
citizen who is absent yet renders one’s own identity legible. What if we 
imagined identification as occurring through similitude instead? Equity 
rather than equality, contact rather than parity. For you and me, so sin-
gularly dissimilar yet so humanly like one another, for us both to live like	
Americans in our embodied proximity to one another, through the nar-
ratives we exchange, is a metaphorical condition. To live in such a way 
depends on the juxtaposition of two singular entities. Such a mode permits 
us to figure—in both senses, to	 imagine	and to	represent—what the term 
“American” means now and how it can change. Such a future orientation 
depends on discovering the vital differences within our communities and 
our supposedly integral, contained selves.
 To opt for a metaphorical existence is to inhabit a life of resemblance, 
not a life of identification or authenticity. Resemblances are risky, especially 
if we know that the condition we promote as “real” is just a figuration and 
thus is susceptible to change. Conceptualizing citizenship as a condition of 
living metaphorically moves us toward an ethical paradigm that remembers 
all bodies’ vulnerable condition, a foundation of being that reinforces their 
similarity to one another. By thinking through this logic of resemblance, we 
can deconstruct predominant political fictions about identity, individualism, 
and security. Instead of living a completely individuated life, individuals are 
always multiple because they continuously open themselves to fellow citi-
zens, with whom they share some likeness. Nation-state and global citizen-
ship are thus conditions that need not be reduced to civil self-censoring in 
order to compel individuals’ subscription to a homogeneous moral code. 
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They develop out of an ethical and publicly motivated sense of individual 
responsiveness to the privacies through which others imaginatively iden-
tify—or, better, liken—their selves to others.
 Below I elaborate how this politicized ethic is a direct response to what 
Michel Foucault terms liberalism, a form of individualism that hampers 
the discovery of more equitable forms of democratic commonality. Liber-
alism prizes the identical and the contained self over other more vulnerable 
attitudes that could positively resignify difference. If we move away from 
liberalism’s identificatory logics, we can promote a more coalitional, rather 
than communitarian or minority, understanding of commonality. In such a 
scenario, individuals rediscover themselves by finding likenesses to others 
with whom they presumably had none. A theoretical investigation of what 
liberalism is and how modern poetry disrupts it can spur queer theory to 
ethically reassess its rhetorical investments in those same rigid modes of 
identification and national belonging that it usually remonstrates against.
Liberalism, one half of a democratic faith
Michel Foucault’s theory of biopolitics and its related technologies (popula-
tion, security, governmentality) concerns the historical shifts in late moder-
nity’s dominant mechanisms of power. During the eighteenth century, the 
Western polis was based on a model of sovereignty, in which the head of state 
wielded absolute authority. This sovereignty was figured as a power over life, 
predicated on the ruler’s sole ability to sentence subjects to death. With the 
rise of disciplinary structures (such as the clinic and the prison), and still 
later with the emergence of biopolitics proper, the sovereign’s absolute con-
trol over life and death was no longer the preeminent form of power. The 
delinquent individual was now conditioned into a state of normalcy, thus 
giving rise to a normatively defined collective. With the advent of a biopolit-
ical regime of power, however, individuals are not the subjects of a discipline 
aiming to create a moralistic, normative majority. The presumption is that 
a normative collective already exists. In this regime, the population is the 
object of power, more specifically of an administrative government’s conser-
vative management that aims to preserve and secure the collective’s stability. 
Rather than a power over life, a right to life determines politics and social 
power. But this right is not, as is too often believed, a natural one belonging 
to the individual. Instead, only the population as a whole is entitled to it. 
Individuals are subjectivated in such a fashion that their first conscious pri-
ority is to care for their selves, to look out for their own well-being; however, 
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they assume such a discipline primarily for the general population’s benefit, 
not their own.1
 Despite his seemingly schematic presentation of these three regimes’ dif-
ferences, Foucault never maintained that sovereignty or disciplinarity fully 
disappeared with the emergence of biopolitics. As has been reinforced by the 
work of theorists extending his thought, aspects of one regime are still present 
in the others.2 For instance, Giorgio Agamben’s work on exceptionality and 
the Nazi death camps underscores the close interrelation of sovereignty and 
governmentality in those systems where biopolitical strategies are deployed 
to the advantage of an exceptional class that operates with some degree of 
sovereign self-interest.3 More recently, in federal responses to 9/11, we have 
witnessed what Wendy Brown calls “a transformation of American liberal 
democracy into a political and social form for which we do not yet have 
a name, a form organized by a combination of neoliberal governmentality 
and imperial world politics, shaped in the short run by global economic and 
security crises” (Edgework, 51). In her analysis of recent U.S. policies of pre-
emptive war and indefinite detention, Judith Butler closely aligns the afore-
mentioned governmentality with “petty sovereigns, unknowing, to a degree, 
of what they do, but performing their acts unilaterally and with enormous 
consequence” (Butler, Precarious	Life,	65). Neither truly monarchical nor 
fascistic, new sovereign subjects are constituted by their own tactical speech 
acts. They selectively and performatively administer or suspend the law in 
the name of their duty to the nation’s population, “to neutralize the rule of 
law in the name of security”; yet, their supposedly autonomous declarations, 
made “in the interests of the executive function of the state,” actually cement 
their position as cogs in an impersonal administrative machine (ibid.,	67, 
83). This historical stage of antidemocratic sovereignty is distinct from past 
biopolitical forms insofar as it ushers in “an unprecedented generalization of 
the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government” (Agamben, 
State	of	Exception,	14).
 Queer theory must redress this recently emergent, imbricated structure of 
the three regimes of power that produce heteronormative citizens and nor-
malized populations. The accounts by Brown, Agamben, and Butler throw 
into relief the fact that queer theorists specifically need to scrutinize how 
security functions as the chief narrative device driving normalizing social 
processes and the management of populations.4 The location of power at the 
juncture of sovereignty and biopolitics has historically led to the close asso-
ciation of late democracy with a laissez-faire	paradigm that sustains capitalist 
economic forms and resultant distributive inequities. In the end, though, 
such “freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of appa-
ratuses of security” (Foucault, Security,	Territory,	Population,	48). The seem-
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ingly antithetical terms of security (the maintenance of the status quo) and 
freedom (the permission or even encouragement of circulation and move-
ment) are inextricably linked through administrating agencies’ strategies 
of government and risk management. This “game” sets out to maintain the 
currently accepted order of things by “not interfering, allowing free move-
ment, letting things follow their course” (ibid.). If the rules of the game are 
followed, the majority of the population should prosper, albeit at the expense 
of a dispensable few. What is more, the welfare and fortune secured by such a 
biopolitical strategy allows for only a rather limited—even illusory—mobility 
and freedom. Foucault dubbed this entire apparatus liberalism.5
 For the purposes of this exegesis, though, I wish to extricate this con-
cept from Foucault’s reductively economic, laissez-faire definition. Instead, 
I wish to connect it to those modern democratic ideals that emerged along-
side capitalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.6 With 
the passing of a monarchical political sovereignty comes an institutional-
ized belief in the citizen-subject’s individualized freedom. Although the pure 
sovereignty of that freedom is as illusory as Foucault notes, it would be del-
eterious to judge all freedom in a capitalistic-democratic system as utterly 
impossible. What is more, experiences of freedom are attached to some sense 
of autonomy, a rediscovery of a kind of sovereignty which disentangles that 
modality of power from its usual biopolitical constraints. For this reason, I 
prefer to approach liberalism not just as a particularly historicized economic 
force but also as a democratic first principle, a faith in the sovereign indi-
vidual’s inviolable integrity, self-sufficiency, agency, and privacy. I use the 
word “liberalism,” rather than “liberal,” in order to specify a formal	condition 
not to be confused with a political attitude, partisan bias, or party alliance. 
Instead, I am interested in appropriating that idea of “comprehensive liber-
alism” which John Rawls summarily dispenses with in order to pursue its 
supposedly more historicized complement, “political liberalism.”7 However, 
my turn to a comprehensive or ontological logic is not intended to promote a 
neo-Kantian aesthetic theory or to stage an ahistorical recuperation of John 
Stuart Mill’s utilitarian liberalism.8 Rather, I wish to perform a deconstruc-
tive rehistoricizing of what Rawls calls a political liberalism. Rather than 
a trans- or ahistorical constant, liberalism is a polyvalent article of faith, 
inflected with different meanings in different epochs by different individ-
uals. By putting that object of belief back into history, we can examine how 
various exclusions have been propagated through the unexamined embrace 
of notions of autonomy and privacy, as well as the associated principles of 
equality and freedom. Our objective should be to pluralize and historically 
reground, rather than simply reject, ontological fictions. Historicizing these 
fictions, somehow integral to democratic living, allows us to perceive their 
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dynamic, shifting natures and thus generate a critical relationship to them.9
 William Connolly’s twin concepts of liberal individualism and liberal 
individuality, both of which “give the individual moral primacy over the 
interests of the collectivity,” provide a useful parallel for my project’s aim 
(Identity/Difference, 73).10 For Connolly, the concept of liberal individuality 
is a more ethical, though not truly politicized, engagement with the question 
of the individual’s status in democratic society. In contrast, liberal individu-
alism subscribes to a normalizing logic that prescribes fixed identification 
and is pervasive in contemporary identity politics. With “ease,” the “doctrine 
of the steadfast individual” becomes “a doctrine of normalization through 
individualization,” a process often mediated by governmental apparatuses 
(ibid., 74). This danger is not easily skirted. In fact, it may be a necessary 
prerequisite that comes from how liberalism necessarily opposes the collec-
tive. These two distinct forms of liberalism “generate complementary strate-
gies to evade the paradox of difference,” namely that difference resides at 
the heart of identity itself instead of inhering in the relation between two 
supposedly self-same, integral entities (ibid., 92). “Identity is . . . a slippery, 
insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulner-
able to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, 
or subvert definitions applied to them” (ibid., 64). Both liberal individualism 
and liberal individuality allow us to overlook those political mediations that 
reveal how identity is contingent and mutable, rather than fixed. As Con-
nolly interestingly puts it, they obscure how identity at its core is vulnerable	
because of the difference it contains.
 Expanding on Connolly’s conclusions, we might say that modern liber-
alism functions to normalize individuals, to render their senses of self more 
secure and less vulnerable	by occluding the more destabilizing spaces and 
experiences of difference. Populations are able to emerge because individuals 
deploy narrative strategies that let them cling to secure forms of identity, 
rubrics that grant them some appreciable degree of sovereignty. Freedom 
necessitates individuals defend those boundaries that imbue them with 
some degree of social mobility. That sovereignty is limited, though, since it is 
tied to and circumscribed by the state, insofar as it relies on a stable or static 
identity that can be statistically	measured. In this way, what is by nature an 
unpredictable freedom becomes a quite probabilistic quality.11 The freedom 
associated with liberalist individualism is thus not an absolute sovereignty. 
Rather, it is a highly conditioned agency that is recognizable and predictable 
because the agent functions through an identificatory moniker (or intersec-
tion of monikers) chosen from an available assortment that lets the agent and 
the larger collective be administered and statistically assessed. That is, this 
highly qualified form of independence necessitates the individual’s ultimate 
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identification not just with recognizable identity groups and market niches 
but also with the categorical entity of the national population. Each of these 
units constitutes a collective whose unpredictable qualities can be treated as 
probabilities, like any other natural or pseudo-natural phenomenon.
 Unlike a population, though, commonality—wherein difference resides—
is a self-generative cultural construct that keeps alive individual members’ 
differentiating singularities while establishing a shared ground. It does not 
subscribe to any rhetoric of identification, nor can it be easily categorized 
and fixed according to an undifferentiated mass identity. But political, even 
ethical, action does not come about simply by choosing commonality over 
liberalism or by disidentifying with the population. Liberalism and arguably 
even some understandings of population are necessary. Democratic living is 
unimaginable without some	recourse to identifying our selves as individual 
actors within recognizable communities. An undemocratic danger, however, 
attends hyperbolic claims for the merits of liberalism and its attendant tech-
nologies (security, identity, population, stability, nation-state), at the expense 
of either commonality or historical consciousness. Liberalism and common-
ality are twin concepts: they are foundational principles existing in tension 
with one another, two agonistic halves of a democratic faith. Taking my cue 
from John Dewey’s own assessment of liberalist individualism in the 1930s, 
I argue that this tension imbues liberalism with a dynamic historical life. 
Over time, an aporetic understanding of democracy—as necessarily both a 
condition of commonality and liberalism, of collective union and individu-
alism—becomes.12 Each of these terms of this paradox at the heart of demo-
cratic living is historically inflected and rearticulated even though each is too 
often misread as an ahistoric truth beyond examination, critique, or reart-
iculation.13 To move critically toward commonality, then, we cannot simply 
ignore the liberalist portion of the equation. We must struggle with it and 
rediscover how often our very modes of critique depend on, and are invested 
in, forms of liberalist security and identification. Because queer subjects are 
both excluded from and persecuted by the biopolitical state and its strangely 
governmental liberalist paradigm, it is especially pressing that queer theo-
rists reread those ideas of security believed to be emblematic of our own 
intellectual and civic freedoms.
Ethically redefining Queerness
Almost two decades ago, scholars began to rethink precepts of social jus-
tice and democracy through queer theory, a space located in the academy 
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yet linked to extramural queer politics. The document that launched the 
field as such was Michael Warner’s edited volume Fear	of	 a	Queer	Planet	
(1993), which had appeared originally as a special issue of Social	Text two 
years earlier. A glance at its contents gives a sense of the field’s beginnings 
as an enterprise moving between and across several disciplines (gay and les-
bian studies, Marxist studies, African American studies, sociology, literary 
and cultural studies). The contributors recognized that queer issues extend 
beyond the domain of sexuality since “queers live as queers, as lesbians, as 
gays, as homosexuals, in contexts other than sex” (Warner, introduction,	vii). 
Following the lead set by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in Between	Men (1985) 
and Epistemology	of	the	Closet (1990), they proceeded with the assumption 
that, as Warner put it, “gay politics would be a starting point rather than the 
exception”; consequently, their inquiries “would not be limited to manifestly 
sex-specific problems” (ibid., xiv).
 Routinely, queer theory still links issues pertaining to sexual and gender 
minorities to social and political matters beyond sex and minority identifi-
cation. This concern partly accounts for this field’s distinction from “queer 
studies,” which is characterized more by sociological realism and a persistent 
tendency to describe already existing (or past) communities. Queer theorists 
conclude that such empiricism ultimately reinforces identity politics and a 
communitarian ethos. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s sense that modern 
society arises out of the unfortunate collapse of the cultural into the political, 
Warner’s introduction to Fear	of	a	Queer	Planet boldly claims that “queer 
politics opposes society itself ” (xxvii). Theorists pave the way for that resis-
tance by focusing on what he dubs queerness. This is not a queer identity per 
se. Instead, it is a polymorphous entity usually read through antihumanist 
concepts, such as desire. In most theory, individuals are conceived as sub-
jects acted on and constructed by outside forces, rather than as autonomous 
and agentic persons acting wholly on their own volition to represent them-
selves in a socially transparent way. Although queerness remains vague or 
even ill-defined, its alluring focus on passion seems to let thinkers sidestep 
the problems of egoistic inflation and seemingly unhindered agency asso-
ciated with both politically liberal attitudes and comprehensive liberalism. 
“Queerness . . . bears a different relation to liberal logics of choice and will, 
as well as to moral languages of leadership and community, in ways that con-
tinually pose problems both in everyday life and in contexts of civil rights” 
(ibid.,	xviii–xix). By striking at the liberalist construction of the citizen-sub-
ject, queer theorists emphasize the importance of those forms of desire that 
are loosely linked to same-sex eroticism or sexual practices. In this way, they 
trouble how heteronormative sociopolitical orders limit and manage imag-
inings of political possibilities and individual experiences of difference.
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 It would do us well to remember that, since queer theory’s inception, 
the term politics	has signified for these scholars differently than we might 
presume. It is the domain of reflection, rather than direct action. “Queers 
do a kind of practical social reflection just in finding ways of being queer,” 
Warner notes. The role of theory is to make such reflection less “reactive, 
fragmentary, and defensive,” as well as less prone to being “misled by the uto-
pian claims advanced in support of particular tactics.” Theorists are charged 
with the objective of unearthing “the logic of the sexual order [which] is so 
deeply embedded by now in an indescribably wide range of social institu-
tions, and is embedded in the most standard accounts of the world” (ibid.,	
xiii). Because queer theory primarily analyzes the interface between queer 
subjects’ social lives and their political and civic relations with others, we 
could posit that since its start it has been, strictly speaking, an ethical, rather 
than a political, field of inquiry. Instead of serving an immediately political 
function, queer theory is a politicized	thinking about the conditions of rela-
tionality.	Its “radical” nature depends on its production of crisis-provoking 
critique. When regarded as originating in ethical analyses, such crises do 
not necessarily result from a given theorist’s outlaw or revolutionary stance 
in relation to the day’s liberalist order. Rather, the order itself is resignified 
because the crisis resituates theorists in the present, from which they cannot 
extricate themselves. Critics must confront the difficult questions about how 
they are involved with, or folded into, the very norms and ideologies they 
resist.14 Following the lead of Foucault’s late essay “What Is Enlightenment?” 
I would say that such an ethic constitutes a praxis much like art. It “trans-
figures the world” and does so “not [through] an annulling of reality but 
[through] a difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exer-
cise of freedom” (Foucault, Essential	Works, 1: 311). If queer theory explic-
itly establishes itself as a kind of ascetic and aesthetic practice, then it can 
embrace its role as supplier of a new ethical imaginary. We can provide our 
activist colleagues with a new vocabulary about citizenry, autonomy, and 
difference that may aid their challenges to prevalent biopolitical modes of 
subjectivating citizens and constructing manageable populations.
 Because it begins in a faithfulness to what is foreign to, and disruptive of, 
one’s sensibilities, a kind of vulnerability is a precondition for a politicized 
queer ethic. Instead of securing and safeguarding an a	priori self, an ethical 
subject emerges while pursuing an idea that captures and compels it to sur-
render the very sense of security usually afforded individuals through iden-
tificatory practices. The philosopher Alain Badiou postulates that such an 
ethical attitude rests on a single principle: “Do all that you can to persevere 
in that which exceeds your perseverance. Perseverance is the interruption. 
Seize in your being that which has seized and broken you” (Ethics,	47).15 As 
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he elaborates elsewhere, “All resistance is a rupture in thought, through the 
declaration of what the situation is, and the foundation of a practical pos-
sibility opened up through the declaration.” Such declarative resistances are 
not heroic articulations of one’s position in a given order. Rather, they follow 
an initial experience of “risk”: “Not to resist is not to think. Not to think is 
not to	risk	risking” (Metapolitics,	8; emphasis in original). A politics begins 
only after one names	the unknowable event that “breaks” one’s self by dis-
rupting the conventional narratives framing experience.16
 If queer theory is to strategically rethink liberalism’s biopolitical tenets, 
we must jettison frequent attachments to, and evocations of, revolutionary 
political attitudes. In their privileging of the security (or longed-for security) 
of an idealized, unflagging autonomy, too often many queer theorists reject 
vulnerability and true commonality.17 Queerness itself is mistaken for the 
cause of ethicopolitical disruption, rather than its effect. This confusion is 
part of queer theory’s political legacy. Before and during Gay Liberation, 
revolutionary theorists of queer subjectivity in the 1960s and 1970s claimed 
some power for themselves by embracing misperceptions about the threat-
ening nature of nonnormative sexuality and by playing upon the illegality of 
sodomy and other same-sex acts.18 Appropriating a homophobic discourse 
fearful and condemning of a supposedly dangerous eroticism, these authors 
aggravated Middle America’s homophobic dis-ease by associating homosex-
uality with an asocial criminality which everyone was susceptible to being 
victimized by. By unsettling the supposed security of heteronormative con-
ceptions of self and social mores, they hoped to advance their agenda of 
queer antipatriarchal and antisexist revolution. Theirs was “a total revolu-
tionary movement,” as Allen Young puts it in his essay for the epochal 1972 
anthology Out	of	the	Closets (“Out of the Closets, Into the Streets,” 24). Gay 
liberationists sought to “offer a truly permanent peace”; ironically, the road 
to such yearned-after civil serenity would be modeled on the rejection of 
gender-normative roles, in both social life and sexual play, that made gays, 
lesbians, and transgender persons “‘foreigners’ in their own culture” (ibid., 
20, 21). Thus, a misleading acceptance of their outlaw and outlawed posi-
tions was mistaken for a route to freedom.
 Similarly, today’s queer theorists often presume that political transfor-
mation begins with embodying or identifying as, rather than actually being 
seized by, the supposedly revolutionizing technologies of sex and the anti-
humanist (even depersonalizing or dehumanizing) force of desire. Lee Edel-
man’s controversial anti-identitarian manifesto No	Future (2004) exemplifies 
this trend.19 Opposing the reproductive familial underpinnings of pro-
gressive and future-oriented ideologies, Edelman rejects a gay and lesbian 
minority politics dominated by civil rights rhetoric. Instead he assumes the 
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position of the queer outlaw who chooses to be uncivil by embracing desire 
(in the Lacanian sense). He imagines this strategy to be a means of “enlarging 
the inhuman” (152; emphasis in original). Thus, his idealized queer theorist 
“situates his ethical register outside the recognizably human” and so undoes 
the presumed security of both personal identity and nationhood (ibid., 101). 
Echoing his forebears from the heyday of revolutionary politics and rhetoric, 
Edelman proclaims: “Fuck the social order and the Child in whose names 
we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie [i.e., the Broadway character who 
adulates “tomorrow”]; fuck the waif from Les	Mis; fuck the poor, innocent 
kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small [i.e., Cardinal 
Bernard Law and the law]; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations 
and the future that serves as its prop” (ibid., 29). Since Gay Liberation, queer 
thought’s dual legacy has been the production of such a blatant “fuck you” 
attitude coupled with the cooption of queer subjects’ demonized character-
izations as the very embodiments of a living risk.
 Such apocalyptic provocations of liberalist heteronormativity are not 
entirely surprising. In many ways, they attest to a realistic impetus for queer 
thought for decades. Since the Cold War, sexual minorities have occupied 
a place in the social imaginary in which they are thought to embody death 
in a variety of forms, ranging from a literal morbidity (HIV/AIDS-related 
afflictions) to figurative social constructs (the death of the family, the death 
of morality). Drawing on Agamben, we could say that queers in the United 
States have approximated the role of homo	sacer, whose literal embodiment 
of bare life (itself contiguous with death) leads to their exclusion from the 
citizenry’s metaphorical, civil body. In contrast, a fully enfranchised citizen 
is identified “as bearer of rights and, according to a curious oxymoron, as 
the new sovereign subject . . . can only be constituted as such through the 
repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation of the corpus, bare life, 
in himself ” (Agamben, Homo	Sacer,	124). We are compelled to prove our-
selves as entitled to full habeas	corpus, the basis of democratic civil and civic 
existence; and we can only do so if we demonstrate enough sovereign voli-
tion to keep life in check. Queers who fully embody vitalist forces, such as an 
“uncontrolled” or “uncontrollable” sexual desire or polymorphous perversity, 
are judged not to have contained and isolated within themselves the unruly 
life force (often called “desire”) threatening the heteronormative biopolitical 
order. In the early and mid-1980s the Reagan administration’s deathly silence 
about the HIV/AIDS pandemic judged queers to be not just expendable but 
actually worth	sacrificing so as to let the national majority’s well-being remain 
intact. The coalitional politics of seropositive subjects and other persons 
living with AIDS that arose as a response to this situation was a wellspring for 
queer theory’s original cross-disciplinary and ethicopolitical spirit.20
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 Even in today’s supposedly more tolerant social climate, those of us who 
are recognizably sexualized or gendered as queer still live in close prox-
imity to threat, self-endangerment, even death. Simply holding our partners’ 
hands in public, walking too closely or displaying too much affection for 
one another, or expressing desire for a stranger may provoke an epithet, a 
threat, or a more violent response. For transgendered subjects, even banali-
ties like choosing between sex-segregated public restrooms can incur bodily 
harm. Despite all the liberal cant, we are still judged by many to be high risks 
threatening the general population. A social queerness might be defined as 
that condition in which intimacy and the embrace of bodies and desires can 
become a death sentence. It is our ethical obligation to refuse to turn away 
from these realistic principles and the material actualities of loss, melancholy, 
threat, and vulnerability. These realities run through our lives, motivate our 
projects, and politicize our thinking. In Badiou’s terms, they have seized 
us and have recreated our basic understandings of humanity, community, 
nation and world, health, and welfare. We must be cautious, though. There is 
a significant difference between acknowledging the vulnerable condition of 
our lives and appropriating the ideologically laden position of homo	sacer, as 
many theorists and scholars have.21 Seizing what has seized us is a matter of 
assuming an agency in naming an injurious ethical paradigm, so as to force 
its proponents to claim responsibility and participate in its transformation. 
Merely appropriating that paradigm to vanquish it or, worse, to dissolve our 
selves is not an ethical form of seizure.
 Vulnerability can be realistically appreciated without reducing it to a 
painful or shameful condition. Edelman illustrates that some may reject this 
attitude out of hand because it seems to play into a heteronormative “fan-
tasy” perceived to be the root cause for “the defensive structure of the ego” 
(No	Future, 21, 14). Yet vulnerability does not just shore up heteronorma-
tive boundaries and liberalist egos. Actually, it is a multivalent condition 
and some of its forms might teach us surprising lessons about what is to 
be gained through our passions and our connections to others, our respec-
tive environments, and even language itself. To that end, it may be the key 
means of reimaginging what is at the heart of queerness, that elusive idea 
so central to queer theory since Michael Warner first coined it in Fear	of	a	
Queer	Planet. Queerness is more than a social experience of living in the 
biopolitical shadows. It is also an ethical attitude that resignifies the realistic 
circumstances of queer lives’ vulnerability. Rather than align such a critical 
queerness with a radical, voluntarist dissolution of the liberal subject, we 
should approach it as an embodied vulnerability that resignifies liberalism 
by rediscovering its agonistic connections with the other side of the demo-
cratic paradox: commonality.
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 Biopolitics’ glorification of liberalism and queer theorists’ propensity for 
revolutionary posturing both foreclose openness because they similarly insist 
on antagonistically and defensively securing boundaries at any cost. In con-
trast, living with others demands that we accept the prospect of being hurt 
because of the inherent insecurities of life and freedom. This is an equally 
realistic and resistant attitude, even though it precludes the adoption of an 
adversarial stance. Most importantly, this realism lets queer subjects work 
through the material conditions defining them so that they may find new 
points of contact with one another. Exploiting those discovered contacts, 
they can then work outward and assume a future orientation to rebuild their 
social universes together. Thus, they may collectively rescript possibilities 
for freedom and autonomy. The queer Jamaican-American writer Thomas 
Glave describes this scenario most pointedly. Despite all the injury we face 
in a warmongering, racist, and homophobic culture, he admits: “I cannot 
imagine living without hope, without some sort of faith, in other people, no 
matter what color they are, no matter whom they love or desire. Such faith 
requires that one live slightly precariously here and there, with vulnerability; 
it requires that one constantly risk being terribly hurt by others’ indifference 
to, and contempt for, one’s personhood and the personhood of those for 
whom one cares” (Words	to	Our	Now, 202). Our theoretic work must undo 
misbegotten ideas about sovereignty and security to find what Glave vulner-
ably—not naïvely—holds out for: hope. Therein begins a new queer ethic.
the Embodied Joys of similarity
We can begin to look for the hope attending a seemingly undesirable vul-
nerability by recognizing what is constructed as most at risk by the current 
regime of power: our private selves. At the heart of liberalism’s celebration 
of the atomistic person and her sovereign agency is an embrace of priva-
cy’s mythic sanctity and security. Shannon Winnubst notes that, in the civil 
sphere, liberalism marks a particularly proprietary form of private relations. 
“The language of rights derives from the overarching model of ownership.” 
Thus, “the modern project of liberal individualism thereby reads difference 
as that which can be, or ought to be, demarcated, delimited, enclosed—and 
owned” (Queering	Freedom, 42).22 The more one owns one’s self, the more 
one can assume the privileged status, on both ontological and civic levels, 
of what Winnubst calls the “neutral individual.” Such self-possession of a 
distinctive identity, one’s full realization of private personhood, ironically 
allows one to claim a recognizable, disembodied status. Conceived as merely 
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a husk, the body is imagined to block the view of the private mind that liber-
alist society exclusively privileges as evidence of a propertied, enfranchised 
citizen. That mind is culturally and ideologically conflated with the subject’s 
identity, which, in turn, is metonymically attached to a desire she supposedly 
can own and control.
 Privacy is thus the apparatus through which power is exercised over our 
most intimate experiences of our selves. Problems can arise because public 
space is always susceptible to being rescripted as a private domain. Contrary 
to what we might deduce from queer theory’s outlaw legacy, however, this 
resignification of the public is not always a consequence of one’s own willful 
introduction of one’s “private” and sometimes “inappropriate” desires to a pre-
viously forbidden public space. Those who possess a normative authority and 
agency still engage what Phillip Brian Harper terms a “regularized manipula-
tion of the public and private realms . . . in the myriad different contexts of 
our social life” (Private	Affairs, 82). To our disadvantage, even when we do not 
wish it, we might be judged as imposing our private selves upon a public cul-
ture where we are regarded as foreign, estranging, uncivil, lewd, uncivilized, 
or treacherous.23 An ethical reappraisal of liberalism should start with the 
recognition that the sacrosanct private sphere is not an abstract, metaphys-
ical, or intellectual space removed from the civil or public spheres. Rather, 
embodiment itself blurs the line between the supposedly distinct spheres of 
public and private experience. We	are	always	public	 entities,	 even	when	we	
believe	we’re	 in	 the	most	 intimate	or	private	of	 situations. A critical queer-
ness emerges from the recognition or experience of this condition, and the 
consequential unveiling of liberalism’s supreme fiction of private autonomy. 
“Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for 
which we struggle are not quite ever only our own,” Judith Butler reminds us. 
“The body has its invariably public dimension; constituted as a social phe-
nomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine” (Undoing	Gender, 
21). Through our bodies, our privacy is always being read by others . . . much 
like the content of a lyric poem. (I will return to the central role lyric plays 
in all this shortly.) If we cannot determine what parts of our “private” selves 
are so examined, then the censorious selectivity underpinning civil liberties’ 
attachment to a propertied and proper existence of exclusive ownership and 
right should be regarded as utterly fictitious and disempowering.
 Our private lives are folded into a public sphere, and that publicity is 
folded, in turn, into others’ private realms through their own embodied 
living. The primary condition of civic life hinges on a paradox: what is an 
other’s intrinsic privacy is also extrinsically ours to share. Our freedom, our 
very lives depend on the degree to which we respect others’ differences not 
as absolute categories but as in-forming our senses of self. According to a 
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liberalist logic of identity, we depend on others to define us as different and 
integrally singular individuals. I know that I can identify as “I” because “I” 
am not “you” because “you” are intrinsically different from “me.” This is an 
idea of difference that, as Winnubst would say, we can own. Coupled with 
this rather commonsensical notion of the antonymous yet inevitable rela-
tion between identity and difference, though, is the sense that we depend on 
others because they facilitate our changing sense of our living selves. As Butler 
formulates it, another “makes a claim on me” by asking me for an account of 
myself (Who are you?). Simultaneously, this other raises my consciousness 
that I am a conditioned being because she asks that question “in a language 
that is impersonal and that belongs to historically changing horizons of intel-
ligiblity.” This language, shared between me and my other, brings to light “an 
enigma, a foreignness, that is ours without ever belonging to us” (Giving	an	
Account	of	Oneself, 134). I want to emphasize that this “primary opacity to 
the subject,” which Butler defines as dividing the subject and providing the 
ontological basis for an ethic, begins in an awareness of intimacy with, and 
a proximity to, others (ibid., 20). Such opacity is not only the product of a 
verbal or otherwise discursive address but is also corporeal.24 Without our 
others’ being-there, we would never have had the opportunity to discover the 
joy of who we are or who we will (or can) become. Some part of our “proper” 
intrinsic selves is folded into them. That is the difference from ourselves that 
we cannot own. Hence, that attribute is actually im-proper and folds into 
what “properly” defines, and supposedly wholly distinguishes, others from 
us. We cannot identify with or definitively appropriate the qualities of these 
simultaneously common properties and estranging improprieties. They are 
what Gilles Deleuze characterizes as the limits producing the very possibility 
of individuality. Rather than an atomistic, bounded being, the individual is 
a cluster effect, a multiple or a haeccity. We might trope the chief conceit of 
one of Deleuze’s favorite American authors, Walt Whitman, to say that we 
should im-properly imagine our selves as living	multitudinously. Individu-
ally, each of us exists as a process of becoming through one’s foldings into 
and out of others, through the variability of our shifting connections.25
 The promiscuous, recurrent production of those foldings is risky, for it 
renders our relations, and thus our selves, increasingly stranger. In our con-
tacts with others and the outside world, we are always touching our selves 
queerly. In our encounters with what’s outside, we rub up against and happen 
upon features similar to those constituting our selves. Such similarities are 
both familiar and unfamiliar because they are found elsewhere and thus are 
inflected with a difference that marks them as not ours. Because those attri-
butes which we bodily communicate with the world around us also belong 
to some other, our contacts cause us to exit our selves (and do so joyfully, at 
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that). As is the case with Badiou’s subject, who claims fidelity to an idea that 
seizes it, we are captured by those objects that transport us beyond our limits 
by awakening in us a sense of our extensiveness and similarity with what we 
usually deem “alter.” A paradoxically estranging likeness offers the inviting 
prospect of a life that approaches a better good. We touch a difference within 
our selves via similarities found elsewhere, and so an ethic emerges upon 
our becoming intimately familiar with—yet unable to wholly know or pos-
sess—what’s “outside.”
 While the lessons we learn from vulnerability often do owe much to the 
grave circumstances conditioning us and supplying the limits for our own 
self-definition, this other mode of vulnerability that urges us to traverse lines 
of difference are welcomed, desired, and	invited.26 We long for that different 
body which joyfully brings a similarity that frees us from the bounded priva-
cies mandated by a liberalist culture and a biopolitical state. This prospect 
of welcoming a risky condition brings to mind Hannah Arendt, that figure 
who influenced Michael Warner’s early articulation of the ethics underlying 
the antisocial stance of queer theory. But the Arendt in my mind is quite dif-
ferent from Warner’s. Mine is the one who finds vulnerability to be more than 
simply a condition attending romantic love (which she, perhaps problemati-
cally, believes is isolating). Instead, vulnerability can also produce a feeling for 
political collectivity. It is the root cause of courage, wherein all politics origi-
nates. In Greek antiquity, the individual’s decision to enter the unpredictable 
space of the polis meant leaving behind the securities of the household’s abso-
lutely private space, the only place where one’s power and sovereignty were 
certain. To be a citizen was to embrace a form of risk: “Only that man was 
free who was prepared to risk his own life” by taking leave of the home, that 
dominion where life was defined and secure (Arendt, The	Promise	of	Politics, 
122).27 Oxymoronically, though, that privacy is now a feature of our political 
lives. Turning one’s attention to the polis proper, to the nation-state, does not 
mark a courageous escape from the securities of a private bounded and sov-
ereign home space. Since the Cold War, the chief problem of government has 
been that the nation-state figures itself as a macro-scale version of the home. 
Publicity recedes in the face of what Arendt terms a “society” that upholds a 
liberalist idealization of privacy and atomistic sovereignty. The right to a pri-
vate and fully knowable existence is mistaken for acting responsibly. Political 
possibilities, however, arise in our critical reflection on our exposure to social 
institutions. Rather than look for a world apart, as Arendt tended to, we can 
look for an alternative ethos by embracing a hopeful courage, by regarding 
our bodies as instruments for redefining a social emphasis on privacy as an 
experience of a kind of publicity.
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 Vulnerability promotes such courageous public living. To appreciate it 
is to pursue an adventure in commonality, to sidestep the temptation of 
mourning the passing of a seemingly authentic (yet utterly illusory and ideo-
logical) privacy. Our public contacts with others bring vulnerabilities that do 
not just result in private injury; they can also bring publicly and personally 
transformative joys, an attitude that Spinoza characterizes as “always good” 
(Ethics,	258, proposition 42). Deleuze teaches us that Spinoza offers the basis 
of a “Postcartesian philosophy” (Expressionism	in	Philisophy, 335) wherein 
“adventitious affections,” or those joyful passions arising from our embodied 
living, are the “occasional causes” of new forms of rationality and action 
(ibid., 307). Understood to be a passionate condition that will eventually 
realize an active joy, vulnerability can offer a degree of pleasure that—unlike 
any other pleasurably affective emotion—“consists in the fact that all parts 
of the body are equally affected. That is, it consists in the fact that the body’s 
power of acting is increased or helped” (Spinoza, Ethics, 257–58, proposition 
42). We can push our understanding of pleasure, then, beyond the self-shat-
tering of jouissance cherished by many queer theorists as the chief means of 
rising above a compulsory cultural individuation. A Spinozist or Deleuzian 
sense of joy augments individuals. It reinforces singularities without ego-
istic inflation because it raises private beings’ consciousness of their extrinsic 
connections to others.
 Perhaps “joy” seems too individualizing for our purposes because it tends 
to promote the health and well-being of only one	particular body. It would 
be better to cast this “joy” as a sense of possibility for collectivity, rather than 
a rejoicing at the opening of possibilities for the individual alone. If contact 
is the precondition for such joy, it is less individuating and isolating than 
even what Spinoza had imagined. What is more, we might more easily move 
beyond a notion of an affective joy found through corporeal contacts with 
objects. This quality is also bodily experienced through verbal contacts. A 
queerly common joy is poetically	voiced, a textual grain hearkening back to 
the singular body from which it originated and affecting the auditor or reader 
who encounters the trace of that voice. For this reason, poetry reminds us of 
the possibilities for pursuing action through our passionate living, without 
necessitating that we surrender a realistic view of the dangers to which we 
are routinely exposed. “Without the unity prescribed by the poem,” Badiou 
notes, “we are buffeted by waves of sadness. Thus, there is a principle of joy 
in the poem, an active principle” (The	Century, 21).28 It is in poetry, then, 
that we can find a means to articulate vulnerability not just as a cause for our 
sorrows and pains, but also as the beginning of common joys and newfound 
freedoms. Poetry can help us ethically re-vision and re-form liberalism.
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Lyric’s Lessons about Living metaphorically
Henry Abelove has argued that we have forgotten the anti-imperialism of Gay 
Liberation because social historians of gay and lesbian politics occlude how 
that movement appropriated the antinationalistic spirit of exilic queer North 
American literary writers such as Paul and Jane Bowles, James Baldwin, and 
Elizabeth Bishop (Deep	Gossip, 70–88). Similarly, I believe that we can learn 
much about the past political histories and future possibilities of vulnera-
bility if we explore poetry, that literary discourse veritably shunned by much 
queer theory and queer studies.29 Poets past and present have resisted liber-
alism’s various historical manifestations. Lyric is particularly equipped for 
such projects since it sets itself apart from other discursive modes through 
its renunciation of modernity’s imperatives of rationality and its consequen-
tial blurring of the lines between public and private. As the contemporary 
poet Nathaniel Mackey reminds us, the importance of modern and contem-
porary poetry is owed to its ability to “other” its readers, to raise a general 
consciousness of “the dynamics of agency and attribution by which other-
ness is brought about and maintained.” He continues, “Artistic othering has 
to do with innovation, invention, and change, upon which cultural health 
and diversity depend and thrive” (Discrepant	Engagement, 265). Extending 
Mackey’s thought, we could say that poetry’s othering is a product of how 
lyric improperly draws the seemingly unrelated object even closer and thus 
resignifies understandings of the “proper” and “private.” It lets differences 
discrepantly point to those similarities connecting us to others and does 
so without colonizing the other or overwriting crucial distinctions. That is 
to say, lyric puts into relief the inherent vulnerabilities of social conditions. 
“Cultural health and diversity,” then, can be promoted through the study of 
how past poetries reject the stabilities of rigid modes of identification as they 
pursue dynamism and difference.
 It might seem counterintuitive to align lyric with ethical efforts to disrupt 
liberalist imperatives that individuals secure integral, fixed selves. Doesn’t 
it necessitate a subjective I, imbued with an unsurpassed linguistic agency? 
Doesn’t such verse implicitly celebrate the private and self-possessed person? 
In his essay “On Lyric Poetry and Society,” Theodor Adorno admits that the 
bourgeois and modern ideals of liberal individualism do, indeed, ground the 
genre; however, he also reminds us that poetry’s linguistic material allows 
for a self-reflexive criticism of its liberalist basis. Because “language remains 
the medium of concepts,” all lyric possesses an “inescapable relationship to 
the universal and to society,” no matter how abstract or how individualistic 
it appears (Adorno, Notes	to	Literature, 43). In fact, it “is always the subjec-
tive expression of a social antagonism” (ibid., 45). In lyric, the irreconcilable 
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contradictions of social structures speak through authors’ voicing of their 
singular experiences. Often those expressions are not fully comprehensible: 
this is the basis of the aesthetic artifact’s inscrutable nature. Nevertheless, 
social institutions’ motivating presence remains legible even in texts’ choked 
silences or mumblings. This echo or trace supplies the foundation of what 
Adorno terms elsewhere art’s “immanent critique,” its “double character” 
of attempting to reject empirical reality even though it is produced out of 
that same reality (Aesthetic	Theory, 251, 227).30 Even the seemingly most 
individualistic or asocial lyric aspires to transcend the liberalist idealizations 
enabling its production.
 Others have noted how lyric has been used in the United States, specifi-
cally, to contest ideological constructions of privacy. In the decades before 
the New Deal, sometimes that resistance came in the form of poems explic-
itly advocating a socialist welfare state.31 Later, during the Cold War, privacy 
would become, as Deborah Nelson argues, “an increasingly incoherent con-
cept, which proved both troubling and, paradoxically, very valuable” (Pur-
suing	Privacy	 in	Cold	War	America, 4). It was the very idea on which the 
difference between “democracy” and “communism” depended, and govern-
ment and law were devoted to preserving privacy as a sacrosanct foundation 
for democratic individualism. Many poets saw their work as contributing to 
more than individualistic or counterpublic interventions in some monolithic 
public sphere. Instead, they regarded poetry as a vehicle for what Nelson 
calls “the proliferation of privacies” (ibid., xiv). Rather than reject Romantic 
lyricism, confessional poets such as Sylvia Plath, Anne Sexton, and Robert 
Lowell advocated the lyric subject’s autonomy. However, their adoption of a 
conventional lyricism did not reproduce a dominant liberalism; instead, it 
multiplied available forms and understandings of privacy and thus gener-
ated resistant differences. Nelson insightfully recasts the liberalist dynamic 
of identity politics as contesting, rather than merely reinforcing, reified con-
structs of liberalism and private citizenship. Confessional lyric supplied a 
paradoxically visible privacy for disenfranchised subjects, especially women, 
gays, and lesbians. A bid for privacy could be made by those who were pro-
scribed, both ideologically and legally, from an exclusive and exceptional 
sense of “patriarchal privacy” that guaranteed rights and citizenship only to 
particular sorts of individuals (i.e., white, middle-class males) (ibid., xiii). 
Deemed inappropriate and too revealing, poetic disclosure draws atten-
tion to the fullness of citizens’ otherwise censored interior lives. Excluded, 
improper citizens turned to lyric to represent the paradoxes underlying a 
Cold War sense of “a private self that is perpetually monitored by others”; 
thus, they exposed the extent to which “privacy” is itself a fiction (ibid., 30).
 But our senses of what privacy is, or what it could become, are not prolif-
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erated only by confessional lyric modes. Much modernist and experimental 
lyric produced during and since the Cold War draws our attention to how 
language mediates and redefines our “public” lives by bringing it ever closer 
to our “private” selves. It does so by bringing the foreign and the external, 
what is im-proper to our selves, home through our bodies. That is, these 
other examples of lyric foreground the embodied production and reception 
of poetry to generate the contact and folding, the joyful similarity, I described 
earlier. Opposing Jacques Derrida’s early claims about the problematically 
metaphysical nature of speech,	Adriana Cavarero argues that vocality, one 
aspect of speech, actually counters Western metaphysical logic. Originating 
in the cavity of the singular body, the voice is “the musical way in which 
the speaker cannot help but communicate him- or herself by invoking and 
convoking the other” (For	More	Than	One	Voice, 180). Such a calling-to-
presence need not be understood as granting the individual primacy; thus, it 
need not be read as reinforcing the foundation for liberalism and its human-
istic faith in integral, inviolable personhood. Voice, working together with 
the body in the public space of democratic life, draws others close and so 
opens one’s self to new vulnerabilities. A different ethic originates in this 
solicitation, seduction, contact.32 But Cavarero falls shy of developing what 
I am about to suggest: The	voiced	word—the	lyric	verse	that	exists	somewhere	
between	writing	and	song—is	especially	suited	for	opening	one’s	self	to	others. 
Modern	lyric	introduces	difference	into	our	identities,	rather	than	allows	hege-
monic	and	containing	mechanisms	of	identity-based	understandings	of	differ-
ence	to	domesticate	what	is	most	strange	about	our	selves. Poetry constitutes 
a fold between two otherwise intrinsic selves. It does not simply signal the 
existence of singularities (I	am	here,	you	are	there,	and	we	are	independently	
changing); instead, it uses a tertiary body, a textual one, to signify different 
parties’ co-relation (we	are	and	are	becoming,	together).33
 Modern and contemporary lyricists continually contest the boundaries 
between public and private by publicizing sentiment, publishing affect, ren-
dering privacies both visible and audible. And they do so by foregrounding 
how we are vulnerable not only because of the embodied conditions of our 
lives, but also because of a similar set of linguistic conditions. Whether 
characterized as political liberalism, communicative rationality, or a more 
decorous civil moralism, our tendency to depict our civic lives as limited to 
a sphere of civility erects exclusivist boundaries and thus circumscribes pos-
sibilities for reimagining citizenship. Our encounters with poetry loosen us 
from any claims to absolute privacy or linguistic mastery. Thus, they qualify 
our steadfast democratic faith in individualist sovereignty. Consequently, our 
reading experiences instruct us in how to live in a critical relationship with 
our selves and our communities. Lyricism provides ethical lessons that ulti-
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mately bear a political importance, even if the political narratives expressly 
communicated by the poems themselves are dated, incomprehensible, or 
unheard. It dispossesses us of our claims to any absolutely proprietary rela-
tionship to our selves.
∼ 
Queering	Cold	War	Poetry explores the writings of Wallace Stevens, José 
Lezama Lima, Robert Duncan, and Severo Sarduy, four poets who reflect 
on how lyric helps individuals discover new relations to their respective 
nations and the world. Even if some of them explicitly reference it as a key 
concept informing their poetics, implicitly they imagine poetry as helping 
us imagine a more vulnerable mode of relation. If queer theorists let them-
selves be seized by these writers’ ideas about ethics and similarity, perhaps 
we, too, can expand our critical vocabulary and reappraise vulnerability’s 
worth to our own intellectual and political pursuits. Oddly enough, my 
thinking about queer vulnerability began with my encounters with Stevens, 
a canonical straight writer. In his own day, he had become enamored with 
the queer literature of a nation that disrupted his own sense of selfhood. 
As the most metaphorical of American modernists, Stevens had a formi-
dable direct and indirect influence on a transnational poetic line interested 
in elaborating ethics of vulnerability. That exposure could come in any of a 
number of aspects of one’s day-to-day life, but Stevens’s work emphasizes 
that vulnerability begins in our reading practices wherein we open ourselves 
to others’ imaginaries and imaginations. Lyric, he believed, points to those 
resemblances that cause us to find likeness-in-difference. This condition of 
similarity disrupts normative and binding forms of group identification.
 Stevens himself may not have been homosexual, but the degree to which 
his poetic rethinking of identity and difference garnered responses from 
later generations of queer writers warrants his place in this study of vulner-
ability as a kind of critical queerness. Indeed, it was his correspondence with 
the gay Cuban editor José Rodríguez Feo that prompted him to articulate the 
eroticized pleasures of reading as a resistance to the ready-made categories 
of identity and nation. Rodríguez Feo brought Stevens’s reflections about 
resemblance and vulnerability home with him, and he shared them with 
José Lezama Lima, his co-editor at the vanguardist little magazine Orígenes. 
The two had published Stevens in their magazine’s pages, and his influence 
on the group brings into relief the origenistas’ postcolonial resistance to the 
imperialistic spread of norteamericano	ideas about the invulnerable and pri-
vate citizen-subject. Often misread as apolitical, in all actuality these Cuban 
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vanguardists developed an intensely politicized ethos through their art. 
Lezama, in particular, was instrumental in this effort. Drawing on Stevens’s 
lessons about the potential of metaphor to pleasurably unsettle established 
identificatory logics, the great Cuban lyricist developed a complex poetic 
system that doubles as a queer ethical philosophy. Coding queer desire as 
a “secret,” Lezama’s poetics unsettle the liberalist consensus defining the 
national culture of the Cuban Republic prior to the 1959 Revolution.
 The later homosexual poets Robert Duncan and Severo Sarduy were avid 
readers of Stevens and Lezama, respectively. Their work engages, implicitly 
(in Duncan’s case) or explicitly (in Sarduy’s), their predecessors’ poetic ethics 
of vulnerability. Each moves vulnerability away from a too close associa-
tion with the particular lyric device of metaphor and instead associates it 
more closely with that condition which metaphor produces: a field of resem-
blance. Similarity and resemblance are postulated not only as necessary for 
furthering the ability of lyric to generally shake up the foundations of iden-
tification, but also to specifically link that disruption to the production of a 
collective climate more amicable to queer desires and subjects. That hopeful 
look toward a queer-friendly future is not synonymous with a liberal desire 
for a democratic safe space within the national civil sphere. Rather, it calls 
for a dynamic remapping of public spaces as simultaneously private ones. 
Such reconfigurations allow for a proliferation of intimacies and desires 
that insist we continually recognize, rather than try to deny, our continual 
vulnerabilities. We must take advantage of that condition in order to trans-
form integral, commonplace understandings of nationhood and citizenry. 
In this way, we might find a new faith for individualism not based on the 
liberalist imperative that we care for ourselves and the people by shoring up 
our boundaries, our borders, our skins through a hard-and-fast identitarian 
logic that is more afraid of difference than accepting of it.
 Read together, these four writers give us a glimpse into what past lyricists 
have imagined about the possibilities of vulnerability and similarity. Their 
work can school contemporary queer theory in the joys of rediscovering 
commonality, of learning what it means to live metaphorically, so that we 
might move beyond liberalism’s constraints and exclusions. We begin our 
hopeful examination by considering the case of Wallace Stevens, a hetero-
sexual North American poet who discovered the rather queer pleasures of 
his similarity to, and an unlikely poetic alliance with, a Cuban vanguard.
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s modernism’s foremost celebrant of the imagination, Wallace Ste-
vens might be mistaken for an aesthete dilettante, a steadfast meta-
physician, or an escapist. Yet, after the publication of his first book, 
Harmonium (1923), he moved away from a symbolist “pure” poetry 
and was less remiss about openly referencing political and social actuali-
ties.1 Mindful of reports of the Spanish Civil War’s atrocities, in the 1930s he 
consciously began to negotiate the realism preferred by the radical literary 
Left. He assumed a more socially critical position, which Alan Filreis has 
described as that of a “representative ‘middle-ground’ writer teaching him-
self to read the radical cultural position from right to left” (Modernism	from	
Right	 to	Left,	30).2 It would be misguided to equate this “middle ground” 
position with any sort of progressive agenda, though. Politically speaking, 
Stevens remains very much in the middle, in what I would identify as a lib-
eral space. But his later work attempts to arrive at a different sort of ethical 
relationship with liberalism, evident in how his poetry and poetics rearticu-
late individualism and agency.
 Generally, interwar and postwar life in the United States was character-
ized by a conflicted relationship to the shifting nature of democratic ideals. 
Liberalist attitudes were openly attacked by the era’s political radicals, and 
were redefined by the New Deal and other policies that attempted to disso-
ciate democracy from laissez-faire capitalism. Joseph Harrington has argued 
that Stevens’s lyric extends his professional duties at the Hartford Insurance 
and Indemnity Company into the realm of poetic discourse so as to erect 
poetry as a bulwark protecting the writer’s economically liberalist interests 
A
intrinsic Coupling 
Wallace Stevens and the 
Pleasures of Correspondence
C h a P t E r  1
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from the welfare state’s more collectivist realities. In this way, Harrington 
believes, Stevens used his writing to “privatize not just government functions 
but the rest of life as well” (Poetry	and	 the	Public,	84). “Insecure” in light 
of the Depression, unconvinced of socialist democracy’s strength in light 
of the Spanish Civil War, threatened by Social Security’s impingement on 
his own legal career, he offers poetic insurance against those “public events 
[which] threaten the privacy, individuality, and safety of the reader” (ibid., 
95). I share Harrington’s assessment that liberalist ideals favoring the private 
subject were the truths of Stevens’s day, even of his professional life; thus, 
they do register recognizable effects on his poetry. I do not believe, how-
ever, that Stevens was poetically invested in a conservative notion of privacy 
or privatization. His is a case (not unknown to many of us in academia, I 
might add) where professional and intellectual interests conflict. Without 
endorsing either radical or New Deal platforms, Stevens’s lyric still struggles 
to critically	and ethically evaluate the U.S. citizen-subject’s relationship to 
liberalism and its tenets of private individualism, coherent identity, and, 
most especially, nationalism. He saw his work as staging what he terms an 
intervention	in ideas about, and experiences of, the world as he and his fellow 
Americans knew it.
 In “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words” (1942), Stevens observes 
that “the social obligation so strongly urged [by writers and critics] is a 
phase of the pressure of reality which a poet . . . is bound to resist or evade 
today” (NA	28). The high premium his contemporaries placed on socialist 
or empirical realism in literature propagates a “state of violence” akin to that 
executed by militaristic nation-states during the Second World War (NA	
26). As Stevens’s familiar adage runs in “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” 
(also published in 1942), poetry “must be abstract” (CP	380). Despite that 
abstraction, though, he would maintain that “the imagination and society 
are inseparable” (NA	28). Clearly, in their avoidance of realism’s violence, his 
imaginative figures are intended as ethical responses to social particulars.3 J. 
Hillis Miller even characterizes Stevens as charging poets with the responsi-
bility for discovering a new “democratic and American” possibility (Topog-
raphies, 281). Due to our poet’s own emphasis on the contextualized nature 
of that discovery, though, we should not see his democratic ethics merely as 
a rhetorical “act of place taking” (ibid., 277), through which “the performa-
tive power of language” works to “bring about the magical appearance of a 
‘world’ with all of its topographical attributes” (ibid., 276). Rather than per-
formatively conjuring a new world ex	nihilo, Stevens might be better imag-
ined as changing the contours of the existing republic. Like John Dewey, he 
is interested in imagining reform so as to produce the Great Community, “a 
society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences 
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of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of that word, so that 
an organized, articulate Public comes into being” (Dewey, The	Public	and	
Its	Problems,	184). For both the philosopher and the poet, this artful and 
visionary project of building new publics is explicitly critical of certain con-
temporary forms of liberalism.4 Stevens’s emphasis, though, is on the process 
of discovery rather than the end product itself. The final nature of his Great 
Community remains unknown, yet its mere promise helps reshape under-
standings of democratic individualism. Instead of place taking or even place 
making, then, he explores how “the imagining of community takes place,” as 
one critic puts it (Quinn, Gathered	beneath	the	Storm, 4).
 “Every image is an intervention on the part of the image-maker,” Ste-
vens remarks in “Imagination as Value” (1948, NA	128). The imagination’s 
capacity to intervene in daily life owes to its being “the irrepressible revolu-
tionist”; every poem is testimony to “the power of the mind over the pos-
sibilities of things” (NA	152, 136). It would seem that his ethic is rooted in 
thinking about social codes and discourses. However, I want to distinguish 
this from a meditative, neo-Kantian reflection. The power of Stevens’s poetic 
thinking owes less to a metaphysical capacity for rational, categorical judg-
ment at a remove from things as they are; instead, it owes more to the fact 
that thinking occurs in social contexts. That is to say, thinking	is	an	embodied	
experience	of	one’s	material	conditions. As “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” 
qualifies poetry’s abstract nature, lyric is actually “[a]n abstraction blooded” 
(CP	385). The imagination’s ability to stage social interventions develops 
from the poet’s “congenital” perspective (NA 136). In “Effects of Analogy” 
(1948), Stevens elaborates on this idea by noting that “poets are born not 
made”; that is, a poetic sensibility is a “problem of his [i.e., the poet’s] mind 
and nerves” (NA	122). In a strange turn, though, he undercuts poets’ seem-
ingly fixed, aristocratic privilege by also linking them bodily to the very pop-
ulace from which they are supposedly distinct, by nature. “It may be that the 
poet’s congenital subject is precisely the community and other people” since, 
in the end, the writer is “inseparable” from what she writes about (NA	123).
 Such a congenital bond does not mean that lyric must reproduce a 
community’s values. If it does, it isn’t really poetry; it then would be mere 
“propaganda on behalf of the community and other people” (NA 122). The 
imagination compels true poets to look through, and then beyond, the social 
immediacies into which they are born. The national culture, the popula-
tion, the community as it is known all pose significant and inevitable limits 
to that imaginative enterprise; but instead of foreclosing the possibility of 
change, those limits spur a writer to take advantage of her singular perspec-
tive in order to find, imaginatively, difference in what’s on hand. Writing of 
the local and commonplace, modern poets introduce new realities. Their 
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perspectives let others find “satisfaction” with such simple things as “a man 
skating, a woman dancing, a woman / Combing” (“Of Modern Poetry,” 1939; 
CP	239–40). This turn to common pleasures does not signal Stevens’s aban-
donment of the polis; rather, it indicates his desire to use pleasure and the 
familiar to change the larger order of things. To redress the wartime and 
postwar crises posed by nationalism, though, “the speech of the place” (“Of 
Modern Poetry”)—even “the place” itself—had to be redefined and rendered 
unfamiliar. The people to whom the poet congenitally belongs, as a matter 
of body and birthright, are not to be understood as merely a nationally cir-
cumscribed population. Rather, he belongs to, and works on the behalf of, a 
more global imaginary.
 Foreign, potentially estranging elements were already a part of North 
American cultural life in the 1930s and 1940s. In political discourse, the 
word “American” was beginning to be used to denote a hemispheric, not 
just a national, locale separate from the Second World War’s European the-
ater. Early on, though, Stevens moved rather hesitantly toward establishing 
a poetic commonality with the South. When faced with the task of selecting 
one of his poems to appear in translation in the Argentinean magazine Sur, 
Stevens confessed to his friend Henry Church that “I cannot say that I have 
the slightest understanding of anything in South America. In a general way, I 
have a feeling that the people down there are not yet themselves” (LWS	418). 
When he finished composing “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” he sent it 
off to Sur to help his neighbors construct their selves, as well as to allay his 
own insecurities about “the difficulty of writing a poem definitely addressed 
to South Americans” (LWS	418). Despite his initial doubts, however, “Notes” 
does find a way to relate to Latin American audiences. Significantly, Stevens 
describes the hemispheric relation between North and South as an “intrinsic 
couple.” As is the case with the other mentioned couples of “sun and rain” 
and “two lovers,” the geopolitical entities are related in a disjunctive synthesis, 
not a dialectical one. That is to say, they are paired in an aporetic dependence	
resulting from, and maintaining, their fundamental differences: “Two things 
of opposite nature seem to depend / On one another” (CP	392).
 Eventually, Stevens would reassess his idea that the South lacked an iden-
tity against which the North contrapuntally defined itself. On occasion, it is 
true, he still pined nostalgically for the comforts and securities only national 
fraternity can supply; but, increasingly, his poetry and poetics would dem-
onstrate his conviction that his and his countrymen’s own secure, liberalist 
sense of identity was itself a problematic fiction.5 That shift in attitude owed 
much to the correspondence he conducted between December 1944 and 
February 1955 with José Rodríguez Feo, one of the founders of the Cuban 
little magazine Orígenes. The story of this unlikely epistolary exchange, first 
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brought to light over twenty years ago by Beverly Coyle and Alan Filreis, 
founds a neglected North-South genealogy in modernist poetry.6 Stevens’s 
contact with the origenistas would influence, directly and indirectly, later 
writers’ queer resistances to liberalist notions of autonomous selfhood, 
sovereign nationalism, and security.7 Over the course of that decade-long 
exchange, Stevens recognized the North’s similarities	to its southern neigh-
bors as unsettling the commonalities of his day-to-day life in Connecticut; 
for that reason, Cuba and the relations it inspired gave him pleasure. Thus, 
his hypothetical poet’s congenital nature was not fated but instead was sub-
ject to change, as his perceptions of his circumstances shifted. This muta-
bility enabled poets to help quell the Cold War’s increasingly nationalistic 
zeal, by intervening in the North American public’s understandings of their 
individual freedoms and collective possibilities.
the Cuba of the self
Stevens’s southward turn in the 1940s marked a new phase of his longtime 
fascination with the Spanish Caribbean and the Hispanic borderlands of 
Florida and the Keys.8 Initially, that private thrall had been enabled by impe-
rialist policies which founded some of the Caribbean islands as indepen-
dent republics and commonwealths while, at the same time, discursively and 
institutionally folding them into the North American political and economic 
fabric. Appended to the Cuban Republic’s constitution, the Platt Amend-
ment (passed 1903; abrogated 1934) established the United States’ right to 
intervene in local politics, to determine the supposedly sovereign nation’s 
boundaries, to regularize Cuba’s trade with other countries, and even to 
manage its infrastructure for waste disposal so as to hamper the spread of 
disease to the Northern mainland. Another critical piece of legislation was 
the Jones-Shafroth Act (1917), which granted the residents of Puerto Rico 
qualified status as U.S. citizens with only limited representation in Congress 
and no Electoral College votes.9
 In retrospect, it is apparent that a nascent biopolitical logic structured 
the political, economic, and even cultural management of Cuba’s and Puerto 
Rico’s respective populations as dependencies. This governmental strategy 
constructed semi-permeable, rather than fully permeable, boundaries that 
safeguarded the Northern population while allowing for a freer transnational 
movement of capital. It also permitted greater imperialistic control over the 
mobility of the Caribbean territories’ residents, products, even waste. These 
acts and amendments did not really cordon off the South, then; instead, 
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they produced new political imaginaries and infrastructures that affected 
Northern trade, tourism, and business, and that encouraged norteameri-
canos’ residential colonization of the Caribbean. Consequently, new forms 
of contact—one could say new intimacies—emerged between the popula-
tions of the mainland and the islands. Until the late 1920s, norteamericanos 
found their Caribbean neighbors to be familiar and foreign, and, for the 
most part, that was deemed to be a manageable difference. With the onset of 
the Great Depression in 1929, those familiarities were popularly perceived as 
unbearable similarities. White, middle-class U.S. citizens found themselves 
on the socioeconomic margins previously imagined to be occupied only by 
racial and ethnic minorities at home and by citizens of the so-called “banana 
republics” and territories in the global south. Capitalism was revealed to be 
a faulty system, and meritocracy was exposed as a myth.10
 Narratives and domestic policies suggesting the general populace’s 
reactionary xenophobia and nationalistic nativism threatened the plural-
ized sense of American nationhood that had begun to emerge prior to the 
Depression. International initiatives and progressive politics that demon-
strated quite the opposite attitude were reassessed.11 Spurred by anxieties 
that the European war would spread to the Americas, the earlier admin-
istrative rhetoric of economic reciprocity between North and South—a 
“reciprocity” ultimately benefiting the United States—fell into disuse. It was 
replaced with an “idea of continental solidarity” that forged a united front 
in the Americas against the external	threats of fascism and totalitarianism 
(Wood, The	Making	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	314).12 It was the age of the 
Good Neighbor Policy, a hemispheric vision first introduced at the 1933 
Montevideo Pan American Conference by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull. Swearing not to intervene militarily in Latin America’s external or 
internal affairs, and adopting noninterference strategies forbidding the use 
of sanctions, loans, or even verbal disapproval to influence foreign nations’ 
domestic politics, the northern giant adopted a multilateral approach that 
sought to resuscitate the Monroe Doctrine’s original spirit.13 As the fed-
eral government reassessed its international role as an administrative and 
imperialist nation-state, unlikely progressive alliances were forged at home, 
too. During the Second World War, the U.S. Communist Party’s anti-fascist 
commitment forced it to evolve into a “considerably larger and ideologically 
looser Popular Front left that shaded into mainstream liberalism” (Gosse, 
Where	the	Boys	Are, 20). Rhetorical ambivalences, “with highly ambiguous 
connotations,” resulted across the political spectrum as popular political 
movements adopted the language of “inter-American solidarity” deployed 
by the FDR administration (ibid., 21).
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 This moment of political commonality across party or ideological lines 
and geopolitical boundaries was short-lived. Beginning with the CIA-
sponsored coup of Guatemala’s communist government in 1948, the Good 
Neighbor Policy would be misrepresented as including, rather than out-
lawing, interference measures such as covert operations, economic support, 
and trade sanctions. It would be treated as an extension of the 1947 Truman 
Doctrine’s official inauguration of containment policies to stop the spread 
of Soviet influence. To that end, it was cited as a premise for the suppres-
sion of all “revolutionary nationalism,” whether or not particular Southern 
revolutions had communist aims (Green, The	Containment	of	Latin	America, 
292).14 Similarly, the United States’ heterogeneous Popular Front would meet 
its own end as civil struggles for group identity rights were attached increas-
ingly to politically progressive (though ontologically liberalist) agendas, 
beginning as early as the mid-1950s. Earlier forms of political liberalism 
would inform a much more conservative Cold War ideology espousing an 
American exceptionalism and a strong individualism based on capitalistic 
democratic ideals.15
 Despite the conservatism that resurfaced during the Cold War, Wallace 
Stevens demonstrated his continuing commitment to the previous decades’ 
political conviction that North and South do, indeed, constitute an intrinsic 
couple. This first principle was a product of his general belief that all bound-
aries—whether national or subjective—are not absolute. As he reminds us 
in the famous formula from “Connoisseur of Chaos” (1938, CP	215–16): 
“A. A violent order is disorder; and / B. A great disorder is an order. These 
/ Two things are one.” Analogously, Stevens would promote the necessity of 
reading the life of a national community through what is supposedly alien 
to it. He preserves the hemispheric ideal underlying FDR’s Good Neighbor 
Policy, then; but his work demonstrates a way of thinking at odds with how 
it was implemented, even before the war. In international relations, power 
asymmetries had become reified because the government acted according 
to static ideas about participant nations’ cultural and political identities.16 
In contrast, Stevens’s work evinces his attempts to read self and nation more 
completely and dynamically through	 difference, rather than just defined 
against it. He struggled to read foreign texts not just as sources of another 
national or regional culture’s authentic expressions. As we shall see, he did 
run into the pitfalls of cultural comparison because he could not wholly 
extricate his thinking from a liberalist predisposition; ultimately, though, 
Stevens was more interested in using his contacts with representations of 
foreign life from the South to catalyze changes of his own self and national 
culture.
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 In short, he perceived a need to disrupt prevailing identificatory logics. 
Stevens would tell Rodríguez Feo that “there are very few living individuals 
because we are all compelled to live in clusters: unions, classes, the West, 
etc. Only in such pious breasts as yours and mine does freedom still dwell” 
(SM	137). If new connections are foreclosed by static identity groups, or 
“clusters,” individuals will not be truly “living.” For Stevens, communism was 
especially “specious.” Its “damned nonsense” propagated a language evacu-
ated of meaning, and its insistence on the party line offered only a formalism 
that actually inhibited individuals’ independence by imposing containing 
identity structures (SM	137). His disdain for communism is not proof that 
he was swayed by American Cold War propaganda, however, for he was 
critical of his own country’s “democratic” ideals, too. In the postwar U.S. 
mainstream, a resurgent nationalism urged citizens’ identification with their 
country and people, with “the West.” Although this was different from radi-
cals’ preferred category of class, Stevens rankled at any compulsory group 
identification.
 He initially turns to the South, then, not to find new alliances but to dis-
rupt the supposedly inviolable integrity of the easily identifiable American 
individual. Only in this way could he challenge liberalist corollary of a “we” 
that, according to Alain Badiou, merely pluralizes the individualistic “I.” 
Where the coherent subject is lauded, collectivity is imagined as militaristic, 
imperialist, and nationalist: in short, as one where individual freedoms are 
impaired by biopolitically collective forces’ domination.17 If language prac-
tices ideologically perpetuate group mentalities, other kinds of linguistic 
praxes might enlighten one about different possibilities of experience. Ste-
vens believed that true freedom and a fuller, redefined sense of the indi-
vidual necessitate exposure to a discourse that openly reveals, rather than 
dissimulates, its mediated and artificial nature. In this way, the individual—
and, by extension, the nation—might be read as corresponding to, and in 
contact with, others from whom one is usually cut off by the Cold War’s 
identitarian linguistic mediations. Poetry is a perfect vehicle for such libera-
tion since in its foregrounding of a metaphorically metamorphic language 
it actually encourages readers to look beyond familiar and legible forms of 
community. In the more unfamiliar and defamiliarizing terrain of modern 
lyric, where what’s close at home is perceived to extend into a larger world, 
one can discover echoes and traces of likeness that frustrate easy or a priori 
sympathies. In this way, poetic resemblance spurs one to recognize hitherto 
invisible commonalities. It generates a productive and ethical crisis disrup-
tive of dear liberalist precepts.
 Stevens’s correspondence with Rodríguez Feo provided him an opportu-
nity to think through how lyric’s semi-public, semi-private form can realize 
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such an ethical project. Through his personal contact with the Cuban editor, 
he could rediscover the difference at the heart of his norteamericano	self. The 
first two poems that he wrote specifically for his correspondent, “A Word with 
José Rodríguez-Feo” (1945, CP	333–34) and “Paisant Chronicle” (1945, CP	
334–35), are relatively minor pieces. Stevens himself dismissed them as “two 
scraps” he rushed off, and he asked Rodríguez Feo not to publish them (SM	
46). Nonetheless, we can conclude that Stevens eventually did judge them 
to have some value since he included both in Transport	to	Summer	(1947). 
More tellingly, he reprinted them in The	Collected	Poems (1954), from which 
he had omitted several other previously published texts. Whatever he saw in 
them, their value for us owes to their theorization, albeit rather clumsy and 
ineloquent, of how poetry teaches us to live intimately with difference and 
less dependently on identitarian boundaries.
 “Paisant Chronicle” begins by repeating a question Rodríguez Feo had 
posed in an earlier letter: “What are the major men?” (SM 38) In setting 
out to answer this inquiry, from its opening line this poem perpetuates the 
same sort of pedagogical relation characterizing that between the ephebe 
and the narrator in the earlier “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.” Three 
years after writing that other poem for an anonymous Argentine audience, 
Stevens finally had come into personal contact with a Southerner to whom 
he has learned to address himself, as both an acquaintance and a poet. Origi-
nally, Rodríguez Feo was curious about the meaning of the enigmatic phrase 
“major men,” which had recurred in “Notes” as well as in “Repetitions of a 
Young Captain.” Stevens regarded this inquiry as a chance to think about the 
phrase’s significance now, rather than an opportunity to explain past poems.18 
The lesson that unfolds in “Paisant Chronicle” is not so much about fixing 
the identity of Stevens’s good neighbor as it is about unfixing	his own.
 Stevens works through the significance of the phrase Rodríguez Feo had 
asked about by way of the new one introduced in the poem’s title. His term 
“paisant” is a neologism, mixing the French paysan and the English peasant	
to produce a bastard word that also calls to mind a mutilated version of the 
word pleasant. In the poem’s narrative, paisant chronicles are defined as the 
tales of “a multitude of individual pomps,” or the “funeral pomps of the race.” 
These historical narratives foreclose pleasure because they keep the people 
separate from one another, a mournful fate that produces only a funereal 
and dour literature. Problematically, individuals are encouraged by such 
poetry not to experience their own historical agency, but to become heroic 
objects	who only “live to be / Admired” by others. This desubjectifying desire 
is highly esteemed, even to a point bordering on worship or envy. Worse still, 
it is doubled at the level of the nation-state: “Nations live / To be admired by 
nations.” The predicament shared by the nation and the individual is symp-
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   39 11/13/2008   12:52:03 PM
c h A P t e r  10 
tomatic of a general devaluation of life’s vitality and pleasure. One maintains 
one’s ego by upholding and meeting others’ expectations. The heroic stories 
created by such circles of admiration reduce “humanity” to a mere “sum” of 
such objectifying “chronicles.”
 In contrast, there is the major man. “That is different.” Stevens’s emphasis 
on difference	here is not incidental. This figure is “The fictive man created 
out of men.” These poetic fictions do not constitute a chronicle, but instead 
are “artificial” images of men that encourage the “easy projection long pro-
hibited.” Imaginary rather than individual, mediated images rather than 
supposedly transparent representations, the major men allow one to move 
beyond the limiting and ideologically motivated narratives, or chronicles, 
of group identification that foreclose change and compel individuals to live 
for the approval of others. Acting as a pedagogue, Stevens proceeds to offer 
Rodríguez Feo, and later his general reader, an antidote for paisant chroni-
cles’ pleasure-killing banalities. He urges his reader to find his own examples 
of major men: “see him for yourself.” He tailors this advice to what he imag-
ines his Cuban correspondent would see in Havana. The major man “may” 
be found sitting at a café, before cheese and a pineapple. “It must be so.” His 
imperative (“must”) interestingly offers a jarring contrast to the preceding 
line’s more conjectural tone (“There may be . . . ”). It also echoes the direc-
tives in the cantos’ titles from “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” (“It Must 
Be Abstract,” “It Must Change,” “It Must Give Pleasure”). The resultant con-
tinuity with the long poem suggests that in “Paisant Chronicle” Stevens is 
rethinking the nature of intrinsic couples, as introduced in “Notes.” Here, the 
American reader who encounters the poem upon its publication is asked not 
just to look to the South for a quantifiable and identifiable difference, a lack 
of identity, or even a quaint image that will reproduce objectifying nation-
alist narratives. Instead, the South is a proximate setting where Stevens and 
his countrymen can find differences that will affect understandings about 
their selves and, ultimately, humanity.
 If we limit our reading to Rodríguez Feo’s perspective, Stevens appears 
to be making a merely empirical move: look at what is there, in your actual 
social setting. What begins as a private lyric in a private correspondence, 
though, would be made more public upon the poem’s inclusion in later vol-
umes intended for North American audiences, most of whom at that time 
lacked a café culture or easy access to exotic fruit such as pineapples. Stevens 
really expands the domain of what counts as “reality” through the poem, 
then. Rodríguez Feo may be explicitly asked to find his own major men in a 
café with a pineapple on the table; however, the general reader is also	implic-
itly asked to do the same. In her case, though, that meaning-giving object is 
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an image; it is found in the language of the poem itself, rather than happened 
upon as a physical referent outside the text. For someone holding Stevens’s 
book, perhaps even reading it at a restaurant or lunch counter, what is most 
proximate is the page itself. The poet’s artful mediations of a Havana Rodrí-
guez Feo had described for him will be the general reader’s resource for 
solving the problem of paisant chronicles. Through such successive media-
tions (the writer poetically mediating his correspondent’s descriptive media-
tions of Cuban actualities), readers are presented with ample opportunities 
for finding new connections to reality and, in the process, new modes of lin-
guistic agency. With the help of a poet who imaginatively reflects on others’ 
perceptions, we might become truly living individuals once more.
 The lesson of “Paisant Chronicle” is continued in the second poem Ste-
vens sent to his Cuban friend in 1945. “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” 
was written specifically as a response to his correspondent’s passing question 
in an earlier letter about why Ernest Hemingway and other foreign writers 
have “not exploited the grotesque in our [i.e., the Spanish-speaking world’s] 
lives” (SM	42). Rodríguez Feo closely associates the term “grotesque” with a 
baroque or mannerist aesthetic, and his question points to his group’s ambi-
tion to extend that aesthetic sensibility to characterize an ethic and lifestyle 
of the Americas, generally (see chapter 2). In the process of answering this 
inquiry, “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo,” like “Paisant Chronicle,” echoes 
some of the attributes of “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.” Namely, both 
“Notes” and “Word” problematize lyric’s supposedly private nature. The ear-
lier poem had included an uncharacteristic personal dedication to Stevens’s 
friend Henry Church, in which Stevens imagines them as sitting together “in 
the central of our being.” Both the public poem and the private correspon-
dence it grows out of are actually overlapping, semi-public spaces much like 
a train station, such as New York City’s Grand Central Station; through those 
textual fields, they connect to one another’s private lives (CP	380). What is 
more, the three movements of “Notes” consist of “630 lines—excluding the 
21-line epilogue and 8-line prologue—commemorating his [i.e., Stevens’s] 
sixty-three years” (Richardson, Wallace	Stevens, 196). The long poem’s body, 
in other words, contains a life: Stevens’s life. Similarly, the very title of “A 
Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” marks a connection between lived fact and 
poetic fiction. Through his personal appeal to the young editor, Stevens 
makes a disciplinary argument about poetry’s public	 value. He pulls his 
correspondent aside to have a “word” with him, to set him straight about 
what is really at issue with the aesthetic category of the “grotesque.” Despite 
the fact that the poem originally accompanied a letter, Stevens’s decision to 
answer Rodríguez Feo’s questions in this form suggests that the poet was 
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consciously deploying a public mode intended for a general readership. 
That publicity would be fulfilled when he collected it a few years later in 
Transport	to	Summer. As public as a theatrical aside, Stevens’s admonition in 
this addendum to “Notes” really is meant for everyone, not just his original 
Cuban reader.
 Identifying his addressee as “one of the secretaries of the moon,” Ste-
vens affiliates Rodríguez Feo with a lunar and nocturnal imagination that 
“Makes everything grotesque.” Is that grotesque limited to the tropical set-
ting inhabited by the Cuban and his countrymen, however? Do they have 
a particular aesthetic sensibility because they experience the moon and the 
night in a particular way? Stevens preferred to see the moon’s transformative 
power as owing to a more universal set of conditions with which his public 
readership might identify, no matter where they were. After all, the moon 
makes everything	grotesque. But he questions whether that aestheticizing 
result owes to the fact that evening itself reflects “man’s interior world.” Did 
norteamericanos, out of habit or custom, not make use of this interior? Is that 
why they lacked a literary grotesque tradition? Stevens doubted the worth of 
equating darkness with interiority, the supposed seat of an authentic private 
identity. Such possibilities introduced a problematic egoism or a fixed idea 
of an appropriate cultural attitude wherein artists are congenitally alienated 
from, rather than connected to, their world. Posing a second question imme-
diately after the first one, Stevens awkwardly tries to reframe the discussion. 
“Is lunar Habana the Cuba of the self?” Here private or personal interiority 
is abstracted to the level of a general ontology (the	self). The actual nighttime 
city of la	Habana, at that time the national capital in which and of which 
Rodríguez Feo writes as its “secretary,” now metonymically represents the 
metaphorical nighttime “world” hidden in every individual. With this second 
question, Stevens begins to speculate about the value of folding interior and 
exterior into one another. This route more desirably averts a psychologism 
he later dismisses, when he rejects understandings of the grotesque as “a visi-
tation” of “another consciousness” or as “the spent, unconscious shapes of 
night.” Unlike those gothic fantasmagoria, Stevens’s lunar imagination does 
not exist inside the self, as is popularly believed; rather, it is an extension of 
the outside, where one naturally finds the moon.
 That he asks a Cuban to see Cuba in this way is quite important. The poem’s 
occasional origin, of which the title continues to remind us, forces us to 
think of lunar Habana as an actuality experienced anew by a living addressee 
familiar with that setting. Even a Cuban will see the Caribbean city differently 
or grotesquely in a poetic light. Stevens works through the logic of this reori-
entation to the outside world through a hypothetical (“For example . . . ”) 
selected from the imagined Cuban landscape. He instructs Rodríguez Feo to 
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notice “this old man selling oranges.” The indexical modifier “this” points to 
a specific entity at hand, who is then realistically described: he “Sleeps by his 
basket. He snores. His bloated breath / Bursts back.” This description paints a 
vivid picture for which Rodríguez Feo can find actual or easily imagined cor-
respondences. More importantly, the rather generic description also draws 
Stevens’s North American readers closer to the man at whom he is pointing. 
In that proximity, this “Cuban” example is rendered less like an object; he is 
less likely to be fodder for some paisant chronicle. Indeed, the figure becomes 
exemplary of what “Paisant Chronicle” defines as a major man.
 The tropics do not provide a key to the unknown, the unconscious core 
of any reader’s being. This image of an unremarkable, quite ordinary old 
man is conveyed in undecorated language that only reinforces its realistic 
objectivity for both the original audience and the larger, more general 
one of the published poem. This is not to suggest that there is no poetic 
quality mediating that quotidian image, though. Stevens’s diction linguis-
tically reinforces the intimacy one might feel with such a familiar figure. 
What is more, it does so in such a way that the poem compels the reader 
to share the figure’s bodily rhythms, which destabilize and complicate the 
easier mode of sympathetic identification encouraged by the surface nar-
rative. The descriptive alliteration of labial “b” sounds, occurring in stac-
cato monosyllables or trochaic two-syllable words, causes the reader, when 
voicing these lines, to mimic the old man’s breathy expulsions as he snores 
(“basket,” “bloated,” “breath,” “bursts”). Propelled outward, her bursting 
breath synchronically commingles with that of the slumbering figure. Yet, 
we know from Stevens’s line that this man’s idiosyncratic exhalative bursts 
move “back.” So, if the reader breathes like the vendor, then her outward 
projection paradoxically carries her backward, too. If this is the prime 
example of what Stevens means by using imagistic major men to discover 
“the Cuba of the self,” then his North American readers are encouraged to 
do something other than imperialistically seize a foreign object, colonize 
another people, or territorialize an exotic landscape. They are offered a 
space for living, quite literally for breathing	differently. Through poetry, 
readers come into a closer and estranging contact with the quotidian by 
bringing themselves bodily into synch with the major men about whom 
they read. Since readers are sent back into themselves, this is not an appro-
priative identification; rather, it is a mode of disidentification. We must 
move outward to “boldly” venture inward, toward that terrain known as 
“the Cuba of the self ” where we can “pick up relaxations of the known.” 
Categories framing our knowledge are not wholly cast off in this process of 
disidentification. They are merely relaxed. Despite the apparent heroism of 
this embarkation, these experiences are casually “pick[ed]	up” like objects 
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(or even erotic trysts) gathered in the course of poetically rereading our 
selves in light of others’ self-conscious and imaginative renderings of the 
world.
 In the last half of the poem, Stevens returns to the original question that 
prompted his excursus on Cuba, interiors, and fruit vendors. He definitively 
concludes that if the grotesque is not a psychological attribute, then there is 
an “absolute” form of it found “within / The boulevards of the generals.” That 
is, the material spaces readers inhabit provide access to a wholly imaginary 
view of the world. Stevens asks us not to travel upon the monumentalizing 
boulevard whose names evoke the paisant chronicles of a people’s history. 
Instead, we must search the space cordoned off between the streets, into the 
neighborhoods within the official infrastructure’s planned and pragmatic 
grids. Straying off the boulevards, we can approach those interior areas 
where we build our homes, live our lives, conduct commerce, communicate 
with one another, and, most importantly, read. If we take notice and learn to 
live and breathe with often overlooked actual objects or representations of 
commonalities like fruit vendors, we will find that they can introduce those 
“relaxations of the known” with an intriguing, and transformative, unfamil-
iarity.
 Stevens’s lesson ends with a description of this outward-bound journey 
to the interior as producing a “simplified geography” seen in the light of a 
newly arisen “sun.” Described as “news from	Africa,” the remapping her-
alded by this new day’s dawning introduces a defamiliarizing distance that 
expands, yet “simplifie[s],” interior spaces and common realities. Ultimately 
individual psychologies are not altered, but the “geography”—the carto-
graphical schema upon which we map and make sense of our experience—
is. Here, Stevens is clearly playing with a racialist, if not racist, trope. But he 
doesn’t associate Cuba, or even the alterity of an experience of “the Cuba 
of the self,” with an Africanist primitivism. The dark heart of the world is 
not an unconscious discovered in the colonies, as we have been trained to 
believe by Joseph Conrad. Indeed, in this moment at the end of the Second 
World War, as global decolonization begins, it does seem that a change in 
the world’s geography is imminent. Stevens wanted to ensure that his poetry 
complemented people’s shifting political understandings of their relation to 
place. When we breathe more easily and relax in the company of its major 
men, we experience a transformation that Stevens deemed necessary for 
warding off the perpetuation of nationalistic objectifying narratives. Rather 
than shepherd us onto the appropriate path so as to maintain our proper 
selves and secure an admirable homeland, poetry can teach us how to find a 
bit of pleasure while preserving our individual freedom to find our own ways 
in this remapped, evolving world.
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on the Pleasures of resemblance
I cannot overemphasize Stevens’s aversion to psychologism. “A Word with 
José Rodríguez-Feo”’s depiction of the grotesque as beginning in external 
factors, rather than in an individual’s personal taste or proclivity for phantas-
magoria, is but one facet of his conviction about this matter. As I discussed 
earlier, Stevens posited the imagination as a congenital affair; its limits are 
posed by the body (as he specifically notes in “Effects of Analogy,” by one’s 
“mind and nerves”), for it is the body that connects one to a people and to a 
place. Contrary to a liberalist ethos, then, the individual is always somewhat 
public, and her lyric endeavors always function as public commitments even 
if they originate in personal circumstances and contexts. If the poet’s func-
tion is to intervene in the social imaginary, a portion of that project resides 
in seeing how the interior actually is an extension of the external world.	In 
the years following his renunciation of psychology and nationalism in “Pai-
sant Chronicle” and “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” for their similar bol-
stering of the ego in chains of admiration, Stevens counterintuitively began 
to articulate an individualistic basis for his critique of liberalism. How might 
he rescue the individual, yet be critical of egoism? This contradictory urge, 
this ambivalence about the individual’s priority in ontological and social rela-
tions, exposes the degree to which he was unable to extricate himself wholly 
from his ideological climate. On the one hand, existing as part of an intrinsic 
couple with the South redefines his sense of self and national belonging as 
a U.S. citizen. On the other hand, his later work exhibits Stevens’s belief 
that Cuban residents should do the neighborly thing and provide him with 
the material—that is, the images—he needed to ensure his own imagina-
tive freedom. Thus implicitly hierarchizing populations, he imagines his 
poetry as developing out of private and largely intellectual encounters with 
others who estrange him from himself. Privileging the mind, and troublingly 
occluding the embodied nature of relations to which he usually paid more 
attention, his work is limited to recasting predominant ideas about public 
living for North American readers. His ethic’s resultant problematic core 
can be phrased as an extrapolation of one of the tenets from “Notes Toward 
a Supreme Fiction”: Poetic	 composition	must	give pleasure. This element of 
Stevens’s thinking supplies a corollary to queer theory’s cherished concept 
of desire. If not carefully addressed, both pleasure and desire actually can 
reintroduce subjective, individualized dimensions that impede ethical disen-
gagements of liberalism and its nationalism and identity politics.
 We can find Stevens’s most sustained theorization of pleasure in a pivotal, 
yet often overlooked, essay crucially connected to his correspondence with 
Rodríguez Feo. Originally delivered at Harvard University in February 1947, 
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and published in June of the same year by The	Partisan	Review and then 
separately as a pamphlet by Cummington Press, “Three Academic Pieces” is 
composed of a short lecture and two new poems (“Someone Puts a Pineapple 
Together” and “Of Ideal Time and Choice”). Stevens begins the prose section 
with his then decades-old insistence that reality is the basis for the imagina-
tion, that “the accuracy of accurate letters” is determined by how imaginative 
literature relates to “the structure of reality” (NA	71). Immediately, though, 
he qualifies that such “accuracy” cannot be measured according to mimeti-
cally realistic standards. Instead poetry discovers “the resemblance between 
things”; he adds that this resemblance “constitutes a relation between them 
since, in some sense, all things resemble each other” (NA	71). Stevens sup-
plies an example from nature. Traces of a common color produce relations 
between objects on a distant seascape: “There is enough green in the sea to 
relate it to the palms. There is enough of the sky reflected in the water to 
create a resemblance, in some sense, between them” (NA	71). This visual 
principle is extrapolated into a universalistic one: “So, too, sufficiently gen-
eralized, each man resembles all other men, each woman resembles all other 
women, this year resembles last year” (NA	71–72). Such a relation based on 
similarity “binds together” things that otherwise would exist in unrelated 
difference if one concentrated only on their particularities (NA	72).
 “The proliferation of resemblances extends an object”: this production 
of likeness is “[t]he point at which process begins” (NA	78). Such a sense 
of processual extensiveness brings Stevens’s thought closely in line with 
Leibniz’s monadology, Spinoza’s ethics, and Alfred North Whitehead’s phi-
losophy of organism. Elsewhere I have described this phase of his work as 
evincing a “baroque poiesis” based on intersubjective monadic relations.19 
Here I wish to refine my earlier conclusions. What Stevens’s poet-subject 
discovers outside her self is not at all a Romantically sublime otherness. Such 
an idea of radical difference would reproduce and secure his self-enclosed 
identity, much like the Good Neighbor Policy and its model of dependence 
and national hierarchies from which he struggled to differentiate his ideas. 
Instead the discovered resemblance extends the poet beyond her proper self. 
In such similarity, she recognizes that her boundaries do not really contain 
her. This ecstasy spurs a crisis, or an ethical self-reflexivity. She is not the 
person she thought she was. She may be like	that ego-ideal, but she does	not	
fully	embody	that identity. Coming to terms with that difference is part of a 
process	of learning about one’s self. Writing is an invaluable contributor to 
the process of subjective composition. Through its publication, poetry ties 
the private experience of discovery to a public revelation of what has been 
discovered. As readers rediscover the poet’s experience in their encounters 
with her written mediations, and as they find themselves involved in and 
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extended by those discoveries, these transformative resemblances continue 
to proliferate.
 Stevens had long believed that metaphor is poetry’s primary rhetorical 
trope. By definition, it creates a similitude between “unlike” things. But with 
his rethinking of relationality in “Three Academic Pieces” comes a subtle 
qualification of his understanding of metaphor’s centrality to lyric’s social 
intervention. Metaphor, he suggests, is synonymous with the “better word” 
of “metamorphosis.” For the antithesis to this term he proposes “identity,” 
which he defines as “the vanishing-point of resemblance” (NA	72). Meta-
phorical resemblance is more than mere substitution, then; it is a metamor-
phic transformation of two previously independent entities.20 This metamor-
phosis rewrites the world as we know it by disrupting the discrete identities 
through which we make sense of it. Those transformative resemblances are 
not created by the artist, though; rather, they are garnered from a preex-
isting “text.” “What the eye beholds may be the text of life. It is, nevertheless, 
a text that we do not write” (NA	76). The perceptions themselves remain 
“private resemblances,” insofar as they unfold from the poet-subject’s pri-
vate and congenital experience. Nonetheless, they do become quite public 
because “one’s meditations on the text and the disclosures of these medita-
tions are no less a part of the structure of reality” (NA	76). “[T]he mind 
begets in resemblance,” particularly through the aesthetic texts which permit 
one’s imaginings to be shared with others. In other words, the poetic com-
munication of those simultaneously figurative and disfiguring compositions 
returns privately observed and conceived resemblances to a public forum.21 
As these newly discovered relations circulate in a public imaginary, “the text 
of life” is clarified a bit for everyone because the poet’s metaphorical lan-
guage “heighten[s] our sense of reality” (NA	77).
 Although metaphor undoes the securities of a self-same identity, the 
extensive resemblances engendered by the trope make the resultant state of 
exposure to the outside world surprisingly delightful. Stevens remarks that 
“[t]he relation between the ego and reality must be left largely on the margin” 
(NA	79). Relegating psychoanalysis and its ego to the sidelines, he clears the 
way to move beyond misreadings of lyric as the product of what he calls 
elsewhere the poet’s “direct egotism”; instead he moves toward an account of 
poetry’s pleasures (NA	46). Curiously, his refusal to address the ego opens a 
discussion of Narcissus, that mythic figure who inspired a central Freudian 
concept. As he “sought out his image everywhere,” Narcissus seems to have 
overlooked those objects he “did not expect” to see where his reflection and 
nature overlapped: a water snake nesting in his hair, a “look of hate” in his 
own eyes, the generally “inexplicable ugliness” of bare life (NA	79). What 
Stevens resolves from the lesson of this mythic major man is quite unlike the 
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theory psychoanalysis developed out of the tale of Narcissus. Neither the ego 
nor its misrecognized objects provide the content discovered in one’s search 
for resemblances. In Stevens’s thinking, the substance of a resemblance is 
almost secondary. Pleasure—both the effect of and desire motivating resem-
blances—is what matters most: “as we seek out our resemblances, we	expect	
to	find	pleasure in doing so; that is to say, in what we find. So strong is our 
expectation that we find nothing else” (NA	80; emphasis added). Narcissus, 
the paradigmatic poet, finds and delights in the desire which precedes the 
relation. That desire itself inflects the discovered relation. Stevens’s ideal poet 
finds the desire his heart desires, a self-fulfilling mode of production.
 We might invoke Gilles Deleuze to revaluate this as something other than 
merely an affirmation of the poet’s a priori self. Rather than just actualizing a 
preexistent desire to secure his self, Stevens’s poet actualizes a virtual poten-
tial. He lives for the “middle,” the virtual experience of the similar relation 
itself rather than the constituent elements and part-objects out of which 
resemblance is produced. Actualizing that potential ends up disrupting the 
identity of the subject who originally imagined it.22 If identity is the “van-
ishing-point” of resemblance, as Stevens maintains in “Three Academic 
Pieces,” then identity is the limit at either end of that experience, that middle, 
which gives our bodies and minds pleasure. When the poet encounters an 
image, a process begins whereby she finds a relation that pleasurably extends 
her beyond her own personal boundaries. This extension is “some extraordi-
nary transfiguration,” a passionate discovery of a potential to become part of 
the world and to be connected differently to others in some new, enlivening 
way (NA	80). Although such discoveries affect the person and her sense of 
self, and although the poet already lives longing not to be restricted to the 
sense of her self she already knows, ultimately these estranging discoveries 
are impersonal because they are gifted. One may seek one’s pleasures, but 
one doesn’t know where they will come from. Even a reflection of one’s self 
will contain surprising elements; thus, it will supply “one of those amiable 
revelations,” a gift of awakening “vouchsafe[d]” by nature and reality as if 
they were divinities aiding the poet in his own epic process of becoming 
and self-refashioning (NA	80). Disrupting identity conventions determined 
by clear-cut distinctions between self and other need not be painful, then. 
In fact, for Stevens, they are joyful metamorphoses because they relieve 
modern life’s pain and doldrums.
 Ontologically, this principle does critically revaluate the foundations of 
liberalism; however, problems ensue when we consider the power dynamics 
underlying those reflections wherein Stevens saw himself anew. As men-
tioned earlier, his correspondence with Rodríguez Feo helped produce this 
strange idea that narcissism is actually a pleasurable disidentification. Two 
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months before he delivered “Three Academic Pieces” at Harvard, Stevens 
wrote the Cuban editor that he was “[t]aking a new and rather quackish sub-
ject and developing it without the support of others” (SM	93). This solitary 
and academic enterprise, though, does not really occur without others’ “sup-
port,” for his correspondent (unbeknownst to himself) actually aids Stevens 
in his poetic endeavor. In the same letter, a few sentences after a rough sum-
mary of his upcoming lecture, he suddenly and perhaps inappropriately con-
fesses, “I love the little vistas of Cuba that you put in your letters” (SM	93). 
Below, in the next section, I consider what those “vistas” comprised and how 
they interfered with Stevens’s rethinking of national difference, thus limiting 
the efficacy of his project. For now, though, I merely want to point to how 
those Cuban images sent by or through Rodríguez Feo supplied Stevens with 
a gift of resemblance through which he was able to pleasurably rediscover 
himself and disidentify with his norteamericano	ego. Indeed, literal gifts sup-
ported and encouraged Stevens in this transformative, narcissistic process. I 
am referring especially to two watercolors that the Orígenes	painter Mariano 
Rodríguez (known in the art world simply as “Mariano”) had sent to Stevens 
through Rodríguez Feo in January 1945. The North American poet would 
write that the paintings were “both a good deal more Cuban than you are 
likely to realize” (SM	39). He was particularly smitten with the picture of a 
pineapple, which he chose to hang in the most intimate and private of spaces: 
his bedroom. Oddly, he declared to Rodríguez Feo that it “is now quite the 
master of that scene” (SM	38). Refiguring his inner sanctum as a theatrical 
space (a “scene”), Stevens qualifies how we’re to understand his private and 
supposedly authentic self. That once interior but now rather public space 
is newly inflected by Mariano’s pineapple. The painting’s representational 
embodiment of Cuba’s botanical exoticism introduces into Stevens’s Con-
necticut home “the sense of an unfamiliar place” (SM	39). The result: the 
poet abdicates sovereign control, and surrenders his own claims not only 
to mastery but also to the master bedroom! Boundaries of propriety and 
proprietorship, two hallmark conditions of liberalism, queerly break down 
because he discovers pleasure in sharing this intimate setting with an idea, 
or paper image, of foreignness.
 Mariano’s painting finds its way into “Three Academic Pieces” two 
years later, via Stevens’s inclusion of the poem “Someone Puts a Pineapple 
Together” (NA	83–89) in his lecture. An unnamed narrator reflects on “A 
wholly artificial nature” while observing a picture of a pineapple, “This husk 
of Cuba.” The image provides the narrator-poet with a “tangent of himself,” 
a relation produced by “Chance” and noted to be a kind of “ephemera.” Only 
through aleatory discoveries of such oblique relationships to one’s self can 
one “Divest reality / Of its propriety,” or challenge the liberalist and mor-
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   49 11/13/2008   12:52:04 PM
c h A P t e r  10 
alistic codes fixing one way of being a proper self. Though tangential, it is 
reality, “the irreducible X,” all the same. What is more, his newfound and 
estranging sense of self literally resides in the image. As the “Inhabitant and 
elect expositor” of this condition, it is his responsibility to reveal that he, like 
all of us, is a citizen of an artificial world. That is to say, this lived condition 
and freeing of oneself from the strictures of identity owe to the mediations of 
art and representation. The word elect	signifies a governmental representa-
tive chosen by the people, as well as those chosen by God to receive His grace 
and to experience the rapture. Given that dual connotation, the poet’s duty 
is presented as politicized and salvific. He helps construct major men by 
intervening and putting a pineapple together again, by discovering, via this 
image, the relation between himself and that “X” of reality. That account of 
resemblance is the pleasurable medium for his messianic mission of saving 
the rest of us from liberalism, egoism, and nationalism. Who knew that such 
narcissistic pleasures could prove to be the remedy for the ills of the Cold 
War’s paisant chronicles?
reading from the Exterior
Stevens’s theorization of resemblance in “Three Academic Pieces” lays bare 
the ontological foundations of his ethic; however, his letters and poems to 
Rodríguez Feo redirect us to that ethic’s social stakes. As “Paisant Chronicle” 
and “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” make clear, his late career’s poetic is 
oriented specifically toward a revision of nationalistic attitudes. That desired 
intervention highlights embodiment in such a way that it frustrates the cere-
bral and narcissistic pleasures of composition. Interestingly enough, when 
Stevens tries to accommodate those social ambitions, he cannot fixate on 
writing and pleasure as much as he would like. Contrary to what one might 
expect from letters exchanged between a poet and an editor, Stevens’s ideas 
about reading—not his theories of writing—are at the heart of their cor-
respondence. In reading, pleasure is resignified: a dynamic that we shall 
see again and again in the chapters that follow. Approached from the angle 
of the reader, rather than from that of the writer, textual pleasures are less 
capable of being misconstrued as private affairs, for the writer is compelled 
to acknowledge how lyric encounters’ persistently public dimensions render 
the stakes of any kind of personal transformation shared with her audience. 
Stevens’s implicit emphasis on, and figures of, reading throughout his oeuvre 
would lead later writers such as Robert Duncan and Rodríguez Feo’s orig-
enista	colleague José	Lezama Lima to regard him as a valuable poetic pre-
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cursor.23 Yet, his emphasis on readership cannot be flatly celebrated. It also 
got him into trouble, and was the lever others used to force him to recognize 
the incompatibility of his one principle of narcissistic pleasure and his desire 
to produce a critique of liberalist nationalism.
 Early on, Stevens portrayed himself as the target audience for his friend’s 
magazine. “[F]or the reader of the exterior,” he would write in 1945, “what is 
of particular interest [in Orígenes] is the Cubans themselves” (SM	35). Much 
like in “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo,” he remarks on the importance of 
Cuban realities making their way into literary texts. His characterization of 
that importance here—as a “particular” appeal or an “interest” for the ideal 
reader outside Cuba—can help us address the ambivalences of that peculiar 
phrase I noted earlier, “the Cuba of the self.” Stevens strategically situates 
himself in Cuba’s “exterior.” The folding between subject and object, inte-
rior and exterior, gleaned in “A Word with José Rodríguez-Feo” must begin 
from a fixed spot, a knowable location. That is to say, even if he is interested 
in ultimately deconstructing identitarian divides, Stevens still depends on 
an initial assertion of an identity-based difference, a clear geopolitical divi-
sion, between North and South. Despite his desire to use his pleasurable 
poetic pursuits to disrupt conventions of identity generally and to pose a 
meaningful intervention that might transform his social context, he is still 
involved in—or, literally, folded into—his American liberalist setting. Only 
in such a self-recognizable site can he really know	and recognize his pleasure 
as such. From “Mariano’s happy little drawings” to “the philosophical and 
cultural work” of its poetry and critical essays, everything in Orígenes was 
valuable to Stevens because, as he put it, “Nothing quite so unconcerned has 
come my way for a long time” (SM	35). “Unconcerned” is a troubling choice 
of words, especially when read in light of his 1946 confession to Rodríguez 
Feo that “I love the little vistas of Cuba that you put in your letters” (SM	93). 
Stevens openly prefers renditions of bucolic scenes of güajiros	and farm ani-
mals to reflections on literature and philosophy. “True, the desire to read is 
an insatiable desire and you must read,” he admits. “Nevertheless, you must 
also think. Intellectual isolation loses value in an existence of books” (SM	
73). Pay less attention to books, he urges Rodríguez Feo; instead, physically 
and intellectually attend to Pompilio the mule and Lucera the cow in Villa 
Olgas, “just to show your interest in reality” (SM	74). The norteamericano 
freely reads southern authors’ literature to cull from it images that will serve 
as realities suitable for his pleasurable discovery of self-extensive resem-
blances; yet, in his mind, Cubans don’t have that luxury. They must read and 
think about the text of life through actual immediacies, rather than learn of 
themselves through others’ textual mediations. Stevens’s advice seems even 
more strange, if not more hypocritical, in light of the fact that quaint coun-
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tryside scenes like the ones he recommends were uncharacteristic of much 
of Rodríguez Feo’s experience as an urban, bourgeois world-traveler.
 We can interpret Stevens’s advice two ways. On the one hand, it suggests 
the North American poet’s own provincialism, his inability to shake off the 
congenital limits of an imperialistically nationalist mindset. Of course, there 
is a power asymmetry here; but it would be an injustice to dismiss his com-
ments out of hand as imperialist.24 After all, Stevens does know full well the 
realities of Rodríguez Feo’s experience. So, his advice might be more gener-
ously interpreted as an encouragement of the editor to engage a lunar imagi-
nary. That is to say, Stevens asks his correspondent to engage a particular	
hermeneutic	 strategy	 that would let Rodríguez Feo read Cuban actualities 
like	a	poet. Instead of attributing the most cultural capital to European and 
North American writing, he first ought to read the book of life in an inter-
ested fashion. Stevens was well aware that he had made a faux pas in his 
letter. In no small part, that error in judgment owed to the ways his own 
pleasures of composition blinded him to his correspondent’s need for similar 
pleasures. He struggled to rectify his misstep in a later letter, where he cau-
tions Rodríguez Feo against misinterpreting his earlier warning that “Cuba 
should be full of Cuban things and not essays on Chaucer.” He clarifies him-
self by noting that his aversion to such essays in Orígenes “is not a question 
of nationalism” (SM	57). That is, he does not endorse an essentialist aes-
thetics insisting that Cuban authors read only Cuban or Spanish-language 
literatures. Nor is he acting as the gatekeeper of his own English-language 
heritage. Instead, his advice originates in a dual idea. Trying to transcend 
one’s nation or period by including everything	in a magazine is irresponsible; 
however, a too strict fidelity to time and place—to be provincially national-
istic and to cling to the securities of readymade identities—is equally unde-
sirable. For fear of being read as provincial, Rodríguez Feo placed too much 
stock in foreign writing and was inclined to err on the side of transcendence. 
Exegeses of medieval English poetry were too academic in Stevens’s opinion; 
they were not sufficiently imaginative engagements with affective and living 
cultural texts, so they didn’t warrant attention. If Orígenes	continued on such 
a path, Rodríguez Feo	actually risked recapitulating a tendency in poetry 
(and in this instance literary criticism, as well) to produce paisant chronicles 
that objectified individuals and perpetuated nationalistic mindsets.
 To facilitate the ability of Orígenes to meet readers’ pleasurable expecta-
tions both on and off the island, Stevens gives a last bit of advice: “The job of 
the editor of Orígenes is to disengage the identity of Cuba” (SM 56; emphasis 
added). “Disengage” is an odd, but crucial, choice of words. It’s not exactly 
clear how his earlier recommended provincial scenes would “disengage” a 
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provincial colonial mindset if we read them as narcissistically pleasurable 
images. What they could do, though, is stymie a growing Cuban nationalism 
echoing modernity’s precepts of liberal individualism and clear-cut national 
differences. In the letter where he mentions his interest in Cuban things, 
Stevens subtly qualifies what appeals to an “exterior” audience about Orí-
genes: “Man’s fever is not present here” (SM	35). His concern with “fever” is 
an indirect reference to the Second World War, which the vanguard refused 
to explicitly address. The poetic and visual images originating in Cuba 
offered readers respite from the grips of media and artwork that focused 
on the international conflict, then. Looking beyond the militaristic events 
that seemed to testify to the “fever” of a humanity defined by the state, the 
magazine	 seemed favorably “unconcerned” with nationalistic matters and 
thus was freer to explore other forms of connection and life.25 From Stevens’s 
position in “the exterior,” Orígenes and the letters and gifts he received from 
the vanguard valuably influenced his revision of his own country’s liber-
alist articulations of nationalism. In their emphasis on the artificial nature of 
images, these texts presented Cuba (or at least its artists) as adequately “dis-
engaged” from the paisant chronicles of the modern world. Through them, 
Stevens became a better reader not of the Cuban Republic but of life	itself. 
It would be reductive to say that the reader of the exterior is outside Cuba, 
then. She is actually on the margins of life, looking at its center. Certainly this 
disengagement would satisfy the narcissistic interests of Stevens as a poet, 
but it also could help fulfill the ethically inspired pleasures of a general audi-
ence on and off the island.
 Stevens’s belief that art should prioritize its vitalist commitments to help 
us move beyond nationhood and toward the forgotten center of experience is 
dramatized by the title of “Attempt to Discover Life” (1946, CP	370). Inspira-
tion for the piece came from a letter written by Rodríguez Feo in March 1946 
while recuperating at San Miguel de los Baños, a resort in Matanzas (SM	
82). The Cuban remarks upon his racial and class difference from others: 
“the town’s capitans (that’s how we call here the Chinese),” as well as “the 
modest citizens (really very poor)” who stroll around selling lottery tickets 
or ride on “their sad-looking horses.” The atmosphere is conveyed as one 
typified by impoverishment, where residents struggle to get a “few pesos” 
from “some rich sick-visitor” such as himself. Rodríguez Feo also notes that 
he has been reading James Joyce’s Ulysses “again.” (The repetition of the expe-
rience of reading this particular text is very important. It indicates that he 
saw reading, and even modernism itself, as a luxury that reaffirmed his dif-
ference from the poor locals in Matanzas.) The poem Stevens produces out 
of his reading of that letter actually bears no resemblance to Rodríguez Feo’s 
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account. This difference is significant, for Rodríguez Feo had purposefully 
included provincial details to entertain the norteamericano,	who had com-
plained earlier that the Cuban editor didn’t pay enough attention to Cuban 
things. Instead of the wandering peasants one might expect from an exoti-
cizing or imperialist text, Stevens’s poem focuses on the moneyed invalids. 
At a café where a waitress makes table settings by arranging colorful roses 
around a volcano made of “black Hermosas,” “a cadaverous person” and 
his “brilliant and pallid-skinned” woman appear. She mysteriously seems 
to materialize out of thin air when the man “bowed, and bowing, brought” 
her. The two do not speak; the accompanying woman merely smiles and 
moistens her lips as she “stood with him at the table.” Just as suddenly as they 
appear, they’re gone. On the table by where they stood are “dos centavos,” the 
few pesos mentioned in Rodríguez Feo’s letter.
 If this narrative indicates where Stevens found pleasure in the images sup-
plied by Rodríguez Feo’s letter, it may seem surprising—yet it’s incredibly 
telling—that he does not mention the horses, Sino-Cubans, peasants, and 
other quaint or exotic details. Instead of a titillating adventure set in a far-off 
place, he realistically conveys small happenings in a quite ordinary, though 
foreign, setting. The opening line establishes that the drama is set in a café “At 
San Miguel de los Baños,” and the flowers adorning the tables are specifically 
noted to be “Of the place.” Rather than actors in an intriguing story-driven 
drama, the wan man and woman function merely as indexical figures that 
point us to the coins left in their stead. This economic detail is “the irreduc-
ible X” of reality, as Stevens calls it in “Three Academic Pieces.” These coins 
are traded merely for a waitress’s services, something far more commonplace 
than a picturesque pony ride in the Cuban countryside. Despite the poem’s 
quotidian contents, however, the situation becomes quite interesting if we 
consider that these bare realities lack narrative support. Consequently, the 
reader must rely on her imagination to make sense of them. We don’t witness 
the waitress actually serving these customers. They don’t sit down at the table, 
much less eat or drink. As far as we know, the patrons don’t even exchange 
words with her. So exactly what service does she provide? Her actual work 
is like that of Stevens’s ideal poet: in her floral arrangements, she takes the 
things of the place and re-composes them, imaginatively. Not incidentally, 
the waitress’s work goes up “In smoke” after the sickly couple arrives. Stevens 
curiously describes the arrangements as dissolving into the air in “fomenta-
tions of effulgence.” Clearly, this dissolution is radiant; but, the word fomen-
tation has two distinct connotations: the floral compositions are spectacular 
either because they incite rebellion or because they offer a medicinal therapy. 
The circumstances of the couple’s departure help clarify the meaning. When 
the flowers dissipate, the man and woman do not just disappear from the 
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café but are “dispelled.” Flower arranging—that is, composition—has the 
force to ward off sickly and even “cadaverous persons,” then. It is strange that 
the couple pays to be driven away, but this detail suggests that art’s “fomen-
tations” are not at all revolutionary. Rather, composition’s ability to trans-
form reality owes to its healing power. It is an ethical, rather than a properly 
political, intervention.
 If the waitress’s art is curative, it makes a bit more sense that the morbidly 
vampyric pair left a tip for her services. But that gratuity would bother Ste-
vens. “The question that is prompted by the poem,” he would gloss later in a 
letter to Rodríguez Feo, “is whether the experience of life is in the end worth 
more than tuppence: dos centavos” (SM	91). If in reading from the exte-
rior one can encounter the realities of life outside the political framework 
of nation and economy, can the health supplied by compositions’ resplen-
dent images really receive sufficient compensation? Does monetary retribu-
tion bind art’s curative powers to a national economy, and thus diminish 
the life-value, the pleasures, of poetry? That more common life-value is at 
odds with the individualized narcissism Stevens also esteems. His anxiety 
here throws into relief that his project’s ethical and curative dimensions 
depend on reclaiming the individual from modernity’s liberalist and nation-
alistic logics. Unfortunately, he hadn’t quite worked out the kinks of his own 
counter-logic. Reading images from the exterior, rather than writing before 
them as if facing a distorting mirror, caused Stevens to take only solitary 
pleasure in his narcissistic compositional pursuits.
 When one acts primarily as a reader who engages images located else-
where, rather than as a writer using images to perpetuate one’s own ideas 
and to pursue one’s own pleasures, one stands a greater chance of discov-
ering a new commonality. Because it is not properly political but is instead 
ethical, such a collective is substantially different from the imagined com-
munities thought to consolidate nations through literary and print cultures 
that produce group identities in contradistinction to others’ differences.26 
As Stevens puts it in one of his last poems, “Artificial Populations” (1955, 
Collected	Poetry	and	Prose,	474): “The centre that he sought was a state of 
mind.” By disengaging the nation, the poet is brought to a new state, a psy-
chological one that foregrounds consciousness (“mind”). Once this “state 
of the mind” is achieved, politically motivated sociocultural divisions dis-
appear. “[T]he Orient and the Occident embrace / To form the weather’s 
appropriate people.” Such an embrace evokes a physicality that qualifies the 
otherwise cerebral pleasures of this state. Indeed, it is an intrinsic coupling 
that imaginatively repopulates the world not in the poet’s own image, not as 
a means of securing his own predetermined pleasures, but in the terms of 
poetically discovered resemblances. This population does not belong to the 
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nation or even the world. It belongs to the weather. That may seem ethereal 
or intangible, but weather is actually quite physical. It supplies the conditions 
and context through which we are most conscious of our bodies and their 
physical location in the world. And as we know (often to our dismay), we 
cannot control or govern or administrate the weather. It goes to follow, then, 
that we cannot control or even determine the shape this atmospheric com-
monality-to-come will take. In keeping with his aversion to psychologism 
and the unconscious’s fantasias, Stevens affirms the link between pleasure 
and consciousness; yet, he notes that this relation cannot be administered 
and controlled. In short, it can’t be forethought, as he once deemed it in 
“Three Academic Pieces.” Pleasure can affect the individual, much like the 
weather can; thus, it corporeally affects the starting point of an identity one 
knows, an identity that necessarily begins in a consciousness of one’s distinc-
tion—in body and	mind—from others’ recognizable differences. A person 
thus can be led—willingly and consciously—by the imagination to a horizon 
where identity itself matters less, where outcomes cannot be predicted. In 
some ways, then, Stevens instructs us that we should be less wary about the 
boundaries that identity and community provide. They supply useful ways 
for knowing our bodies; it is only from the groundwork they establish that 
we can imagine extending or even articulating the possibilities of their plea-
sures. We must know the body as it is, we must read it as a positive quan-
tity, in order to deconstruct it by rereading it in light of other texts, other 
images.
 Such a mode of imaginatively yet consciously reading one’s self and one’s 
environment, in the hopes of augmenting pleasure and of producing a new 
state of mind, bears important consequences for changing how we perceive 
the realities of the nation-state. Much like the rose’s sanative “fomentations 
of effulgence” in “Attempt to Discover Life,” the later poem’s titular “artificial 
population” is a means of healing the modern subject: “A healing-point in 
the sickness of the mind.” Stevens’s description is reminiscent of Deleuze’s 
claim that “[h]ealth as literature, as writing, consists in inventing a people 
who are missing” (Essays	Critical	and	Clinical,	4). Indeed, poetry is a means 
of restoring collective health by discovering the new terms for community. 
When identity is the vanishing-point of resemblance, as Stevens believed, 
the irony of that condition is that when one fully inhabits one’s self, one dis-
appears. If poetry addresses the ailments of the individual, the patient can 
be brought back, refreshed, to reality. As she imaginatively rediscovers her 
body and finds new health, though, she does not return to the original van-
ishing-point. Instead, she emerges at a different place, the “healing-point” 
where she connects differently with a new commonality. Everyone just has 
to look beyond her ego to find those points of reconnection or, if I may, cor-
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respondence. The cosmopolitanism Stevens gestures toward at the very end 
of his life is a lot like lyric, then. It is a semi-public reiteration of individu-
alism that disengages the subject from a nationalistic liberalism; but it does 
so in the name of preserving the individual’s power, pleasure, and freedoms. 
Our readerly correspondences help us see beyond the state’s biopolitical 
horizon.
 As Stevens’s lessons were translated into queerer registers, later writers 
from both Cuba and the United States would put less emphasis on pleasure’s 
narcissistic nature. José Lezama Lima, Robert Duncan, and Severo Sarduy 
understood full well that any pleasure found in extending their selves owed to 
how they willingly exposed their selves to language and to others. No matter 
how idiosyncratic or unorthodox Stevens’s understanding of it is, narcissism 
ultimately runs contrary to his desire to free himself and his countrymen 
from a liberalist idealization of the ego. Whom does such a pleasure benefit? 
Doesn’t it actually instantiate other inequities? If one party serves as a sup-
plier of necessary images to those in the exterior, isn’t she excluded from the 
pleasures of dynamically participating in a process of social transformation? 
Where his narcissism introduced incommensurable problems, the dynamic 
Stevens termed resemblance—like that extensive relation I call similarity or 
metaphorical living—is key to later queer writers’ work. Through it, they 
could refigure lyric pleasure in such a way that it becomes less egoistic, more 
vulnerable, and thus much more effective as a tool in their own resistances 
to liberalist identitarian and nationalist attitudes. If we heed the connections 
they draw between similarity and vulnerability, and if we respect and ana-
lyze the limits attending these writers’ resistant projects, we can learn much 
about what we need to articulate our own less revolutionary, yet nonetheless 
resistant and transformative, theorizations of desire and queerness.
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osé Lezama Lima, the co-editor of Orígenes	during its twelve-year run 
from 1944 to 1956, regarded Wallace Stevens as an important ally and 
friend. The North American’s work contributed to his own ideas about 
queerly resisting the liberalist logics of imperialism and postcolonial 
nationalism. In “Alrededor de una antología” (“About an Anthology”), 
Lezama credits such foreign-language poets as T. S. Eliot, St. John Perse, and 
Stephen Spender for contributing a sense of “the new” (lo	nuevo), “a knowl-
edge [un	conocimiento] approximating a dialogue and creative community 
[comunidad	creadora]” (IP 176).1 Above all, though, he deemed “the great 
poet Wallace Stevens” responsible for “the fundamental acquisition of Orí-
genes”: “the concept of the imago,” according to which “the image [imagen] 
functions in history with a force just as creative as semen in the domains 
of creatures’ resurgence” (IP	176). Lezama mentions how Stevens’s poems 
“Attempt to Discover Life” (discussed in chapter 1) and “The Novel” biblio-
graphically originated in letters from his co-editor, José Rodríguez Feo. About 
the second poem he writes that from the young Cuban’s letter Stevens drew 
“the detail, the situation, the unthought-of groupings, touching, like creators 
that scratch and awaken [como	arañazo	y	despertar	 creadores], the distant 
poetic imagination; an unequivocal sign of universalization, appearing in 
the transmutations and imaginative mysteries of other creators far removed 
from our latitude and landscape. The imago	in the faith of its incarnation in 
history and the mysterious successions of novelty [lo	novelable]” (IP	176–77). 
For Lezama and his colleagues, this imago—feisty and scratching to awaken 
distant readers and to turn them on—demonstrates art’s attractive ability 
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to create new beginnings (orígenes) and to rediscover life by telling it anew. 
Local particulars thus enter into an appealing tension with a universal poetic 
imagination. Lezama’s playful neologism novelable—which suggests both a 
novel	quality (novedad	or novel) and the	novel	(novela)—links that aesthetic 
reconstitution of the world to an imaginative retelling of history. Like the 
literary genre to which he alludes, poetry can remake the nation. Because it 
lacks transparency, though, it can also gesture toward difficult-to-pinpoint 
similarities that link Cuba to other countries.
 It is not so strange that Lezama singles out Stevens as the origenistas’ “fun-
damental” influence. Indeed, that is how Rodríguez Feo envisioned the U.S. 
poet. In his very first letter to Stevens in 1944, Rodríguez Feo also wrote of the 
“similarities” and “affinities” he found between his own ideas and the older 
writer’s work (SM	33). He describes his first translations of Stevens’s poems as 
having “the Spanish polish” and as demonstrating “the perfect recognition of 
similar images, combinations, and affinities which make it so difficult to keep 
the poem from turning into something quite foreign” (SM	33). His translations 
were too domesticating, though, for they hid what he most valued in Stevens’s 
poetry. Rodríguez Feo wanted to be more faithful to Stevens’s struggle against 
a culturally colonizing imperative, a struggle one can witness in the poet’s 
language (see chapter 1). This is precisely what was so “novel”—in Lezama’s 
doubled sense—about Stevens’s work for postcolonial Cuban writers and edi-
tors. Rodríguez Feo’s early translations possessed a “Spanish polish” that was 
“foreign” not only to the American poems but also to their Cuban translator. 
If they had been retranslated back into English, their new tone would have 
rendered them a bit too “anglicized” (SM	33). Rodríguez Feo wanted to rec-
tify that and believed he now could better present the North American poet 
in Orígenes as a modernist who escapes provincialism and colonial gentility. 
In short, as a writer who usefully models for Cuban audiences what it is that 
the origenistas	themselves also hoped to do.
 The fact that the editors of Orígenes	assembled an international roster of 
contributors, including North American writers such as Stevens, to cultivate 
their anticolonialist agenda was no small matter. Following Cuba’s late-won 
independence from Spain, the United States exercised a strong formal influ-
ence over the island’s politics and economy until 1934. The effects would be 
felt well into the 1940s. Cuba only began to shake off the North’s economic 
and political sway when the corrupt military leader Fulgencio Batista, who 
presided over several puppet administrations only to become de jure presi-
dent for four years, was voted out of office in 1944. (He resumed dictatorial 
power with a military coup in 1952, four years before Orígenes	terminated 
publication.) At that time, a new constitution was passed to ensure public 
education, land reform, and a minimum wage. This is not to say that U.S. 
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influence disappeared. Often legislators still were in the pockets of Northern 
businesses and barred the implementation of progressive measures. Less 
menacingly, a wide range of Northern cultural objects—from baseball to 
Protestantism—were also valued by Cubans. Rather than being symptomatic 
of the islanders’ caving to a norteamericano	cultural imperialism, the appro-
priation of North American media and goods popularly signified Cubans’ 
resistance to a Spanish colonial heritage. Nonetheless, such cultural appro-
priations also imported American values of democratic nationhood that were 
attached to prized institutions and objects. As a result, a “new moral order” 
emerged that “implied acceptance of the idea of personal transformation 
and social change, a means of self-invention and self-actualization” (Louis 
A. Pérez, Jr., On	Becoming	Cuban, 343). Northern liberalism, reflecting ideals 
of personal autonomy and national sovereignty, thus found its way into a 
postcolonial Cuban imaginary.
 This liberalism inflected how social differences were perceived on the 
island. Those members of Orígenes	who may have felt especially marginalized 
by their minority status had particular interest in their culture’s democratic 
fate. Numbered among the magazine’s collaborators were three women (Bella 
and Fina García Marruz and Cleva Solís), a Catholic priest (Angel Gaztelu), 
a gay Afro-Cuban (Gastón Baquero), and several gay criollo men (including 
Lezama, Rodríguez Feo, and Virgilio Piñera).2 But the kind of resistances 
that their little magazine proffered to liberalist attitudes about identity, dif-
ference, and nationhood was unlike other Cuban vanguards’ resistances to 
U.S. imperialism. In the 1940s, the Havana literary scene was dominated by 
what Jesús Barquet calls “the combative attitude” of Gaceta	de	Caribe	and 
Viernes, which continued the tradition of the minoristas	who published the 
seminal Revista	de	Avance	(1927–30) (Consagración	de	la	Habana, 24). These 
publications exemplified the tendency of Latin American vanguards to stage 
“a reenactment between art and experience” by expressly promoting post-
colonial nationalism and by directly protesting colonial rule and imperialist 
influence (Vicky Unruh, Latin	American	Vanguards, 26).3 Like Jean-Paul Sar-
tre’s existentialist artist, they espoused aesthetic transparency to politically 
redress the dehumanization of art and the alienation of society. In contrast 
with such artistic militancy exacted through self-evident sociopolitical refer-
ents, the origenistas endorsed “a resistant ethic” (Barquet, Consagración, 79). 
As Lezama famously articulates this ethic in the opening of his lecture series 
La	 expresión	americana	 (The	American	Expression, 1957): “Only the diffi-
cult is stimulating; only resistance that challenges us is capable of uplifting, 
sustaining, and maintaining our potential for understanding” (EA	279). The 
aesthetically difficult texts appearing in Orígenes equipped readers to come 
to critical terms with Cuba’s enigmatic cultural ties to Europe and the United 
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States. Rearticulating, rather than summarily rejecting, those connections 
was key to a resistance premised on neither the nation’s nor the citizen’s lib-
eralist sovereignty.
 Like Stevens, Lezama believed metaphor was the best tool for his ethic. 
In “La dignidad de poesía” (“The Dignity of Poetry”), which appeared in 
the final issue of Orígenes, he complains that ethics is erroneously thought 
of as a codification of social conventions; thus, it “has been made an enemy 
of creation and life.” Instead, ethics are found “in creation, a direction [con-
ducta] inside poetry, that sometimes is interpreted and at other times passes 
by our side like a mass of bumblebees, icicles of light, a cluster of golden 
rhythms in two-four time, upon which our hands do not take hold” (TH 
305). Poetry is a lesson in “an oblique experience” (una	vivencia	oblicua) 
(TH	308). Lyric offers readers a sense of conduct intuited from, rather than 
prescriptively communicated by, the very device Lezama uses to describe it: 
a proliferation of elusive and unrelated metaphors (bees, light made of ice, 
golden rhythms). As Emilio Bejel explains, such buzzing and luminescent 
metaphors construct “a new reality” out of “new combinations” of linguistic 
materials (“Lezama Lima,” 21). Presented by such figural texts with more 
uncertainties than answers, Lezama’s readers find themselves “always in the 
borderland of reality,” specifically “outside the social and linguistic order of 
consumer society” as it existed in liberalist, pre-Revolutionary Cuba (ibid., 
22).4 Each enigmatic metaphor provokes an “interminable reading” in which 
“we put ourselves at risk” (nos	arriesgamos) by willfully accepting a “tenta-
tive and dynamic” hermeneutic that unsettles a	priori identifications (ibid., 
30). If approached historically within his cultural moment, Lezama’s writing 
can be seen to have posed particular risks for his Cuban readers. Exposing 
the little commented-on similarity between North and South, the myste-
rious and elusive nature of Lezama’s metaphorical verse estranges his Cuban 
readers from an easy rejection of Northern culture.5 U.S. and Cuban cultures 
are shown to be similarly invested in a liberalist imaginary, and those resem-
blances (as Stevens would call them) refigured the Cuban citizen-subject as 
particularly vulnerable. Lezama’s exposure of those vulnerabilities pushes 
lyric and the resistances to liberalism prefigured by metaphor into a queer 
and postcolonial register.
Early twentieth Century Cuban nationalism and 
appropriations of northern Liberalism
In 1898, at the conclusion of the War of Independence, Cuba was en route to 
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securing its status as an independent state. For over three decades, though, 
it had political sovereignty in name only. The Platt Amendment, originally 
passed by the U.S. Congress as a rider to the Army Appropriations Act in 
1901, was incorporated into Cuba’s 1903 constitution. Until it was abrogated 
in the spirit of FDR’s Good Neighbor policy in 1934, this piece of legisla-
tion set the terms of U.S. political and economic influence over the Carib-
bean republic. In addition to forbidding Cuba from ceding or selling land to 
any other nation, it gave the United States power to place tariffs on Cuban 
goods; to regulate the island’s trade, foreign policy, and negotiation of trea-
ties with other countries; to launch military interventions in Cuba as it saw 
fit; and even to oversee the management of the new republic’s infrastructure 
and sanitation systems. Understandings of national sovereignty were further 
confounded by the blurring of geopolitical boundaries. Due to the provi-
sions of Article VI, the Isle of Pines, a sizeable territory off the main island’s 
southwest coast, was “omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries 
of Cuba.”6 Proprietorship of this small territory was subject to future negoti-
ation. Article VII stipulated that the Cuban government was required “to sell 
or lease . . . certain specified points to be agreed upon by the President of the 
United States.” The Permanent Treaty of Relations, substituted for the Platt 
Amendment in 1934, specified that space as Guantánamo Bay. It granted 
the United States exclusive rights to a naval station there until both parties 
cancel the lease, a condition that, to this day, has not been met.
 The Platt Amendment, as the historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr., characterizes 
it, offered “an adequate if imperfect substitute for annexation” that “served to 
transform the substance of Cuban sovereignty into an extension of the U.S. 
national system” (Cuba	under	the	Platt	Amendment, 109).7 The Reciprocity 
Treaty of 1903, which was passed on the heels of the Platt Amendment’s 
passage, “accelerated the integration of the Cuban economy into the North 
American system” by eliminating tariffs (ibid., 122). U.S. goods flooded the 
Cuban market, and land speculation by Northern industries grew as did 
“large-scale colonization schemes” that resulted in the establishment of 
“agricultural colonies” throughout the archipelago (ibid., 123, 124). With 
stunning transparency, the very name of the Cleveland-based Cuban Colo-
nization Company, one of the principal land brokerage firms that settled 
Camagüey province, attests to the imperialist drive underlying the North’s 
relationship to Cuba at the turn of the century.8 More than the lines between 
the two nations’ political systems and consumer markets were blurred in 
this blatant recolonization. Cultural distinctions were affected, too. Pérez 
deems “social realignments” in Cuba between 1903 and 1934 as ultimately 
having a “larger significance” to shaping U.S.–Cuban relations than any dip-
lomatic, political, or economic shifts in either nation since. Several military 
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interventions and over three decades of democratic and capitalist steward-
ship were exacerbated by the continuing presence of U.S.	settlers, laborers, 
tycoons, and tourists. The combination led to an “Americanization” of 
Cuban industry through “the introduction of North America’s accumulated 
technical knowledge, advanced industrial systems, new machinery, capital 
flows, new business organizations, and modern building innovations, all of 
which came loaded with meaning and metaphors as well as models of iden-
tity and self-representation” (Pérez, On	Becoming	Cuban, 115). The trans-
formation of the island’s economy reinforced how other forms of contact 
with the North, both within and outside Cuba, had shaped the islanders’ 
imaginary about citizenship since the nineteenth century. Criollos, or colo-
nists of Spanish descent born on the island, had made it a tradition to vaca-
tion in the United States. They also sent their children to school there, to be 
educated outside the Spanish colonial system. Prior to independence, exiles 
settled in the Florida Keys and in major metropolitan areas on the Eastern 
seaboard, and these areas became hubs for Cuban political dissidents and 
revolutionary presses. The United States had long offered Cubans what Pérez 
provocatively describes as “a world that they could enter and dwell in, a 
place where they could size up their own [colonial] situation and explore 
new means of self-fulfillment and self-representation” (On	Becoming	Cuban, 
64; emphasis added). The North’s more recent colonialism and penetrative 
market metamorphosed Cuba’s home terrain. One did not need to literally 
go into exile to cultivate intimacies with norteamericano	culture. Now even 
living in the homeland was a kind of exile existence, an inhabitation of a 
foreign and potentially estranging space.
 Cubans sought to define themselves through that alterity. A wide range 
of Northern cultural objects and institutions “were appropriated to affirm 
the ways Cubans differed from Spaniards to demonstrate that who they 
were and what they wanted to become were not of Spanish origin” (ibid., 
69). Democratic values and concepts,	with which those objects were asso-
ciated and through which the United States’ own pluralistic nationhood 
was articulated, were also adopted and inflected as Cubans appropriated 
Northern cultural iconography. The popular embrace of narratives about a 
modernity aligned with transnational consumer capitalism led to the close 
association of a sense of Cuban national sovereignty with a cultural ideal of 
personal autonomy. Lacking a corporatist tradition for expressing utopic 
resistances to modernity, a tradition available in other former Spanish colo-
nies, Cubans from the political Right were drawn to Northern liberal ideals 
of personal autonomy; and those on the Left also “inscribed themselves in 
the liberal spectrum” (Rafael Rojas, “Orígenes and the Poetics of History,” 
156).9 An appropriative cultural imaginary fueled a consciousness of polit-
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ical autonomy. Thus, it helped form a Cuban liberalist ideoscape, which 
Arjun Appadurai defines as an assemblage of images that “are often directly 
political and have to do with the ideologies of states and the counterideolo-
gies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of 
it” (Modernity	at	Large, 36).
 Fraught with contradictions about who counts as a citizen and what qual-
ifies as freedom, however, the U.S. cultural texts, institutions, and practices 
with which Cubans identified presented ambivalences about the democratic 
nature of sovereignty, historical agency, and privacy. Consequently, oppor-
tunities were opened for appropriating liberalist tenets to transform a sense 
of Cuban nationhood and freedom, but to do so by imagining the limits 
of subjectivity and identity differently	without recapitulating problematic, 
divisive rhetoric about personal and state autonomy. This form of appropria-
tion, exemplified by Lezama and the origenistas, cultivated an idiosyncratic 
understanding of nationhood much like what Iván de la Nuez theorizes 
as the unconventional national identities that recently emerged in Cuba’s 
post-Soviet and protocapitalist periodo	especial. Neither a rejection of one’s 
similarity with Northern or European ideals nor an adoption of an exotic or 
primitivist idea of one’s otherness (what Nuez terms confrontation	and repro-
duction, respectively), appropriation develops a new sense of self and nation 
out of the very tools linking one culture to another. In the 1990s, members 
of the diaspora, as well as Cubans who never entered exile but participated 
in the island’s newly opened limited markets, became conscious of a cultural 
continuity between the island and the rest of the world. These experiences 
established “zones of otherness” (zonas	 de	 la	 otredad) individuals could 
inhabit. Such appropriative praxes let one enter “that space where the other 
is one’s own self ” (ese	 espacio	donde	 el	 otro	 es	 él	mismo), an extranational 
borderland that allows enough room to recognize intimacies with others 
that render one more of a stranger, a foreigner to one’s self and one’s commu-
nity insofar as one embodies a connection between the local national culture 
and other global sites (de la Nuez, La	balsa	perpetua, 40).10 The resultant 
sense of nationhood is disconnected from an identification with the state 
(cubanidad) or even with a given community (cubaneo). Instead, it founds 
a sense of belonging to a diverse and dispersed population, what Gustavo 
Pérez Firmat calls cubanía.
 In the pre-Revolutionary appropriative milieu described earlier, Lezama 
imagined these cultural practices as producing a sense of national belonging 
that is diversified insofar as it leads readers into the	distance	 (la	 lejanía). 
This cosmopolitan space of difference would not only reconnect exiles and 
islanders in the Cuban diaspora, but also all Cubans to the rest of the world. 
Finding oneself in this difficultly articulated global identification is a product 
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of the passionate nature of appropriation. As Pérez Firmat characterizes it, 
appropriative cubanía is both self-reflexively agentic (it is “an act of the will”) 
and beyond one’s absolute control (it is “a vocation, a calling” to an identifi-
cation) (My	Own	Private	Cuba,	233). A sense of self can be constituted only 
through cultural resources provided by others, the cultural landscape, and 
language. One is lured to a new sense of self and commonality by some irre-
vocably alien, yet nonetheless seductive, quality. In Lezama’s contributions to 
Orígenes, this passionate nature of cultural appropriation specifically exposes 
the continuing prevalence of norteamericano	 liberalist ideals in a national 
culture that declaims all imperialist and colonialist influences. Attempting to 
articulate the influence of transplanted norteamericano liberalism, he exposes 
the impossibility of Cubans’ absolute independence. He also runs up against 
the fact that the passionate cultural appropriations performed by both his 
own poetic and Cuban popular culture contradict liberalism’s fundamental 
tenets about the citizen’s autonomy and the nation’s absolute sovereignty. By 
accepting that surrender, poetry might model a different kind of resistance 
and a different understanding of agency, one that would not reductively per-
petuate a facile nationalism or blindly reproduce idealizations of absolute 
liberty and independence. His lyric does not merely describe or represent 
social and cultural realities; instead, it strives to embody	them—in the full-
ness of what one can and cannot know about them. The secret has its place 
in that fullness, and Lezama gravitated toward what cannot be known about 
liberalism to reformulate a Cuban imaginary. The results elucidate a queerer 
form of connection and freedom than did the period’s prevalent nationalist 
discourses.
a Poetic system of oblique Experience
One of the phrases most associated with Lezama’s work is “para llegar a,” 
which may be translated as “to get to” or “to reach.”11 His poetry attempts the 
impossible: to approach the fullness of Being that cannot be fully known or 
disclosed because life itself is too fleeting and too multifaceted to be captured 
by words. Lezama calls this ungraspable telos the image, and metaphor is the 
device one uses to approximate it.12 Because a metaphor invokes a resem-
blance to only one facet of life’s multidimensional and shifting visionary 
image, one strives to represent the desired totality by proliferating descrip-
tions. As Lezama writes in “Las imágenes posibles” (“Possible Images”; Orí-
genes	17, 1948), “In all metaphor there is something like the supreme inten-
tion of making [lograr] an analogy, of spreading a net of similes, in order to 
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precisely account for each one of its instants with a resemblance [un	pare-
cido]” (RI 221–22). Such a descriptive augmentation does not definitively 
capture an overarching image of life, though; it only results in a baroque text 
that makes the whole seem all the more enigmatic and secretive. “Metaphor 
carries its dark letter, not knowing the message’s secrets, recognizable only in 
its veil in the momentary light of the image’s candle-flicker” (RI 221). Since 
each description only catches some fleeting glimpse or fragment of what 
one wishes to convey, as if it is illuminated by a flickering candle, obfusca-
tion rather than clarity results. One cannot fully know one’s own existence, 
then. Thus, Sartre’s classic formulation is mistaken: existence cannot precede 
essence. But if essence is unknowable as well, all we are left with are repre-
sentations that approximate both the essence of Being and the particularities 
of our shifting experiences of it. Furthermore, these representations pro-
duce new mysteries, blind spots that interfere with our vision. Lo	profundo 
or lo	 oscuro—terms signifying depth and darkness, as well as profundity 
and obscurity—frequently recur in Lezama’s writings. All creation begins 
by bringing the blind spot to the surface, by letting metaphor do its work of 
generating resemblances so that we may approach—but never truly arrive 
at—what is, by its nature, unknown. Implicitly, then, metaphor has the ability 
to denaturalize the equation of Being with identity. An inescapable feature 
of language, metaphor makes entities less knowable and thus instantiates an 
epistemological crisis that Paul de Man once noted as especially troubling 
for the father of liberalism, John Locke.13 Lezama self-consciously deploys 
this device to purposefully disrupt liberalist tenets.
 Although he appreciated how metaphor disrupts epistemological and 
identificatory conventions, Lezama sometimes still invokes sovereign fig-
ures to elaborate the secretive nature of metaphor. Subjectivity is achieved 
through what he calls oblique experience (la	vivencia	oblicua), which occurs 
“between the dark letter [carta	oscura] delivered by metaphor—precise unto 
itself and mysterious in its associative ends [decisios]—and the recognition 
of the image” (RI 222). Oddly, Lezama compares the subject who recognizes 
the image to Louis XI and unnamed “medieval kings” (RI 222). Such allu-
sions suggest that, despite the secret’s disruptions of liberalist certitudes, 
the poetic subject is still a sovereign one. But the sort of sovereignty poetry 
discovers is popular or commonal; it is not an individualized privilege or 
volition that imbues one figure with absolute power and autonomy. Instead, 
everyone becomes a king. Metaphor’s enigmas point readers to the “pauses, 
the suspensions where the force [fuerza] of the noncausal design, which con-
stitutes the kingdom of absolute freedom and where the person incarnates 
metaphor, are half-opened. Man and the people can achieve their living in 
metaphor and the image, maintained by oblique experience; they can trace 
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the charm [encantamiento] that assumes unanimity” (RI 222). The task of 
constructing a new “man” is thus not the aristocratic privilege of the poet 
alone. The people also play a role in oblique experience. Like the poet, they, 
too, can encounter, through language, a magically transformative secret. 
When the population pursues this common freer “kingdom,” the circum-
stances amount to a cultural discovery of collective impersonality. Such 
“unanimity” is a condition of the popular incarnation of life’s mysteries.
 To have such an oblique experience, the people must inhabit the gaps, 
the suspensions, and the uncertainties that surface as they metaphorically 
convey their individual experiences. Lezama describes this peculiar state as 
a matter of occupying a structure situated between “the woods and the cities” 
(RI 222). This “penultimate wall” is not a defensive border but a “suspension, 
from whence the new cavalcade springs, the interminable army in different 
uniforms” (RI 222). Here an offensive is launched; however, the spectator 
cannot clearly discern, much less claim an allegiance to, one identity from 
among the motley assortment. Standing together on this parapet is an act of 
coalition that complicates any idea of a self-same population. The offensive 
witnessed below, between the cities, never ends; its “interminable” nature 
suggests that individuals are always trying to reach or defend some city’s 
border, to breach or secure the limit defining an identity for their selves 
and their people. Located on this wall, suspended by the secret of oblique 
living, we, the people, do not wear uniforms. Instead of identity, we find 
“unanimity.” We are removed from any secure way of life that is allegori-
cally associated with a city, a nation, or a domain.	Unanimity is a loss of 
individualism, a precondition for that anonymity which, ironically, permits 
self-discovery and freedom. Because this collectivity is gathered in the face 
of metaphor’s darkness and before an ongoing struggle, unanimity never 
resolves into a popular consensus. Instead, it is an opportune condition that 
lets one know one’s self differently. Without uniforms, we must ask: Who 
stands here beside me? Why are we here together? Even though one ceases to 
know which way of life distinguishes one culture from others, civic cohesion 
continues. The univocal parameters of identification disappear. One exists in 
a precarious state of resemblance and looks on with interest at—but is curi-
ously removed from—the identity-based struggles occurring within sight of 
where one stands.
 The relatively static text of the poem (el	poema) is the space of suspension 
from whence civilization’s identity-driven struggles are observed and ques-
tioned. (This stasis is opposed to the dynamic process of poetry [la	poesía], 
the movement of metaphor causing the subject’s displacement.) This is not 
just a space one slips into while reading, though; rather, it is a space of incor-
poration, where the critical and enigmatic experience of suspension is given 
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“a body” (un	cuerpo). Because Lezama’s poet doesn’t understand or know the 
full significances of the relation manifested by any given poem, he is unlike 
Stevens’s narcissistic writer who seeks out resemblances because they give 
him pleasure (chapter 1 above). As a space of incorporation, the poem is the 
product of an uncontrollable and unknowable passion that brings together 
poet and reader. Reading is like standing on that bulwark’s penultimate wall, 
between cities and woods. In that suspended space of relation, one belongs to 
some political commonality but is also aware of a world close by, just beyond 
those definitive borders. One’s attention is directed not only to the skirmish 
below, where uniformed soldiers invade or stave off invasion, but also out of 
a sphere of familiarity and into a hitherto unnoticed distance. “The distance 
between persons and things creates an other dimension, a species of entity 
that is not being: the image, what locates the vision or unity of those interpo-
sitions. . . . So that distance, that absence of things, is not its [poetry’s] enemy; 
rather, it’s a fullness of immediacy, where we slide the mirror that sweats a 
dew of enigmas and the slow transpiration or vapor of images” (RI 235, 236). 
The page and its metaphors are like a mirror we hold up to reality to catch 
a glimpse of the ungraspable truth about the relationship between identity 
and life. Unlike Stevens’s narcissistic reflection, wherein one’s own image is 
mixed with other objects, however, Lezama’s mirror never reflects the reader 
back to herself. Instead, the play of condensation and evaporation—that is, 
the representative play of metaphor—refracts	and distorts. One sees life, and 
oneself, obliquely. Poetry’s distortions and fragments supply “one of the most 
powerful nets man possesses for trapping the fugitive and for animating the 
inert” (RI 235). The glimpse afforded by such a strange mirror is a form 
of power, a way to freedom. Extrapolating from “Possible Images,” we can 
conclude that poetry enables the people, as a whole, to realize a potential 
freedom and self-actualization once reserved only for monarchs. However, 
that sovereignty is unlike anything previously known in monarchical ages. 
It also differs dramatically from liberalist individualism because it can be 
discovered only in a moment of sharing. That common experience makes 
it impossible for anyone to claim that she knows hereself fully or autono-
mously, and it makes it impossible for them to claim allegiance to only one 
national collective. All that one can claim is the space of suspension.
 In his last prose contribution to Orígenes, “La dignidad de la poesía” 
(“The Dignity of Poetry”; Orígenes	40, 1956), Lezama equates modernity 
with “the dialectical period” that emerged with the teachings of Socrates. 
Since antiquity, “modern” man has been plagued by “the individual daimon	
[that]	 replaces the hereditary enchanter, [and thus] surrenders the Del-
phic to the fate of the liberated individual of the polis.” With modernity’s 
emphasis on individualism over mystery, “poetry is extinguished” (TH	317). 
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Dialectics are associated with causality; that is, motive and autonomy are 
figured as the only true means of agency. Consequently, our sense of what 
constitutes history has been diminished to a progressive, linear narrative 
wherein individuals are presumed to have the natural right to act with unin-
hibited freedom. Contrary to that sense of history and the subject, Lezama 
envisions the distance we are drawn into by poetry’s secret as introducing 
what he elsewhere calls “poematic time [tiempo	poemático], a subtle form 
of resistance without making history” (RI 227). One does not seek to make 
history; rather, one lives creatively within time. Rather than causing disen-
chantment or alienation, this different kind of historical experience enables	
a new form of resistance and sovereignty better suited for the reality of our 
not fully knowing our selves, much less the friends who stand beside us.
 When Lezama explicitly writes of poetry as an ethos in “The Dignity of 
Poetry,” he notes that it does not constitute a revolutionary gesture (“in its 
dimensions as liberator”). Instead, poetic ethics emerge if texts let one act as 
an “interpreter of two polar opposite foci: the original act [el	acto	primigenio] 
and the configuration of kindness [bondad]” (TH	307). The poet (and, we 
might presume, the reader brought with the poet into the poem’s suspended 
space) moves dynamically between these two foci, as if tracing an ellipse. 
That movement constitutes a new sort of dialectic. Surprisingly, the focus 
Lezama describes as most “elevating” is not the one associated with creation. 
The “laws of the imagination” are “weighting,” not as free and individualistic 
as too often is presumed. But poetry escapes that gravity by approaching the 
focus associated with kindness and its “laws of customs” (TH	323).	Kindness	
is not something one shows others. Instead, it is a consciousness of how a 
desire to befriend others—to found unanimous communities via poetry that 
looks toward the distance—imposes limits that, in the end, disrupt senses 
of self. Even the most common companion thus seems like a Delphic oracle 
or a recipient of religious grace. A sense of self, as well as the language for 
expressing that sense, are dictated or compelled by those companions. This 
cosmopolitanism causes “a breakdown [rompimiento] of all causality in 
conduct” (TH	317). Obliging the kindness of such personages’ inscrutable 
natures does “detain” our “action,” as Lezama writes earlier; but they only 
hold us briefly (TH	308). When one pauses to wonder how to address a com-
panion and share a vision, liberating commonalities are discovered. That 
suspension, that retarding of agency, is necessary, for it gives one time to 
stare into the distance and to describe anew the puzzling struggles between 
identity and difference that surface behind a city’s gates or a country’s bor-
ders.
 Living where the laws of cause and effect are suspended, we experience 
time in what Lezama famously called imaginary eras (eras	 imaginarias). 
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Rather than starting with our selves, we start with an imagined relation 
to another subject, even another historical moment. Our attention should 
always be trained outward, away from our selves and our cities or nations. 
Each of us will strive to interpret what transpires there, to bring it close. 
Although that effort is doomed to occur perpetually, to fail to produce a 
consensual and definitive interpretation of what we observe, it allows us to 
become unanimous in our resolve to continue to stand, and to live, together. 
Lezama offers a strange ethic, then, which lands us squarely between self 
and other, identity and difference. Concentrating on the relation itself, he 
attempts to occupy an insecure and risky zone. He asks us to realize that 
we live metaphorically. Never existing in complete identification with others 
or images, we live only in forms of likeness, proximate to one another and 
in liminal spaces. In such a world of similarity and difference, there are no 
proper selves.
“a state organized before time”
By locating poetry’s struggles outside history proper in so-called “poematic 
time,” Lezama seems to consign his poetic ethics to the realm of metaphysics. 
Indeed, many readers have presumed as much ever since Julio Cortázar’s essay 
“To Reach Lezama Lima,” which introduced many in the Spanish-speaking 
world to Lezama’s poetic novel Paradiso	(1966). He portrays Lezama as the 
exemplary “primitive” who “wakes up on his island with a preadamite hap-
piness, without a fig leaf, innocent of any direct tradition. . . . He is Cuban 
with only a handful of his own culture behind him and the rest is knowl-
edge, pure and free, not a career responsibility” (“To Reach Lezama Lima,” 
146, 147). Reminiscent of Wallace Stevens’s characterization of Orígenes	as 
idyllically uncorrupted by concerns with the state (see chapter 1), Cortázar’s 
description of Lezama’s poetic as prelapsarian and outside a national cul-
ture or tradition seems to render it utterly apolitical and metaphysical.14 His 
idea of poematic time does seek to effect an immediate social intervention, 
though; and that objective is clarified in an earlier piece suspiciously recalled 
by Cortázar’s depiction of Lezama’s innocently awakening poetic subject. 
The Spanish philosopher María Zambrano’s essay “La Cuba secreta” (“Secret 
Cuba”) appeared in Orígenes	19 (1948), two issues after Lezama’s “Possible 
Images.”15 Having lived in Cuba for thirteen years while exiled from Fran-
co’s Spain, Zambrano refers to her new home as her “pre-natal country” (mi	
patria	pre-natal) (La	Cuba	secreta	y	otros	ensayos, 107). Cuba is a sleeping 
land that has only recently begun to wake up to modernity, and thus it pre-
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serves a dreamlike “secret and silent life” (ibid., 109). Zambrano’s vision of 
a sleepy Caribbean island republic is not as colonialist as it appears. In her 
philosophy, innocence and secrecy are not idyllic states preceding rational 
consciousness, nor are they indicators of an individualistic prelapsarian 
nostalgia like what Cortázar reads into Lezama. Instead, they are tools that 
transform understandings of rationality and refigure	modernity.
 Distrustful of how passions were excluded from theorizations of action, 
Zambrano condemned revolutionary rhetoric for overly idealizing clarity, 
rationality, and singleness of purpose. In Persona	y	democracia:	La	historia	
sacrificial (Personhood	and	Democracy:	Sacrificial	History) (1958), she writes 
that the long road (camino) to realizing one’s own sense of personhood 
begins with “waking up from a nightmare” (14). One does not suddenly 
assume a new consciousness, though; this awakening is “the opposite of a 
Revolution” (ibid., 13). Instead of finding absolute certitude, one wakes with 
an “instantaneous clarity like a lightning flash [relámpago] that makes vis-
ible a situation, the situation of someone who, by wandering off the beaten 
path [andar	en	lo	erróneo] also walks about errantly [anda	también	errante]” 
(ibid., 31–32). By going astray, one finds a path. Ironically, however, staying 
on that path necessitates proceeding without a plan. Lightning throws light 
on a subject for only an instant; moreover, it has a way of doing so by put-
ting the shadows and darkness into relief, not by removing them. So, as we 
walk along, we are always stumbling, as through a darkened wood. Neither 
revolutionary nor paradisiacal, this momentary enlightenment is actually 
an “instant of perplexity that precedes consciousness and, indeed, forces 
[obliga] it to be born” (ibid., 13). Zambrano’s subject never experiences a 
full revelation of that new consciousness, however. The possibility which she 
continually glimpses remains on the “horizon,” like the skirmish witnessed 
from the penultimate wall in Lezama’s “Possible Images.” It is observed 
only as a “distant reality” and “a living focus” that “magnetically” (como	un	
imán) draws one toward a promise of “things-to-come” (porvenir) (ibid., 32). 
Because each rise to consciousness is shadowed by perplexity and confusion, 
not knowing is part of the human condition. As Zambrano figures it, this 
mysteriousness and incertitude enables action and is the precondition for 
freedom. Only through such a project can humanity realize its personhood 
(la	persona) and transcend a scenario that reduces mankind to a mere cast 
of masked characters (personajes) in a scripted historical tragedy.16	Once the 
individual is redirected from particular contexts’ dramas, she can face the 
possibility of universality because she realizes that “all nationalism has its 
end . . . it is condemned to cease to be one day” (ibid., 153). Such a view of 
passion-driven agency thus ultimately promotes cosmopolitanism.
 Despite its transcendental dimensions, Zambrano’s philosophy is very 
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much concerned with redressing modern society’s valorization of only cer-
tain kinds of individualized historical agency. When she wrote of Lezama’s 
concept of the secret in 1948, she was not opposing norteamericano	 lib-
eralism per se but was taking an implicit stance against Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
idea of engagement in “Existentialism Is a Humanism” (1946), a philosophy 
that later influenced nationalistic articulations of postcolonial resistance in 
Cuba. Sartre’s famous dictum that “existence precedes essence” would have 
been especially problematic for Zambrano. That existentialist formulation 
depends on a fully revelatory consciousness embodied by a human sub-
ject “who hurls himself toward a future” and even imaginatively visualizes 
himself there, “at the start of a plan which is aware of itself ” (Sartre, Exis-
tentialism	and	Human	Emotions, 13, 16). In their shared notions of distant 
horizons, of the necessity of disorienting passions, and of darkened glimpses 
luring subjects toward future possibilities, Zambrano and Lezama obviously 
differ from Sartre.17
 The differences of their ideas about action and responsibility are even 
more pronounced when art is the primary subject of consideration. In “What 
Is Literature?” (1947), Sartre argues that poetry precludes engagement. Only 
prose, which trades in a transparent realism, can realize a desirable “action 
by disclosure.” He continues: “The ‘engaged’ writer knows that words are 
action. He knows that to reveal is to change and that one can reveal only 
by planning to change” (Essays	 in	Existentialism, 320). Poetry, in contrast, 
heightens the individual poet’s isolation. Engaging the word as if one were 
confronting “his own image, like a mirror,” Sartre’s poet is a narcissist who 
exists only in a private relation with the rest of the world (ibid., 311). Remi-
niscent of Roland Barthes’s opposition to Sartre in his  ironically titled essay 
“What Is Writing?” (1947, later the first chapter of Writing	Degree	Zero), 
Zambrano’s response lauds the poetic subject as exemplifying a different 
sort of agency.18 “Secret Cuba” narrates that understanding through the lens 
of Lezama’s secretive and difficult metaphorical writing, which, Zambrano 
argues, models an alternative form of engagement in its refusal of disclosure. 
“The poetic word is action that frees the pairing of forms enclosed in the 
dream of materiality and the sleeping blast [soplo] in the heart of man,” she 
notes. “Man does not awaken into solitude; rather, when the word awakens 
it also parcels off, as a country [patria], the reality that has been granted to 
his soul.” That is to say, the lightning flash of consciousness embodied by a 
poem helps the subject overcome alienation in an unexpected way: through 
the secrecy of the poetic word. The surfacing of this secret engenders a sus-
pension wherein one rediscovers one’s self and one’s affiliations with a com-
monality. Unlike existentialism’s favored mode of revelation, the force of 
the secret’s irruption and the strengths of the commonality it promotes owe 
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to the fact that poetry “is not transparency” (Zambrano, Cuba	secreta, 111; 
emphasis added).
 Even the title of “Secret Cuba” highlights how she recognizes that the 
ethical force of Lezama’s work owes not to its metaphysical abstraction but 
to its grounding in a	particular	geography. Reflecting on his poetic in “José 
Lezama Lima en la Habana” (1948), Zambrano writes that “the poet’s uni-
versality seems to rest . . . in ascribing him to a certain place” (Cuba	secreta, 
171). In universality’s eventual transcendence of place, one’s home is a point 
of origin rather than an immobilizing anchor. In moving from locality to 
globality, the poet brings with him the secret, the uncertainties character-
izing a culture once believed to be fully known. If Cuba is the Spaniard Zam-
brano’s own “pre-natal country,” its social reality is the fantasy preceding her 
(re)birth as a worldlier subject, one who is “without identity” (ibid., 111). 
If Cuban culture in the 1940s and 1950s was characterized by a mysterious 
connection to the North, if appropriation rather than authenticity was at the 
heart of its nationhood, the “place” Lezama inhabited was, by its very nature, 
foreign. His poetry’s acknowledgment of the northern shadows thrown on 
Cuban architecture permits a new country to emerge, via secretive and frag-
mentary glimpses of future cosmopolitan possibilities.
 The political dimensions of such an ethic are thrown into relief when con-
sidered in light of Lezama’s response to public attacks by Jorge Mañach, a 
chief member of the Minorista	vanguard whose work modeled a combative 
postcolonial ethic and a proto-existentialist aesthetic for later Cuban poets. 
In an open letter published in the magazine Bohemia	(“El arcano de cierta 
poesía nueva,” September 1949) as a reaction to Lezama’s collection La	fijeza	
(Fixity), Mañach denounced the origenistas. He judged their thematic con-
cerns with religion and a literary absolute as generating a hermetic attitude 
symptomatic of the decadence and provincialism that isolated Cuba from the 
modern world. He also felt that their metaphysics caused them to endorse 
the bourgeois norms responsible for political corruption and the republic’s 
Americanization. Lezama replied the next month. Orígenes	endeavored to 
form what he provocatively calls “a little republic of letters” (IP	20). Unlike 
the Minoristas’ magazine Avance or even the origenistas’ previous short-lived 
publishing ventures, their magazine skirted provincialism by securing con-
tributions from many of the world’s most famous modernists.19 The most 
biting part of Lezama’s letter, though, is his reply to Mañach’s accusation that 
difficulty is uncritical.
Almost all art and a great deal of contemporary philosophy raise their inqui-
ries [problemas] further from the edge [contorno], the wall, or the limitations 
of causal logic. . . . Dostoevsky, Claudel, Proust, Joyce, all those who have felt 
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pressed to raise language to unheard of possibilities: Is it not from beyond 
the limit where they have situated their barbs and insinuations? And is it 
not precisely in their fury against the limit—against language and situations 
so encysted [enquistada] by a bourgeois treatment—where we encounter 
the best enjoyment of a voluptuous intellect, on first glance? Perhaps all this 
turns out to be a little too obvious, given the malice of his [i.e., Mañach’s] I	
don’t	understand. (IP	189)
Mañach, the self-proclaimed aesthetic revolutionary, was the real victim of 
an “encysted” bourgeois malignancy and provincial worldview. His expec-
tation of literary clarity testifies to his uncritical acceptance of convention 
and his being out of step with Euro-American modernisms. Esotericism, 
hermeticism, difficulty: for Lezama, these qualities disrupt social norms by 
pushing language practices beyond habitude. Oriented toward founding a 
“small republic of letters” tied to the rest of the literary world, the success of 
Lezama’s poetic rests upon how its secretive metaphorical nature, the root 
of its difficulty, provides glimpses of an otherwise indefinable cosmopolitan 
promise.
 His cyst metaphor is quite revealing about his opposition to the popular 
encouragement of Cubans’ unquestioned optimism about their country’s 
independence. Ultimately, such ill-founded high spirits caused blindness 
about the realities of Cuba’s continuing connection to other cultures. Polit-
ical and aesthetic utopianism was often coupled with a nationalism that fos-
tered a sense of insularity and a backward glance toward Cuba’s illusory glory 
days. In “La otra desintegración” (“The Other Disintegration”), an opinion 
piece appearing in Orígenes	21 (1949), Lezama inveighs against such unwar-
ranted optimistic political rhetoric. Beliefs that the republic was on the cusp 
of reclaiming its lost past grandeur, he felt, actually belied a “current, almost 
untouchable, in the depths of negativity” (IP	196). He diagnoses any “pro-
jection or drive to more splendid zones” through supposed past glories as a 
“critical symptom that signals the failure of the state imagination” (IP	194).20 
Recuperating a mythic past so as to suture the present’s uncertainties or to 
legitimate a corrupt status quo is the political version of T. S. Eliot’s mythic 
method. Lezama expressly opposed contemporary poetry adopting such 
models because it deployed “critical” or “synthetic” forms that have “no great 
passion” (Lezama, Diarios	1939–40/1956–58, 39).21
 Instead of narrating a predetermined and persuasive idea of hope in a 
rhetorically fabricated optimism that belied an actual negative or pessimistic 
worldview, he himself preferred to be lured	by poetic images toward more 
hopeful possibilities. As legacies of a Cartesian Enlightenment mentality, state 
politics—like typical Cuban vanguardism and Eliotic modernism—prob-
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   74 11/13/2008   12:52:09 PM
A  n A t I o n ’ S  S e c r e t S   
lematically endorses clarity and seeks security. Such utopic nationalism and 
totalizing poetics lacks the sort of “erotic understanding” (el	 conocimiento	
erótico) he and Zambrano appreciate, “an understanding of the other and 
of multiplicity, simultaneously tempting and obscure [oscuro]” (IP	195). In 
contrast, the enticing darkness and inscrutability of metaphorical images 
resist full disclosure, and so passionately engender an “ethical attitude” (la	
actitud	ética) (IP	196). Artists are compelled to “creat[e] tradition for futu-
rity, an image that searches for its incarnation, its realization in historical 
time, in the metaphor that participates” (IP	196–97). Such resistance hinges 
on letting oneself be drawn into circumstances that perpetually unsettle 
one’s expectations and introduce hitherto unrecognized connections and 
possibilities. In an untitled opinion piece from around the same time (Orí-
genes	15, 1947), Lezama asserts that artists who refuse exile and remain on 
the island—implicitly meaning himself and the origenistas—supply “another 
kind [suerte] of politics, another way [suerte] of ruling the city in a profound 
and secret manner” (IP	193). Playing with the doubled meaning of suerte	
(both “fortune”/“luck” and “sort”/“type”), he suggests that the politics of 
poetry offers a future orientation, born of chance. Unlike nationalists’ revolu-
tionary promise, it cannot be perceived teleologically, in its scientific totality. 
Instead, this aleatory politicized future prospect emerges in an unplanned 
way, with the help of the impassioned labor of those who “desire succession 
and work in secret, amorously” (IP	193). As Lezama writes a few years later 
in “About an Anthology” (1952), the same essay where he mentions Stevens’s 
influence, Orígenes saw itself as “something more than a literary or artistic 
generation, it is a state	organized before time [un	estado	organizado	frente	al	
tiempo]” (IP	173; emphasis added). His choice of words could not be more 
deliberate. Orígenes is not a generational style, not even an organization. 
Instead, it is an ethicopolitical strategy confronting time itself. As such, it is 
a state (un	estado) that doubles for the polis. By strategically facilitating dia-
logues between geopolitically and chronologically distant texts, the group’s 
magazine exists out of dialectical history in order to realize a “secret history” 
(la	historia	 secreta) that reveals alternate forms of historical and political 
experience (IP	173).
 Lezama’s poetic reimagining of history draws readers toward the 
unspoken, secret connections between people, arts, and cultures to which 
the state and popular Cuban culture are blind. The resultant uncertainty 
cultivates a kind of vulnerability conducive to moving away from rigidly 
nationalist attitudes. “Our Island commenced its history within poetry” (CH	
83). So begins “Prólogo a poesía cubana” (“Foreword to Cuban Poetry”), 
Lezama’s introduction for a three-volume edition of Cuban poetry published 
in 1965. Christopher Columbus’s record of the isle’s discovery, he argues, 
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supplies the original link between poetic writing and Cuban nationhood. 
Since poetry and history come from the outside, originating with the colo-
nizer, a poetic conception of the nation is incompatible with the political one 
of an authentic, absolutely independent state. Although the famous image of 
a burning branch falling into the sea originally lured Columbus to the island 
and attracted Lezama to these journals, the poet admits an even greater fas-
cination with the voyager’s metaphorical description of the Taínos’ skin. “It is 
necessary to emphasize the accent of that expression—a	horse’s	silkiness—, with 
which the allusion [by Columbus] is made not only to a beautiful presence, 
but also to the burden [carga] of an ethicality buried deep, like a silky and 
fine resistance that was to be characteristic of all lo	cubano’s noble purposes” 
(CH 83–84). Not only do poetry and language come from elsewhere, but 
that outsider’s perspective is the seed of Cuban writers’ enduring obligation 
to the past. It also marks the origin of an idea of belonging to the landscape 
that is fully embodied only by an absence, the enticing skin of the extermi-
nated indigenous peoples. That absent presence—the metaphorical preser-
vation of, and continuing connection to, a violently erased past—is a forceful 
reminder that the colony from which the nation would spring was founded 
on genocide. Consequently, Lezama implies that other Cuban writers who 
carefully read Columbus’s journals are compelled to look at their land and 
their history from the very position of the colonizer from which they wish to 
extricate themselves.22 Like him, they too desire contact with some pure and 
noble ideal of nativist authenticity.
 That authenticity is forever inaccessible, though. By focusing on Colum-
bus’s bestial metaphor, Lezama draws attention to the significance of the 
natives’ skin, not their interiors wherein, according to liberalist logics, one’s 
authentic identity is found. The epidermis here does not just signify racially. 
It also is the limit of others’ bodies, what makes these subjects vulnerable 
in their exposure to the rest of the world. It is an indicator of a bare life at 
odds with the privileges of sovereignty and right enjoyed by Columbus and 
his modern Euro-American world; as such, it is a reminder in need of extin-
guishing. Since the Taínos’ skin is imagined specifically in equine terms, 
their difference assumes ambivalent connotations. Superficially, Columbus’s 
metaphor dehumanizes them. Yet it also brings the natives metaphorically 
closer to European culture since horses are not indigenous to Cuba. Ulti-
mately, their difference makes them susceptible to harm and a racist dehu-
manizing impulse; yet its familiarity also associates the Taíno with a cul-
tural element—not just a natural beast—imagined as embodying resistance, 
endurance, and nobility. Their skin presents an attractive	and erotic limit, 
strong in its vulnerability and thus alluring to both Columbus and Lezama. 
Despite that attraction, however, both the journals’ figurative portrayal and 
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Lezama’s recounting of it keep readers at a distance. The essence and the 
interior of the indigenous subject’s singular mystery are left undisclosed. To 
responsibly produce a national character for Cuba, poetry must contend with 
that alterity which simultaneously embodies vulnerability, erotic magnetism, 
and resistance. Rather than restore a mythic heroic past, one historical duty 
writers have is to resurrect the missing native body. Such re-membering—
both a historical mnemonic and a reconstitution of the past’s dismembered, 
victimized bodies—does not ground a nativist ideology. Instead, it fosters a 
repeated contact with an otherness that resists a totalizing knowledge and 
possession. It reminds Cubans of their own cultural and erotic investments 
in modernity’s genocidal and imperialistic nightmare, not the idyllic dream 
Cortázar believed to inform Lezama’s poetic. It encourages an appreciation 
of stumbling upon and being drawn to images that elicit vulnerability and 
loving attachment, rather than an engagement of a self-glorifying autonomy 
and agentic violence.
reforming Liberalism
In February 1954, Lezama wrote Zambrano that he was frustrated with how 
Batista’s new regime corrupted language to render meaning utterly indeci-
pherable, for its own political ends. “The word is corrupted; through a pro-
cess of oozing moistness, words are corrupted scarcely before they throw 
their voice into the half-open space [al	espacio	entreabierto].” Consequently, 
politicians seem to avoid “the right interpretation,” as well as “truthfulness” 
(la	 veracidad). Instead, “everything’s the fruit of scandal, of substitutions” 
(Cartas	a	Elóisa, 291). If substitution and obscurantism were typical of Cuban 
political corruption, a poetics based on a secret that emerged from meta-
phorical substitutions and prevented direct access to the truth would seem 
circumspect. Indeed, as direct action to resistances heated up, even some 
origenistas	 felt that the magazine’s mission was misguided. Rodríguez Feo 
and Virgilio Piñera left Orígenes	to found the rival magazine Ciclón, which 
served as “a laboratory for experimentation and necessary risk-taking” not 
provided by the other magazine’s poetics of difficulty or its resistant ethics 
(Roberto Pérez Leon, Tiempo	de	Ciclón, 28). Hard-pressed to distinguish his 
concept of the secret from the nation-state’s more malign, corruptive praxis, 
Lezama used the forum of his 1957 lectures for the National Institute of 
Culture’s Center for Higher Education to directly relate the ethical program 
of his poetics to Latin American histories of postcolonial resistance. The 
result, The	American	Expression, implicitly argues for an ethical appreciation, 
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rather than hasty dismissal, of reform	as a viable alternative to revolutionary 
upheaval.23 Lezama felt too connected to other periods and cultures to sup-
pose that he, or anyone else, could easily cut those ties and proclaim absolute 
autonomy. One had to work through, rather than reject, liberalism. In that 
process, one would uncover secret histories—much like the aforementioned 
one between Columbus and the Taíno—that would promote new under-
standings of Cuban citizens’ connections to the rest of the world.
 In his lectures, Lezama characterizes aesthetic texts as historical actors. 
Pointing to similarities in images	supplied by The	Book	of	Hours and paint-
ings by Brueghel, van der Weyden, van Eyck, and others, he argues that these 
texts introduce “natural presences and cultural artifacts that act like char-
acters [personajes], which participate [in history] as metaphors” (EA	282). 
The topical resemblances in these compositions enact a historical drama 
staged through the texts’ figurative correspondences with one another. 
These engagements occur outside dialectical time. The past speaks to the 
future, and the future and present speak back to the past. In this manner, 
dialogues conducted through art produce a dramatic intervention in the 
order of things (EA	283). In Cuba’s changing social and political climate, 
though, Lezama would have been unlikely to win over an audience solely 
with a theory of the aesthetic agency of texts. So, he also characterizes the 
artist—not just texts—as what he terms a “metaphorical subject.” Each text’s 
dramatic intervention in the current order of things is a production over-
seen, even “driven” (impulsado),	by the artist, “who through his counterir-
ritant [revulsiva] force, puts the whole line into motion” (EA	282). Acting 
as a director, the artist coordinates the resemblances surfacing between her 
own and others’ texts. The resultant dialogue moves the aesthetic assem-
blage “toward [a] new vision,” so as to produce a “metamorphosis” (EA	283). 
Both textual actors and artistic directors have agency; however—and this is a 
crucial qualification—they limit one another. The representations’ dramatic 
performance is coordinated by the artist (thus limiting the texts’ agency), 
but the artist cannot always anticipate the full ramifications of textual cor-
respondences and as a result is prohibited from using art didactically, as a 
vehicle for self-expression. The artist’s efforts to realize an aesthetic and eth-
ical vision are further limited by “cultural” resources (the imagination rooted 
in, and limited by, a cultural imaginary) as well as “natural” materials (the 
geographical context where the artist works).
 Lezama was not interested in turning writers and other artists into a sep-
arate, noble class. As was evident in his imagining in “Possible Images” of 
the people standing together on the city’s penultimate wall, he long believed 
that everyone can discover new forms of agency by witnessing the adven-
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tures of metaphor that occur in poetry. The	American	Expression clarifies 
that the agency of the artist, like that of the audience, actually originates 
in surprise	 at discovering unexpected correspondences between texts. 
Reflecting on post-Carolingian art, Lezama rhapsodizes about how “the 
elect” imaginatively approach reality through the lens of the marvelous and 
miraculous, rather than through narratives of “simplistic causality” (EA	
287). Contemporary audiences and artists who are similarly open to the 
surprises revealed by textual correspondences have an analogous experi-
ence. “That surprise over those intersections establishes something like 
the luck [suerte] of retrospective causality” (EA	287). Instead of narrating 
progress, texts thus produce a historical intervention. “Our point of view 
parts ways from [one that upholds] the impossibility of similar styles, of 
the lack of identity of two apparently concluded forms, of the creativity of a 
new concept of historical causality; it destroys the pseudo-temporal concept 
that everything is directed toward the contemporary, [and, instead, moves 
us] toward a fragmentary time” (EA	290). The high estimation modernity 
places on historical progress and state-inscribed aesthetic movements must 
be abandoned; only then can art produce new commonalities by linking 
actors and texts that otherwise would remain unrelated because of instilled 
notions about the propriety of one’s place and time. Agency originates in 
this so-called retrospective glance, which lets one re-narrate connections to 
other places, times, and peoples based on the lessons one has had the luck, 
or good fortune (suerte), to learn from aesthetic texts’ correspondences (EA	
370). When historical convention stops making sense, available narratives 
about coherent, self-contained identity are disrupted because the connec-
tions between past and present are revealed to have “a secret continuity” (EA	
371). Lezama’s secret, then, does not merely obfuscate meaning like Batista’s 
corrupt political rhetoric. Rather, it embodies the unconscious process of 
cultural appropriation responsible for the Cuban landscape	or countryside	
(paisaje), as Lezama differentiates the cultural country from the political 
one	(país). Facets of a secret relation between Cuba and the rest of the world 
stand to be discovered through the imaginary eras established by the corre-
spondences of artworks, in their drama outside the dialectical history asso-
ciated with revolution and modernity. In the remainder of The	American	
Expression, Lezama himself acts as a metaphorical subject who directs the 
dramatic interplay of otherwise unrelated aesthetic and historical texts from 
the North and the South. Figures ranging from José Martí to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and Walt Whitman, from the Mexican corredigedores to the Ger-
shwin brothers, supply glimpses of the Americas’ secret continuities so as to 
begin the process of ethical reform.
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 Appropriation facilitates this cultural interplay, and that aesthetic 
embodying Lezama’s ideal of appropriation is the baroque. In his oft-cited 
second lecture “La curiosidad barroca” (“The Baroque Curiosity”), he calls 
the baroque “the art of counterconquest [contraconquista]” (EA	303). Indeed, 
the heart of his secret history is that contraconquista	art is not merely an aes-
thetic relic from the mannerism of Spain’s Counter-Reformation; rather, the 
baroque is an ethos, an artful way of life, still very much a part of his Cuban 
audience’s experience. 
It is not a degenerate form, but a fullness, that in Spain and Hispanic Amer-
ica represents acquisitions of language, perhaps unique in the world, fur-
niture for experience, forms of life and of curiosity, mysticism that signals 
new modes of prayer, ways of flavoring and treating delicacies, that exhale a 
complete, refined, and mysterious life, theocratic and lost in thought, errant 
in form and deeply rooted in its essences. (EA	303)
Although he likens this baroque to a “Platonism, whose origin was the 
breaking and uniting of fragments,” he undercuts its metaphysical dimension 
by describing it as a material lifestyle, replete with furnishings, recipes, and 
a spiritual program. This style structures Latin American architecture and 
the American subject alike, both of which are “established” in the landscape 
“with delight [fruición]	and a normal style of life and death” (EA	303). The 
great architects of the first American baroque age, which Lezama dates from 
the end of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth, were not Euro-
peans. Instead, they included the Quecha artist Kondori, whose work creates 
a continuum between the natural environment and human habitats, and the 
manumitted Brazilian leper slave Aleijadihno, whose stone architecture puts 
Hispanic colonialism into conversation with African traditions (EA	324). By 
providing structures for dwelling, by influencing the cuisine that provides 
sustenance, and by producing linguistic idiosyncrasies, the baroque’s cul-
tural appropriations and the resultant cultural contacts between colonizer 
and colonized generate a desirable ethos for the Americas.
 Because this resistant style is predicated on secret histories and uncon-
scious connections, though, it is no surprise that, in the New World, it is 
connected to the philosophical principles informing the same Reformation 
tradition opposed by the original Spanish baroque. As Lezama oddly depicts 
this relation, the American baroque is “firmly friendly [firmemente	amis-
tosa] with the Enlightenment” (EA	305). The nature of that amicable con-
nection is not at all transparent or conventional, though. “Before resting in 
its idleness, the gift of its harsh Episcopalian paternity, it was incorporated 
with Cartesian cautions, in order to avoid the drop [gota] of coarse [tosca] 
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amethyst” (EA	303). With prophylactic wariness, baroque subjects deploy a 
retrospective rationality, an inductive Cartesianism, in order to emerge dry 
and unscathed from their encounters with the Reformation’s liberalist ideal 
of autonomous individualism. Tellingly, that ideal is described as a “drop” of 
stone, the baroque’s sterile inheritance from the Enlightenment.
 The next lecture, “El romanticismo y el hecho americano” (“Romanticism 
and American Fact”), explains how the earlier American baroque informs 
a later epoch’s adaptation of a liberalist individualism and nationalism. In 
the wake of the French Revolution, many Latin American priests who had 
“abjured” the Church either “converted back” or “opted for English liber-
alism.” These developments reprised Catholics’ obsession with “the constant 
question about the exercise of freedom”; despite these resurgent debates, 
however, the Church made “no qualification of its dogma” (EA	328). The 
peregrinating Jesuit priest Servando Teresa de Mier supplies Lezama with 
a middle-ground position, where the passion of the Catholic elect and the 
willful autonomy of a reformative Protestantism (and, he adds, of British 
Romantics) intersect. Often misunderstood as a rebel, Fray Servando is 
reimagined by Lezama as “reforming from within the previous order, not 
breaking [it] but taking up the thread again” (EA	330). In other words, he 
freely reforms liberalism to adapt it to seemingly incompatible Catholic 
tenets: mystery, passion, lack of autonomy. Refusing to submit to Enlighten-
ment ideals, Fray Servando learns to live differently in relation to them.
 This reformative spirit permits Fray Servando to enter freely into relations 
with those others from whom he would be discouraged, if not forbidden, 
to have contact if he abided by the Church’s conventions. Lezama focuses 
on the Jesuit’s encounter in the Bayona synagogue with Jews who speak 
“a meticulous Spanish.” Mediated by a common language, that encounter 
allowed both Jesuit and Jew to discover resemblances to one another. “Like 
a good American, he is gifted in sympathos,” Lezama comments (EA	330). 
Sympathy is that quality that an appropriative or reformative practice culti-
vates, and it is what Lezama later characterizes as endemic to the Americas’ 
creative and transformative “gnostic space” (EA	387). He pushes his Cuban 
audience to recognize themselves in this Spanish Jesuit: “Another American 
sign: he enters the foreign [aleja] temple out of curiosity, in order to win 
sympathy and to bring them [i.e., the Jews] afterward to a taste of our omni-
scient freedom.” It is a conversion scene, but one in which the believer fore-
goes proselytizing. Fray Servando engages the other with “the refinement of 
asking with mystery, [ . . . ] with a dream that [the Jews’] alien, fine attention 
is going to be obliged to decipher” (EA	331). In other words, he interacts 
with the Jews through a mysterious and poetic	 language. Since they share 
his tongue, he could have transparently communicated his beliefs. Yet, the 
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wandering priest tries to draw his others into a deeper commonality by pre-
senting a communiqué they are “obliged to decipher” for themselves.
 Through Fray Servando, Lezama presents a metaphorical subject that 
complements his previous discussion of the baroque and thus creates an 
oblique link between cultural appropriation and a reformist approach to 
liberalism. By retrospectively situating themselves in relation to that lesson 
in The	American	Expression’s surprising secret history, Lezama’s listeners 
are encouraged, in a gently seductive fashion, to free themselves from the 
stranglehold of identity. He reads the Jesuits’ reformism alongside the fierce 
individualism of Simón Rodríguez who, driven by “a very agitated demon to 
be a citizen of the world,” lived among Native Americans and enjoyed their 
culture’s celebration of Eros (EA	341). To this secret history of great Ameri-
cans is added General Francisco de Miranda, a military figure renowned 
in pre-Revolutionary Russia, France, Britain, and England for “assum[ing] 
the risk” of petitioning William Pitt for the independence of the Americas. 
Miranda’s efforts would inspire the pan-European vision of a young Napo-
leon (EA	343). Lezama traces a lineage for Cuban nationhood—or, cubanía—
through idiosyncratic figures and historical moments rather than through 
official histories’ celebrated romantic and nationalist figures, such as Simón 
Bolívar. In this way, he forcibly	 interrupts the causal history narrating the 
rise of a liberalist independista	spirit in Cuba. Although none of his figures 
illustrates a revolutionary rupture with tradition, Fray Servando and the rest 
demonstrate a curious form of freedom through their aspirations for new 
commonalities and cultural orders and their explorations of sympathetic 
resemblances. Through their examples, Lezama appeals to his audience to 
reformatively temper liberalist rationality and individualism with a passion 
that lets others’ embodiment of mystery, of singular differences, draw them 
outside dogmatic politics and institutional positions.
 The force of these surprises owes to the erotic, passionate dimensions of 
the secret inducing that experience. As María Zambrano writes in “Secret 
Cuba,” “True secrets do not consist in being unveiled; what constitutes their 
maximum generosity, or what lets them remain being secrets, would keep 
empty that place in our soul destined for them. Our life would be seen as 
vulnerable to their loving presence. Because a secret is always a secret of 
love” (La	Cuba	 secreta	 y	 otros	 ensayos,	106–7). The secret is not what is 
withheld. Rather, it is the very substance	of friendship; it is the experience	
of	connection arising upon the discovery of unexpected sympathies. It is the 
essence of what one still has to learn about oneself, spurring an ever outward 
movement and preventing the promotion of self-interest. One is free only 
insofar as one acts, amicably and amorously, within the mysterious limits 
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of kindness imposed by others. Lezama explicitly addresses this erotic ele-
ment of his reformist ethic in his brief discussion of the long poem Primero	
sueño	(First,	I	Dream)	by the Mexican nun, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz. The 
text documents “the secret journey of our communications with the external 
world through subterranean dwellings [moradas].” It is an erotic lesson that 
can seduce anyone. Earlier Scholastic traditions mark a “spirit subdivided 
on its exterior and melted [fundido] by Eros”; however, Sor Juana’s verse 
demonstrates a “scholasticism of the body, which passes whole through her 
poem” (EA	314). Instead of a false unity forcing together a subject cut up 
by various epistemological categories, she poetically re-presents an integral 
body that traverses the space of the page. Eros itself, then, is defined as a tex-
tual encounter with another’s body, present yet mediated through a highly 
metaphorical language. With each line of First,	I	Dream, readers glimpse Sor 
Juana’s sleeping and dreaming body. Yet, she still remains obscured, semi-
clothed, in the shadow of her words. It is a strange sort of fan-dance, by a 
nun who wants to convert us to the object of her ecstatic vision.
 Lezama sensuously describes the effect of reading this metaphorical tease: 
“Its darkness descends to our depths, in order to merge [fundirse] with the 
unexpressed, so as to block the light, inviting the unexpressed, warding it 
off, and to favor its emission through the descent to the depths that always 
give darkness” (EA	315). Rather than gilding her verse with an erotic content 
that reproduces distracting and divisive categories, Sor Juana’s lyric “invites” 
comprehensible interpretations of these desires. In the end, though, her 
invitation is impossible to act on since her poem continues to evade and 
even “block” the figurative light one might throw on it. In an echo of the 
Spanish modifier for “molten” (fundido), Sor Juana’s text—wherein her body 
floats—thus “merges” (se	funde) with an unknowable part of readers’ selves. 
That is to say, the poem’s erotic charge owes to how it plumbs readers’	depths, 
rather than what it reveals about Sor Juana’s private desires. Sympathetic 
with and desirous of the poem’s body, her readers are seduced into a state 
of ek-stasis, standing beside their selves. They are then free to leave behind 
what is known so that they can move toward an altogether different life, a 
possibility, glimpsed in the poem’s seductively mysterious gestures.
 As Lezama specifies, the experience of reading Sor Juana is quite distinct 
from encounters with the erotic literature of French Surrealism or German 
Romanticism. Whereas those traditions look for “another reality, another 
causal magic”—what we would call an unconscious—Sor Juana’s desire is, 
oddly enough, quite a conscious affair. Lezama describes it as “visibly remi-
niscent of Cartesianism; the dream [conveyed by Sor Juana’s poem] appears 
as a form of control by the superconscience. There is a knowledge [sabiduría]: 
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   83 11/13/2008   12:52:11 PM
c h A P t e r  2 
it seems detached by the poem, in the dream, but is worked over the material 
of immediate reality.” Lezama points to the fact that this eroticism is crafted, 
that Sor Juana’s proliferation of metaphors is “a work in which is continued 
the world of conscience [conciencia] and of consciousness [conocimiento; or, 
understanding]” (EA	315; emphasis added). Generally, such poetry is “remi-
niscent of Cartesianism.” Although it seems like an Enlightenment ideal of 
knowledge based on scopic distinctions between self and other, it is actually 
more like baroque	art that had been described earlier as “firmly friendly” with 
the Enlightenment. That is to say, it bears a resemblance to an Enlightenment 
paradigm yet somewhat “detaches” itself from it. This queer sympathy with 
what we might extrapolate to call liberalist	rationality moves toward a more 
physical and intimate knowledge. This “understanding,” conveyed through 
an obfuscating and difficult metaphorical language, attaches the subject to 
material conditions. The text—and, through it, the author—are put bodily 
into contact with readers.24 The resultant conscientiousness and conscious-
ness, morality and understanding, supplies “a living form” (una	forma	vivi-
ente) that confronts the unknown, head-on (EA	316). This engagement with 
secret matters is “not that dilettantism of old cultures, a form of domestic 
ornamentation, but a healthy passion of the enthusiast, a curiosity indulgent 
of terror” (EA	316). A “healthy passion,” but not at all domesticated. Unset-
tling, yet encouraging readers to live, even if it be in “terror,” with difference. 
Such eroticism schools us in how to hold difference in reserve, as part of the 
medium and substance of our lives. This reserve is the essence of reform: of 
re-formation and re-formulation. Living with difference, seduced by its many 
forms, we move closer to the image of Lezama’s own dream: his queer, cos-
mopolitan vision of a Cuban life connected to others beyond his country’s 
borders.
Closets and sympathy
Lezama obtusely and allusively addresses eroticism, that trope where his 
poetic system’s queerness is located by various ciphers: love, friendship, 
seduction, and, not least of all, the	 secret. When critics or other authors 
read his work for its sexual content or only in light of biographical narra-
tives about the author, they deploy the same logic of straightforward lib-
eralist identification contested by Lezama himself.25 Secrecy is his strategy 
for resisting liberalism, as it is tied to both imperialism and heteronorma-
tivity. As a resistance to the latter, though, it is seriously limited because his 
critical ethic’s queer dimensions are even less explicit than its subtle post-
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colonial elements. Secrets suggest a privacy upholding, rather than trans-
forming, liberalist tenets. Such privacy reinforces liberalism’s historical 
exclusions and injurious heteronormativity. Indeed, Lezama has been read 
in precisely this way. In an embittered memoir, former origenista	Lorenzo 
García Vega accuses him of having embodied the conservatism of Batista’s 
dictatorship. He portrays Lezama as: a closeted homophobe and misogynist 
disengaged from Cuba’s early homosexual and women’s rights movements 
of the 1940s and 1950s; a fallen petit	 bourgeois	nostalgic for his family’s 
lost status; a tyrant who masters a vanguard that refuses confrontational 
avant-garde engagement. Because he and the other gay origenistas	adopted 
a “prudish and hermetic attitude,” because they “wanted to present them-
selves as incarnating the values of a foreign, petit bourgeois aristocracy,” 
they hid “the demoniac [lo	demoníaco]	and the sickly that could have stuck 
out.” Both their homosexuality and discontent with Batista’s regime were 
closeted by tropes of hiding or darkness (formas	del	ocultamiento) (García 
Vega, Los	años	de	Origenes, 124). We cannot argue against the reality that, 
evacuated of all sexual content, Lezama’s trope of the secret is an empty 
form susceptible to cooption. In contemporary Cuba, the liberalism of the 
intersection of strong individualism with the existentialist ideal of the revo-
lutionary subject is exacerbated by the state’s adoption of limited private 
enterprise. In this climate, Lezama’s poetic hermeticism, once denounced 
as counterrevolutionary, is now ideologically valued. The state-sponsored 
academy treats him as “a symbol of power,” as reinforcing the elite status of 
those few who are privy to governmental secrets. Moreover, “his idea of the 
secret of Cuban culture, astonishingly, has been incorporated into official 
rhetoric” and is regarded as affirming the value of less, rather than more, 
truly public spaces (Rojas, El	arte	de	la	espera, 190–91).
 Given these strong criticisms and undeniable appropriations of his ideas, 
it is true that we should exercise caution when turning to Lezama’s poetic 
for an ethical model. Nonetheless, it would be fallacious to dismiss his work 
as having little or no value for contemporary queer theory. As Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick reminded us long ago in her extension of Michel Foucault’s work 
against the repressive hypothesis, the closet and the binaries it instanti-
ates—public/private, self/other, gay/straight—are predicated on knowledges 
governed by the imperative that the	subject	must	have	no	secrets. This epis-
temology of the closet is most effectively countered if attention is focused 
on “how certain categorizations work . . . rather than what they essentially 
mean” (Epistemology	of	 the	Closet, 27; emphasis in original). Rather than 
assign an identity-based sexual significance to every secret, it would serve 
us better to investigate how	a	 specific	occurrence	of	 a	 secret	 functions. The 
value of Lezama’s secret is thus not in the homosexual content it suppos-
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edly occludes but in the dynamic whereby his secret’s very refusal of disclo-
sure functions to disrupt how liberalist frameworks control difference by 
circulating and governing conventions and knowledge about identity. His 
secret exposes what Gayatri Gopinath calls “a different economy of desire 
that escapes legibility” (Impossible	Desires, 13). In her analysis, this illeg-
ibility proves crucial for resistances by queer postcolonial subjects. Often 
they are codes borrowed from elsewhere, translated into their own cultural 
vocabularies in such a way that they are visible but not entirely decipherable. 
In Lezama’s case, Northern liberalist individualism provides such a code, 
and he isolates it as the substance of that mysterious relation continuing to 
connect his newly “independent” Cuba to an imperialistic United States. But 
when he appropriates that individualism, Lezama inflects the liberalist values 
of freedom and privacy with Cuban Catholic resonances of mystery, passion, 
ecstasy, and incarnation. The result is not just evidence of a queer subject’s 
resistant ethics. It also demonstrates the queerness that emerges when one 
opts for postcolonial resistances based on passions that leave one vulnerable 
to others. Thus, one is better able to explore similarities than if one pursued 
a kind of resistance based on a revolutionary agency and the assertion of 
autonomy and divisive, identity-based differences.
 Given that he develops this idea of the secret through cultural appropria-
tion, by re-forming (in the sense of reconstituting) the liberalism governing 
Cubans and other postcolonial subjects, Lezama’s poetic usefully extends 
Sedgwick’s idea that part of what the epistemology of the closet occludes are 
the differences existing between people who inhabit the same identity rubric.26 
Identity is not merely an affair of identifying “as”; it also entails identifying 
“with” and “against.” That is to say, difference always attends identification; 
when it surfaces, it can render insecure those liberalist forms of knowledge 
that leave no room for vulnerability, change, or future uncertainties. Leza-
ma’s secret promotes a paradigm of similarity—both within identity catego-
ries and between them. Like the metaphorical images	of his poetic system, 
they are only partially disclosed resemblances to a transcendent unity, what 
we might call a universalized vision of humanity. Though mere glimpses of 
a humanistic promise, they still function to foster an understanding and a 
sympathy whose premises disrupt prevailing humanistic narratives based on 
easily categorized and contained differences.
	 Lezama rejects homosexuality only insofar as he rejects all a	priori	forms 
of identity. His secret lays bare the unacknowledged difference residing at 
the heart of liberalism’s celebration of individualism and individuation. 
Secrets call attention to themselves. As José Quiroga argues, a “homosexual 
text does not necessarily proclaim its own identity in words but in acts—in 
the coded secrets that it tells, and in the decoding that it wants” (Tropics	of	
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Desire, 100).27 We do not need to read these acts as indicative of the author’s 
desire for the reader to decode the text by throwing open the closet door. 
Instead, we would do better to accept the text’s secrets as a queer sort of 
come-on, a seduction of all readers into a different way of thinking. This lure 
consists of what Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit call a “double movement,” 
or a “soliciting move toward the viewer, and [a] self-concealing move away 
from the viewer” (Caravaggio’s	 Secrets, 5). This “noninterpretable address” 
through “the enigmatic body” is a playful come-on that cannot be acted 
on, a mystery that cannot be solved (ibid., 8, 9). The advance leaves us to 
contemplate the relations between our bodies, and the eroticism traversing 
those relations. Thus, art constitutes “an ontological laboratory” that points 
to “pure relationality, of being as	 relationality” (ibid., 59, 58; emphasis in 
original). Lezama’s secret exposes the nature of relationality, too; however, he 
is not interested just in revealing ontological states of Being. He specifically 
makes liberalist democracy’s autonomous citizen-subject appear differently, 
more seductively. His poetics thus suggestively hint that we are always con-
nected to others. Impassioned, we entice others to draw them close; yet we 
turn away to continue to freely proliferate new connections and contacts. 
Such an identity that exists in ever-multiplying resemblances, which draw 
readers ever onward, is more befitting Lezama’s Cuban postcolonial condi-
tion wherein citizens were intimately bound to outside spaces. In turning his 
back on historical fictions of security and nationalist rhetoric about inde-
pendence, in favoring reform over revolutionary rupture, Lezama is vulner-
able to critics’ accusations of conservatism. Yet, that risk of others’ misun-
derstanding is necessary—and one that queer theory should pay attention 
to—for it is what imbues his work with the optimism of looking outward in 
search of a queer cosmopolitanism’s evasive promise.
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hom Gunn once remarked that Robert Duncan was a “chief origi-
nator” of “a way of speaking about homosexuality”; however, he also 
believed but that his friend was “a homosexual poet only second-
arily” (“Homosexuality in Robert Duncan’s Poetry,” 159). Instead 
of representing the gay community or expressing a gay male perspective, 
Gunn provocatively suggests, the homosexual content of his lyric promotes 
“inclusiveness” by supplying “evidence of the many ways in which people 
live their lives, of the many available ways in which people love or fail to 
love” (ibid., 159–60). Indeed, Duncan maintained throughout his career a 
steadfast resistance to identifying with a sexual minority. In 1976, following 
the heyday of gay liberation, he would announce, “Well, come to think of 
it, I don’t see myself as gay at all” (“A Conversation with Robert Duncan,” 
2: 95). Such statements should not be read at absolute face value, however. 
Duncan was quite public about his sexual attractions to, and relationships 
with, other men; and, unlike José Lezama Lima’s writing (chapter 2 above), 
the queerness of his poetics does not result from an eroticized secret. Rather, 
his aversion to identifying as gay owes to a fierce antinomianism that ren-
dered homosexuality, like any other identity, a merely secondary concern.
 Decades before gay liberation, and even several years before the founding 
of the Mattachine Society, the first U.S. homophile organization, Duncan 
made his initial sizeable contribution to an American way of speaking about 
sexuality with “The Homosexual in Society” (1944). This seminal essay, 
which appeared in the little magazine Politics, argues for detaching homo-
sexuality from the liberal advocacy of minority rights, subcultural identi-
t
vulnerable households 
Containment and 
robert Duncan’s Queered nation
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fication, and the classification by American psychoanalytic institutions of 
same-sex desire as deviancy. Instead, Duncan links homosexuality to an 
aesthetically rendered ethic whereby the individual engages an anarchic 
pursuit of freedom.1 He condemns most postwar gay artists for forming 
a “homosexual cult” that promotes a campy “group language” (SP 48, 47). 
Such “gaiety” is nothing but a codified “self-ridicule” that demonstrates 
their uncritical acceptance of normative classifications of their desire and 
that sets their writings apart from other American letters (SP	47). Duncan’s 
judgments were not well received by Parker Tyler, Charles Henri Ford, and 
others whom he implicitly attacked.2 Perhaps most upsetting was his asser-
tion that their divisiveness and cliquishness evince a kind of “inhumanity,” 
on par with “patriotism” and “bigotry” (SP	48). The true artist, Duncan 
maintains, has “only one devotion”: “a devotion to human freedom, toward 
the liberation of human love, human conflicts, human aspirations. To do 
this one must disown all	 the special interest groups (nations, churches, 
sexes, races) that would claim allegiance” (SP	47; emphasis in original). 
Since this “is a battle that cannot be won in the immediate scene,” the writer 
must demonstrate a “continued opposition” to the so-called “inhumanity” 
reinforced by group identity in order to perpetually strive after an ever-
elusive promise of freedom and, yes, humanness (SP	48). An unwavering 
skepticism about group identification set Duncan apart from later avant-
gardes. Michael Davidson notes that straight and	gay poets associated with 
Black Mountain, the New York School, and the Beats tended “to perform 
and engage social alliances, not represent them separate from the poem” 
because they “addressed specific constituencies without consideration of a 
larger public” (Guys	like	Us, 17–18). Such closed aesthetic communities, he 
argues, were founded on an entrenched masculinism. Duncan opposed such 
gendered attitudes because they, like the campy code of earlier gay coteries, 
minimized the very freedom he felt poetry could discover.
 Premised on undoing the liberalist logic of identification and difference 
that excluded gays, women, and others from a supposedly all-inclusive dem-
ocratic field, Duncan’s work anticipates Judith Butler’s own considerations 
of universalism by half a century. “Universalism belongs to an open-ended 
hegemonic struggle,” she argues, yet we must understand that the object of 
that struggle does not exist, in any positivistic sense (“Restaging the Uni-
versal,” 38). “To claim that the universal has not yet been articulated is to 
insist that the ‘not yet’ is proper to an understanding of the universal itself: 
that which remains ‘unrealized’ by the universal constitutes it essentially” 
(ibid., 39). Like Butler, Duncan saw universality as a process of liberation 
and contestation. Unlike Butler, though, he tended to see such liberation 
occurring in an anarchic fashion, rather than through a group with which 
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one is identified. Such individualism does not wholly do away with collec-
tivity. Like other anarchists in the American tradition—including Alexander 
Berkman and the feminist and sexual advocate Emma Goldman—Duncan 
tied his idealized individual to collective life.3 Indeed, he believed that the 
individual artist’s charge for producing a new universality made her respon-
sible for generating a new commonality. This term signified something much 
different from a “community” or “communitarianism” based on a	 priori	
identities. Duncan’s idea of anarchic commonality is a belief that writing 
discovers modes of public living that challenge liberalism’s normatively gen-
dered and sexualized constructions of private individualism. Art helps indi-
viduals realize their own possibility so they can adapt—or, what we might 
term after Lezama, re-form—existing identity categories.
 In the additional commentary included for the 1959 republication of 
“The Homosexual in Society,” Duncan posits that the poet is responsible for 
generating a “public trust.”4 Such a trust would relieve individuals from “the 
dominant competitive ethos which gives rise to the struggle of interests to 
gain recognition or control and discourages the recognition of the needs and 
interests we all know we have in common” (SP 49). Overcoming laissez-faire 
liberalism mandated rethinking liberalist ideals of identity and individualism, 
especially as they were embodied by what William H. Whyte described as 
the “organization man.” To this end, Duncan sought to link gender, sexuality, 
and nation so that they are no longer treated as discrete categories dividing 
the population and encouraging inter- and intragroup competition. Instead, 
his lyric imagines them as interrelated, similar entities. Rather than rubrics 
that function as containers, they form a field of identificatory possibilities, 
the space of commonality itself, through which individuals are free to move. 
To facilitate such movement, Duncan opposed gendered and heteronorma-
tive presuppositions about authorial and social agency. Rather than begin-
ning with the individual’s volition to express her difference, agency actu-
ally grows out of an eroticized openness to foreignness, an initial receptivity 
or vulnerability	to differences embodied by others. Just as poststructuralist 
thought appealed to American intellectuals in the 1960s because of its self-
reflexive engagements with “the problems with the logic of containment[,] 
its blindness, its contradictions, its duplicities,” Duncan found lyric capable 
of staging disruptions of those same logics (Alan Nadel, Containment	Cul-
ture, 3). Poetry that models such a deconstructive dynamic might help make 
a queered	nation, even a queerer humanity, imaginable.
 Butler cautions, though, that the only recourse available to someone 
excluded from liberal democracy’s supposedly universalistic parameters is 
to “agree to falsify” one’s self (Undoing	Gender, 91). That is, even the socially 
marginalized must represent their selves in terms of the very discourse 
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excluding them: “A discourse that effaces you in the act of representing 
you, a discourse that denies the language you might want to use to describe 
who you are, how you got here, and what you want from life” (ibid., 91). To 
deconstructively transform a discourse and a social field requires the disen-
franchised to first repeat hegemonic representations. Although Butler holds 
out for the possibility that the “performative contradiction” of such reitera-
tions ultimately leads to a reimagining of universality, Duncan’s attempts to 
articulate an excluding principle—rather than just liberally redress his own 
gay exclusion—evinces more skepticism about the possibility that decon-
struction of one identity can affect all of society (ibid.,	191). Consequently, 
his project attempts to deconstruct an entire social field rather than just one 
identity-bound portion of it. However, this ambitious effort is ultimately 
limited by two factors. First, Duncan’s anarchist disposition leads to a con-
sequential blindness to the norms that foreclose (as Butler terms it) resistant 
introductions of difference, especially as those norms are introduced through 
identificatory codes that contain and are written on his body. Second, his 
emphasis on poetry’s ability to heighten readers’ sense of vulnerability only 
foregrounds the body’s role as a deconstructive vehicle. Although Duncan’s 
queerly universalizing project does encounter formidable limits, those blind 
spots still open possibilities for queer theory’s reconsideration of the impor-
tance of similarities shared between identities—in the plural—to any decon-
struction of liberalist and nationalistic culture.
Political and Cultural Containment and the Poetic
Counterstrategy of vulnerability
From the proposal of the Marshall Plan in 1947 to the withdrawal of American 
troops from Vietnam in 1973 (two years before the fall of Saigon), popular, 
political, and ideological discourses in the United States were overtly con-
cerned with preserving boundaries. Whether one considers the Iron Curtain 
dividing Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe from the West or Korea’s 38th 
parallel or Vietnam’s Demilitarized Zone, imaginary lines figured promi-
nently during the Cold War as impassable limits that could contain com-
munist threats. At this time, one particular kind of boundary subjectivated 
individuals above all: that of the nation-state. Nationality is a “secondary 
identity that presupposes primary identities” such as race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, and class, as Étienne Balibar theorizes it. Although it is secondary 
in nature, it ultimately permits a collective sense of national belonging to 
“distinguish itself from them [i.e., primary identities], stand above them, 
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and legitimate them for its own ends” (We,	the	People	of	Europe? 25–26). The 
result is the construction of material and imaginary structures that estab-
lish a symbolic hegemony by determining which “primary” identities are 
included or excluded by the so-called “secondary” identity. “Primary identi-
ties, in order to be incorporated into national identity, must be worked on a 
long time and in some sense ‘deconstructed,’” a process that is attended by an 
intense “structural violence (or ‘symbolic violence’)” (ibid., 28, 29). During 
the Cold War, it was imperative that U.S. citizens identify with their nation, 
no matter if it caused costly contradictions for those minorities who were 
excluded by their state and culture from a place at the American table.
 Duncan was particularly sensitive to this situation. In 1969, he wrote 
to Denise Levertov: “Nationalism has often and still can appear to me as 
monstrous evil: but then I have in mind Viet Nam nationalism North and 
South as well as American, Israelis as well as Arabs—those who would use 
the actual suffering of a people in order to transform them into a Nation” 
(LRD	629). Rather than a focus or an end	for representing the right to civil 
inclusion, primary identities offer, on the domestic front, structural analo-
gies or identificatory metaphors through which one might stage a critique of 
the nationalist politics setting the parameters for universalism. To fold not 
only the homosexual but also the American into the human, the nation as a 
whole had to be queered. To achieve this end, Duncan had to simultaneously 
draw attention to the multiple	exclusions of the logics of containment. The 
lecture “The Adventure of Whitman’s Line” offers valuable insights about 
how he imagined the analogous relationship between the primary structures 
of gender and sexuality, as well as their similarity to the secondary one of 
nation. Walt Whitman’s lyric models how poetry might disrupt the norms 
governing all three identity forms. Duncan connects Whitman’s free verse 
to the “arousal of a strength in man’s sexual love that is to be throughout 
‘tender’ and ‘boundless’”; moreover, “in each line this tenderness and bound-
lessness [is] deliberately renewing itself ” (FC	194). The most valuable aspect 
of the nineteenth-century poet’s precedent is not its frank treatment of 
homosexuality but its open form and expansive line. These elements evoke 
an ever-changing sense of masculinity and cast all forms of male sexual 
desire in an unusually open way. Idiosyncratically representing male sexu-
ality as effeminately “tender” yet still “boundless” in its desire, Whitman’s 
verse introduces a different sense of commonality at odds with nationalism. 
Readers are encouraged to follow his example, to “extend our common time 
and space, to open out, lead toward, a larger, an unknown global destination” 
(FC	201). This cosmopolitan impetus unsettles not only nationalism but also 
the cultural masculinism that accompanies jingoistic fervor:
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It is this [duality] that underlies the very line of Whitman—that it be at 
once bold, advancing, and also tender, seeking mutualities. It is this male 
tenderness, this manliness, the line is a vehicle of—nowhere of the macho, 
the seeking dominance and authority that we are today in crisis of—it is 
the determination to create a new male feeling that has made many men 
enemies of Whitman, for they feel threatened in their sexual needs if they 
have not the guarantee of being master and over-lord. (FC 195–96)
Even at the level of the line, Whitman’s poetry is not bounded. And just 
as his line is free, he does not present the rubrics of gender and nation as 
fixed, closed forms. Instead, they are open processes readers are invited to 
explore.
 This is a very imaginative misreading, or at least a very selective reading, 
of Leaves	of	Grass. Duncan glosses over evidence of Whitman’s machismo in 
order to portray him as a poet of “male tenderness.”5 In his earlier “Changing 
Perspectives on Reading Walt Whitman” (1968, published 1970), he him-
self had criticized his predecessor’s work precisely for such biases. There, 
Duncan takes Whitman to task for demonstrating “the deadly boast of the 
Chauvinist, the patriotic zeal of a spiritual imperialism,” elements too close 
for his liking to the Vietnam era’s “fearful” rhetoric of “presidents, congresses, 
armed forces, industrialists, governors, police forces” (FC 169). His mispri-
sion in “The Adventure of Whitman’s Line” is no mere oversight or incon-
sistency, then; rather, he strategically links an ethical ideal of erotic “ten-
derness” to Whitman’s poetically formal innovation. Thus Duncan draws 
readers’ attention to the link between a decades-long “crisis” in American 
poetry and what he perceived as continuing crises in gender and national 
identities. Deviating from Whitman’s example, many of Duncan’s contem-
poraries insisted on a masculinist, authoritarian control over their material 
and thus redoubled the norm of containment even long after McCarthyism 
itself subsided. Returning to Whitman’s example, then, would allow for a 
reimagining of commonality. As Duncan muses in an early installment of his 
decades-long project The	H.D.	Book: “To write at all is to dwell in the illusion 
of language, the rapture of communication that comes as we surrender our 
troubled individual isolated experiences to the communal consciousness” 
(HD	1.6:	131). Poetic manipulations of language can generate the “cosmo-
politan man” and “an environment enhanced by his realization of the work 
and experience of others involved, into an increase that was not taken from 
things but taken in them” (ibid., 133). In short, language supplies poetry 
with the foundations for new forms through which we can reimagine social 
interaction and collectivity.
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 Duncan’s ideas about commonality reframe sociality in a manner that 
challenges Cold War containment systems, a point nakedly exposed by 
the poem “Up Rising, Passages	25” (1966; Bending	 the	Bow,	81–83). In an 
uncharacteristically polemical fashion, Duncan singles out Lyndon Baines 
Johnson as the perpetrator of a military aggression in Vietnam analogous to 
the genocides ordered by Hitler and Stalin. My interest in “Up Rising” here, 
however, is not in its explicitly antiwar stance; rather, I am interested in the 
poem’s quieter suggestion that bellicose jingoism and imperialist ambitions 
of the United States targeted more than an external ideological threat.6 The 
Johnson administration did not just wage war on the Viet Cong. As Duncan 
writes in “Up Rising,” it was also responsible for “the burning of homes and 
the torture of mothers and fathers and children.” As he judges it, the most 
elementary units of human community—home and family—had fallen 
victim to a brutal violence born of one politician’s thirst for power. The war 
on communism thus threatened a cultural idea valued as much in America 
as abroad: an idealization of “all communal things, of communion, / of com-
munism.” To compensate for the insecurities of military and ideological 
conflicts overseas, the state believed it was culturally and even politically 
imperative that a sense of security be found for the nation at home. Gender 
and sexual issues opened a second front, and the American home was ideo-
logically and rhetorically refigured by what Elaine Tyler May calls “the 
domestic version of containment.” “Within its walls,” she elaborates, “poten-
tially dangerous social forces of the new age might be tamed, where they 
could contribute to the secure and fulfilling life to which postwar women 
and men aspired. . . . Domestic containment and its therapeutic corollary 
undermined the potential for political activism and reinforced the chilling 
effects of anticommunism and the cold war consensus” (Homeward	Bound, 
14). The everyday effects of domestic containment were reinforced by the 
ideological narratives underwriting international policy. As Jane Sherron de 
Hart notes, “The new gender and sexual politics of the long fifties provided 
Cold War liberals and conservatives alike a way to maintain the fiction of 
a stability in intimate matters that so eluded them in national and inter-
national affairs” (“Containment at Home,” 129–30). Such desired “stability” 
produced “strenuous, systematic efforts to maintain traditional gender and 
sexual boundaries, ideologically as well as behaviorally, through cultural 
imperatives and social policy” (130). The maintenance of a nationalist fic-
tion that projected U.S. political strength abroad necessitated the domestic 
policing of all, as well as the exclusion of some, primary identities.
 Such ideological containment assumed a greater cultural priority in 
light of political, social, and medical developments following World War 
II. Middle-class homes and families, once imagined as sites of sexual and 
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gender normalcy, were revealed to be riddled with perversions. The ento-
mologist Alfred Kinsey published the reports of his behavioral studies of 
American male and female sexuality in 1948 and 1953, respectively. These 
studies revealed that it was statistically normal for the average American 
man and woman to masturbate, to engage in premarital intercourse, to 
experience same-sex encounters, to have extramarital affairs. In short, it was 
normal to be deviant; or, as contemporary critical parlance would put it, a 
queerness predicated on desire—rather than a categorically defined set of 
acceptable sexual mores—was discovered to be the norm.7 As shifting atti-
tudes about women’s sexuality complicated the traditional equation of sex 
with reproduction, heterosexuality came to be identified conservatively as 
the evaluative norm, or the standard, for ensuring the stable boundaries of 
North American homes and families.8
 If individuals posed a risk to the gender or sexual norms that made the 
family safe, they were imagined to threaten the very security of the nation. 
Beginning with the House Un-American Activities Committee’s first inves-
tigative hearings of Hollywood figures in 1947, and extending through the 
McCarthyism and Red-baiting of the “long fifties,” homosexuality and com-
munism were virtually coterminous. A veritable homosexual panic linked 
homosexual men’s and lesbians’ supposed “psychological maladjustment” to 
the likelihood of their becoming “security risks” (David K. Johnson, The	Lav-
ender	Scare, 16). The weakness of character associated with homosexuality 
led to the belief shared by the state and the general American population 
that the presence of gays and lesbians in governmental positions presented a 
vulnerability that might be exploited by Soviet forces. In the wake of ninety-
one homosexual employees’ termination from various federal agencies in 
1950, even the number 91 became a popular cipher for “queer.” Known and 
suspected queer citizens were increasingly subject to arrest, surveillance, 
and entrapment, often under the pretense of unearthing “pinko” traitors and 
spies.9 Such conflations continued well into the 1960s, and gays’ and lesbians’ 
lack of access to government jobs was an object of activist criticism even 
after the 1969 Stonewall riots.
 Duncan questioned the Cold War’s ideological defense of both	 internal 
and external boundaries, especially since the security desired for home and 
nation reinforced rigid gender and sexual lines that limited individuals’ free-
doms. Although some may suppose he had a vested interest in ameliorating 
the ostracism he and other homosexuals suffered, much of Duncan’s vision 
for a poetic reshaping of the national climate is actually oriented toward a 
larger goal: opening various Cold War containers in order to salvage a gen-
eral, national spirit of communitas  and democratic ideals of diversity, differ-
ence, and change. In the wake of the Lavender Scare, Duncan found lyric’s 
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capacity for promoting “male tenderness,” such as that evident in Whit-
man’s open form, a means of helping him make unconventional connec-
tions between gender constructs, same-sex desire, and an “un-Americanist” 
(rather than “un-American”) vision.10 Such tenderness would threaten the 
Cold War order of things by modeling a desirable form of risk. Lyric mani-
fests what he perceived as a much needed vulnerability that permits one to 
live more freely, no longer contained by the impenetrable boundaries of ego, 
home, or nation.
 According to his above-noted diagnosis in “The Adventure of Whitman’s 
Line,” Duncan found it necessary for American poetry to move beyond an 
aggressive masculinism that reinforced a “patriotic zeal” and “spiritual impe-
rialism.” Such posturing originated in gendered ideas about language held by 
earlier modernists, such as William Carlos Williams and Ezra Pound. In an 
analysis of these predecessors in his H.D.	Book, Duncan notes that in order 
to be perceived as “American” they were compelled to prove their work’s 
virility in addition to its compatibility with other forms of national culture. 
Many male modernists assumed defensive and antagonistic attitudes more 
in line with “the competition and profiteering of the capitalist society,” even 
though they were interested in challenging existing socioeconomic systems. 
Consequently, their rhetoric “presented a show of even brutality in defense 
against any hint of vulnerability” (HD	2.9: 79). Such “man-talk,” like the 
colloquial tone and abusive misogyny often found in men’s locker rooms 
or military barracks, creates “a divorce within the language itself, a hidden 
divorce between man and woman” (ibid., 79, 80). Thus, outward signs of 
femininity, such as expressiveness or sentiment, were consigned to the mar-
gins of literary culture because poets judged them to be “womanish things, 
a song Herakles sang while sewing for Omphale” (ibid., 80). Perhaps mythic 
heroes could pull off singing in drag, but Williams and Pound doubted 
their own abilities to do so. Instead of lyric expression, they developed a 
polemical poetic in order to connect the oppositely gendered spheres of lit-
erature and politics.11 “He-man bravado or working-class lingo was their 
affectation	of	the	vernacular,” Duncan writes elsewhere in The	H.D.	Book; it 
was “meant to cut thru the genteel affectation of devotion or culture with 
which the middle-class poetry-lover read” (HD	2.5; 58; emphasis added). 
To trope Pound, “making it new” between the World Wars meant mascu-
linizing poetry by replacing one kind of affectation (sentimental lyricism) 
with another (political directness). Duncan concludes, however, that mod-
ernists’ pre-Cold War versions of the “organization man” were nothing but 
“a defensive strategy” (ibid.). Their machismo is the true drag, a rhetorical 
performance intended to hide their proclivities for “feminine” lyricism so as 
to strengthen their challenge of bourgeois poetasters.
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 During the 1950s and 1960s, poetical polemic assumed a new, liberalist 
guise whose gendered dimensions threatened the democratic principle of 
commonality. Duncan was particularly wary of Beat poetry. In principle, 
he might have appreciated how, in aspiring to produce a new communal 
spirit, it broke down the barriers between public and private. What he 
opposed, though, was its aggressive means of making the private public in 
the poets’ pursuit of what Norman Mailer famously dubbed “the apocalyptic 
orgasm” (“The White Negro,” 593). This sexualized masculinity challenged 
the domesticated masculinity embodied by the suburban-based family and 
“organization man,” whose compliance with Fordist socioeconomic ideas 
interpolated him as a white collar laborer who worked to secure power 
only as a consumer. This marked him as an effeminate subject lacking voli-
tion and innovation.12 Such willful resistances to cultural norms, however, 
merely produced a counterculture that separated the Beats from the rest of 
the country. Paradoxically, it also reproduced the majority’s liberalist faith 
in a strong, patriarchal ego and perpetuated earlier modernists’ “man-talk.” 
For example, even though Allen Ginsberg’s quintessential Beat poem Howl	
(1955) redefines masculinity and community by including such marginal-
ized male figures as the homosexual and the insane, the text can also be read 
as an elegy for a lost virile potency. Ginsberg’s narrator laments not only a 
sense of isolation felt as a “Cocksucker in Moloch” but also the fact that he is 
“Lacklove and manless in Moloch” (Howl	and	Other	Poems, 22). He mourns 
his lack of both a male lover and a recognizable masculinity for himself.
 Duncan was especially suspicious of Howl, and his lukewarm response to 
other Beat writing signals his awareness that queer or countercultural expres-
sion was not exempt from the problems of exclusionary masculinism.13 His 
critique is most evident in his published response to Michael McClure’s long 
poem “Dark Brown” (1961). Collapsing the distance between his writerly 
self and his poem’s persona, McClure insists that the exterior “BREAK TO 
WHAT I AM” so that he can transform “The word [into] a sound made of the 
thing / felt” by the reader (3	Poems, 221). He likens this creative forcefulness 
to his own embodied maleness. His texts are “not hard as my cock,” yet they 
bear some connection and resemblance to McClure’s creative body because 
each word is “a motion of mine” (ibid., 220). Although this physicality is only 
metaphorical, he emphatically insists that it is absolutely “REAL!” (ibid., 
220). Duncan wrote “Properties and Our REAL Estate,” which appeared in 
the 1961 inaugural issue of McClure’s short-lived Journal	for	the	Protection	of	
All	Beings, as a subtle criticism of “Dark Brown.” Simply by capitalizing the 
word “real” in his essay’s title, just as it appears in McClure’s poem, he draws 
a connection between the pieces. He specifically takes issue with his former 
student’s declaration “I AM MAMMAL” (McClure, 3	Poems,	217) and shifts 
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our attention toward a less corporeal way of conceiving the human subject. 
“It is easier for me to see that we are all men, of one species,” Duncan argues, 
“and that nation-thinking or race-thinking is damned-thinking; for I am 
surely of mixed race and have no pride there.” This humanistic universalism 
is qualified, though: “And I believe that we are mammal before we are men; 
animal before we are mammal: that most truly we are light” (“Properties,”	
91). Duncan sets out to lighten the forcefulness of McClure’s “mammal-
body,” or whatever other form male physicality takes in Beat poetry.
 From the vantage of quantum physics, even light has a body, so Duncan’s 
seemingly immaterial metaphor does not really disembody poetic produc-
tion or ignore its material contingencies. McClure’s emphasis on a particular 
sort of physicality, though, perpetuates a Cold War masculinist aggressive-
ness and defensiveness about the need to safeguard and contain all forms 
of property. Earlier in the essay, Duncan meditates on the original title of 
McClure’s little magazine: The	Protective	Association	for	All	Beings. As might 
be expected given his anarchist harangue against “old protective associations” 
almost two decades earlier in “The Homosexual in Society” (SP	47), Duncan 
positively rankles at McClure’s title. “The whole density [of the journal] 
seemed to gather about those words of the title McClure has proposed: ‘pro-
tective,’ ‘association,’ ‘beings.’ All three words, if they were meaningful, kept, 
formed a picture of life and manhood or gave terms to life and manhood that 
called up in me a dissenting voice. Wasn’t vulnerability the very quick of the 
light?” (“Properties,” 85; emphasis added) Duncan does more than nitpick 
about the meanings of the words in an abandoned journal title; instead, he 
starts to formulate a less defensive and group-oriented poetic that does away 
with “protective associations” altogether to reimagine “life” and “manhood” 
as permitting more “vulnerability.” For all his rhetoric of light, however, it 
would be egregious to believe that the “vulnerability” Duncan proposes is 
rooted in the ethereal sweetness and light of sentimental lyricism. Rather, it 
is the product of an erotic submission, which results in an amorous dispersal 
of personal boundaries. A politically and nationally inscribed body re-enters 
the moment of composition here but does so in such a way that it is better 
equipped to deconstruct the norms subjectivizing the poet. “Falling in love 
means losing my being,” Duncan writes. “Love exposes us to the first body 
and to the light; we might even fall in love with what we hate or what hates 
us. Only a protective association of all beings will keep us from the threat of 
invasion” (“Properties,” 87–88). To some extent, Duncan does not fear this 
vulnerability. He desires	 it. If poets assume a “protective” stance, then they 
prevent any number of kinds of invasion: an individual’s loss of self-control 
to a “hated” other, a violation of geopolitical boundaries by an enemy, even a 
penetrative sexual encounter. All of these senses are in play throughout the 
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piece, but his mention of “invasion” in 1961 is more than a figure of speech. 
In April of that year, the United States staged a military invasion at the Bay 
of Pigs, Cuba, where the Central Intelligence Agency had deployed Cuban 
exiles it had trained to remove the communist threat of Castro’s govern-
ment. Duncan, in fact, explicitly references mounting international tensions. 
“The United States in Eisenhower and then in Kennedy; and Cuba in Castro 
are what Hell is. They are drawn together” (“Properties,” 86). Poetic vulner-
ability could rectify that political hell by making us think about “invasion” 
differently, as openness. Duncan’s oblique criticism of McClure implies that 
he felt such an ethos could be achieved if the country’s poets modeled a less 
defensive form of relationality and revised their attitudes toward what he 
calls “manhood.”
 By emphasizing passivity and vulnerability, Duncan breaks down 
bounded senses of personhood. When they are receptively passive, writers 
remain open to their passions and are worked on by external forces so that 
they no longer need to defend, or be defined by, national, gender, or sexual 
boundaries. Literature, Duncan posited throughout his career, is a gift freely 
given and shared among members of a community. The gift is received by 
the artist first: “The work of art appears as a gift for another but also as a 
means for another to be there. Self-expression may be an urgency of art, but 
the self has no expression except in this other” (HD	2.2: 29). This gift is then 
passed on to others. To accept it, readers must be open to the text, just as 
the writer is receptive to an inspiriting force. Expressed through the media 
of others, continually opening by receiving the gift of language, this com-
munity of readers is not recognizable as a “nation” per se. It is a new social 
order, which emerges from a queered	Cold War United States.
 Although Duncan often described himself as a Romantic poet, his work 
does not reinforce the misunderstanding of Romanticism as willful lyric self-
expression; rather, he relies on a concept of passive or passionate genius, 
in which a poetic imaginary is produced from the surrender of a person-
ality (“the artist”) to the imagination (“another”). In this act of submission, 
writers do not channel a second party as in a theosophist séance (a practice 
with which he was familiar through his adoptive parents and grandmother), 
nor do they tap their own subconscious minds as in the automatic writing 
practices of the French Surrealists and some Beats. “A poet must follow his 
own ideas or feelings,” Duncan asserts. He immediately qualifies the voli-
tional nature of this pursuit, though. “In a way, instead of having ideas or 
feelings, the poet lets ideas or feelings ‘have’ him. Seized by an idea” (HD	1.1: 
29). The poet is responsible only for inviting the foreignness, simultaneously 
a conceptual and a sentimental entity, the presence of which destabilizes 
language and linguistic praxis. Attracted since adolescence to the Imagists’ 
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personae and to the dramatic monologues of Robert Browning and W. B. 
Yeats, he elsewhere describes writing as “at once a dramatic projection and 
at the same time a magic ritual in which a poet was to come into being—only 
in this art, it seemd [sic]	to me, could my inner nature unfold. I had no idea 
what that nature was, it was to be created in my work” (The	Years	as	Catches, 
i).14 Poetic personae allow writers to be seized by an idea that chooses them, 
not the other way round. Through vulnerable submission and dramatic por-
trayals of one’s self-as-another, they discover their own singular identities. 
Thus the ethic underlying Duncan’s project inheres in this dynamic: rather 
than mount an offensive against others’ verse, poets must invite an inva-
sion by those foreign elements. Only then can language—the radical alterity 
constitutive of human selves—help them discover an uncontained identity. 
The passivity modeled by Duncan’s poetry aids readers in the imagining of 
a new, desirable form of subjectivity. By losing our selves while reading, by 
acting more receptively and less defensively or offensively, we find new bases 
for commonality.
the Queer foundations of a vulnerable household
As Michael Davidson rightly notes, Duncan’s work produces a “feminization 
of tradition”; but it is misleading to read that gendering, as Davidson does, 
as a consequence of the poet’s affiliation during the early to mid-1950s with 
the homosexual coterie of the “Berkeley Renaissance” (also including Robin 
Blaser and Jack Spicer) (The	San	Francisco	Renaissance, 130). We should avoid 
equating “male homosexual” with “feminine”; instead, Duncan’s feminiza-
tion of lyric is an ethical strategy	that directs readers’ attention to the Amer-
ican home. Between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, the household was the 
central trope in Duncan’s general deconstruction of Cold War containment 
strategies. Unlike the paradigmatic home, his novel conceptualization of the 
household does not reinforce the nation-state’s security but instead promotes 
a mid-century mode of queering by encouraging vulnerably receptive and 
passionate attitudes. There, the structural analogies between different iden-
tity markers—gender, sexuality, and nation—are localized in a public space 
that disrupts liberalist expectations of privacy and contained identification. 
In the process of refuting and responding to containment logics, though, 
Duncan’s texts end up reproducing some of their ambivalences. Despite his 
valorization of the individual’s anarchic singularity, he cannot escape the 
limits of group identity, since homosexuality is written upon his body and 
thus overwrites his household. The feminine acts as an allied second pri-
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mary identity to aid in his attempt to deconstruct liberalist logics, but it is 
not enough to help his project escape all identificatory rubrics so as to move 
through a queered nation toward a cosmopolitan humanity.
 Although critics often repeat his term of the “household,” its significance to 
his poetic has remained largely uninvestigated.15 “Our whole American Way 
of Life,” Duncan writes in his extended essay “The Truth and Life of Myth” 
(1968), “is designed to save the householder from his household myths, from 
the lifestory of working in which he has his communion with the house; as 
in the factory, the worker, no longer a maker, is removed from his work” 
(FC	24). Recuperating a bygone era’s hybrid space of domesticity and labor 
for aesthetic production, he links an artisan ethos to a feminine tradition 
of “folk and fairytale [that] have their home in the gossip of old wives and 
little children, stories about the cooking-hearth and the nursery bedside” 
(FC	26). Folklore had opened domestic spaces to public eyes through narra-
tives about socially inscribed individuals who represent a people’s fears and 
desires. “The lowly folktale was populated irremediably by kitchen sluts and 
begging women and broom vendors and soldiers home from the wars and 
the like and their wish-phantasies and fear-delusions” (FC 26). Modern art 
might function similarly if it represented the private North American home 
more like a semipublic, artisan household. Through this strategy, Duncan 
violates Cold War norms of privacy by transforming the home from a site 
to be guarded, or a border in need of patrolling, into a space where poetry 
can challenge capitalism’s fetishism of consumer goods and its alienation of 
labor.
 Through Duncan’s trope of public domesticity, homosexuality is brought 
into the public eye. This visibility would not feed into the general populace’s 
Lavender Scare; instead, it would encourage some citizens’ “wish-phanta-
sies” and so generate connections with readers who, once inspired by his 
work, might challenge compulsory privacy and a cultural containment of 
sexual and gender differences. In fact, Duncan was attracted to feminine 
householder traditions later in his career precisely because they offered a 
desirable alternative to	keeping homosexuality locked behind the doors of 
private poetic coteries. Even in the 1950s he and Spicer desired to move 
homosexuality into public consciousness: “Our people were the people of a 
dream secretly at work in the nation without, of an other nation within and 
below and behind and above the public identity of America; even as we felt 
our	language to be that of a meaning striving to come into existence within 
the public exchange” (Caesar’s	Gate,		xix;  emphasis in original).16 By striking 
at the Cold War’s domestic front, his household reworks conventions of the 
home to create a public workspace which left open the front door—perhaps 
more appropriately, the back door—so that male homosexuality might come 
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into full view for the reading public. Such visibility let Duncan evade the sort 
of autonomous agency and self-expressive voice later associated with liberal 
gay and lesbian identity politics. But more than queer closets are thrown 
open in this scenario. All homes became public sites of a creative desire, 
and thus the queer household leads the way toward the constitution of a 
new form of inclusive commonality. That does away with a liberalist logic 
which fashions the contained home front as a metonym for both the ideal-
ized citizen-subject’s contained ego and the state’s impermeable boundaries. 
In a householder’s world, there are no closed doors to contain the home’s 
policed contents. Everyone remains vulnerably, but joyfully, exposed in their 
work. Thus, the whole citizenry becomes a bit queer.
 The concept of the “household” has a certain degree of biographical veri-
similitude. It can easily be imagined as any of the domestic spaces Duncan 
shared from 1951 until his death in 1988 with his partner, the collagist and 
painter Jess Collins (known in the art world simply as “Jess”). The physical 
spaces inhabited by the couple were varied, ranging from the first room they 
shared in a Berkeley artists’ residence (known as the Ghost House) to the 
nineteenth-century Victorian house they purchased in 1967 at 3267 20th 
Street in San Francisco. But the household is more a spatial imaginary, an 
aesthetic trope they shared rather than a poetic representation of any of their 
actual homes. “Finding Jess made a householder of me,” Duncan claims in 
a 1976 interview (“Conversation,” 1: 90). He proceeds to explicitly differen-
tiate their partnership from a marriage by describing it as more like a “con-
ventional fairy-tale idea” (ibid., 91). Of course, he means his idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the fairy-tale convention, as fostering a different sense of 
publicity rather than more usual understandings of fairy tales as promoting 
private, bourgeois romances. In 1966, Duncan described his household con-
struct as “a lone holding in an alien forest-world, as a campfire about which 
we gathered in an era of cold and night—a	made-up	thing	in which partici-
pating we have had the medium of a life together” (quoted in Bertholf, “The 
Concert,” 80). The Cold War backdrop of “an era of cold and night” is never 
far removed when the trope appears in his texts, so it is difficult to equate 
Duncan’s trope with Michael Auping’s characterization of it as a “decidedly 
middle-class, domestic household” providing “insulation” from the social 
world (“Jess: A Grand Collage,” 39). Even though it was not oriented toward 
a public in the same way as the Beats’ bar counterculture, Jess and Duncan’s 
household was still a visible and public arrangement. It was a “made up 
thing,” a communal concept equated with art and the imagination, and into 
which they openly invited other artists, texts, and readers. That publicity was 
just as unconventional and disruptive of liberalist norms as was the homo-
sexual nature of the couple’s partnership.
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 Duncan’s relationship with Jess is not at the center of my analysis, how-
ever. Instead, I am interested in how he begins to articulate the house-
hold as more than a gay construct by connecting it to gender. This alli-
ance between primary identities would reinforce the effectiveness of his 
poetry’s deconstructive, vulnerable ethic. This development originated in 
his exchange of poems and letters between 1959 and 1961 with the mod-
ernist poet H.D. (Hilda Doolittle). Although he probably culls ideas about 
the household from a number of sources, ranging from Dante to Gaston 
Bachelard, I read H.D. as his primary influence. Her work led him to asso-
ciate the trope with vulnerability and with gender and textual structures, 
rather than just with sexuality or his own biographical narrative.17 A long-
time admirer of and sometime correspondent with H.D., Duncan realized 
that their relationship reached a new level when she asked him to be the 
temporary caretaker of some of her manuscripts. In a letter dated August 
21, 1959, she wrote him: “I would be glad if you would ‘house’ these two 
sets of poems [“Sagesse” and “Ave Vale”] for me, for the moment” (GA	15). 
Recovering from a broken hip in London, H.D. turned Jess and Duncan’s 
home into a way-station for her typescripts before they were forwarded to 
Norman Holmes Pearson, her curator at Yale University’s Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library.
 At the time, the couple was living in Stinson Beach, California, physically 
removed from the poetry scenes of Berkeley and San Francisco. Although 
their household was moving farther from the outside world, Duncan and 
Jess were eager to turn their home into a public and literary site by “housing” 
H.D.’s typescripts. At first, the arrangement simply initiated the development 
of a small coterie of poets. Duncan wrote H.D. that he and Jess read the poems 
as soon as they arrived “for the immediate delight”; and he then “housed the 
typescript in a clip-binder with heavy end-boards,” an architecture or ark 
improvised to protect the coterie’s covenant (GA 18). He concludes his letter 
by marking the affective and erotic intimacy awakened by H.D.’s literary gift: 
“In love’s name, as he attends our art” (GA 18). By requesting that Duncan 
and Jess “house” her manuscripts, H.D. transforms their home into a semi-
public space. As one of the residents of this transformed space, Duncan is 
assigned the role of receiver and reader. Their coterie’s private dimensions 
are overshadowed by the fact that these texts (and the story of their keeping) 
will ultimately become public; the “private” household, then, is opened to 
other members of that public, as well as to their texts. While he had already 
long defined his poetic as “derivative” and dependent on the writer’s role as 
reader, H.D.’s actual presentation of a gift had a profound effect on how he 
conceived the household as a “feminized” structure that renders the poet 
more receptive and vulnerable, as both a writer and a reader. In December, 
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Duncan forwarded the poems to Pearson, per H.D.’s request, and confessed 
at the start of the new year that “the light you gave to my house long ago 
reamins [sic]” and that “once guests in my house, they [i.e., her long poems 
“Vale Ave” and “Sagesse”] have left their imprint upon my heart—where the 
mind best reads” (GA	23, 22). Oddly, he then likens that “imprint” left on his 
“heart” to an impregnation. Since “a man” can “receive one or more souls 
that unite themselves with his own if they are related to it,” H.D.’s poetic gift 
is both a companionate soul and a “light” figuratively inhabiting Duncan’s 
own receptive, reading body and his poetic field (GA	22). “‘Poetry’ is a womb 
of souls,” he claims (GA	22). Reading is a passive activity that perforates the 
subject’s bodily boundaries and turns the subject’s attention inward. Within 
one’s male self, a domestically “maternal” space is accessed. A commonality 
queerly gestates there, thus redefining private spaces as media for public and 
literary exchanges (GA	22).
 A problem ensues, though, because Duncan’s deconstruction through the 
household trope is still mediated by Cold War discourses categorizing his 
own embodied experience of male homosexuality. The threshold through 
which the “light” of H.D.’s poems gains a point of entry into his reading body 
is associated with the “heart” (the seat of passion, corporeality, and eroti-
cism), rather than with the eyes or the brain (the seats of identity, conscious-
ness, and psychology). In order for Duncan to house her poetic word, even 
as a reader, her texts must enter an erotic passage to the younger poet’s soul. 
Indeed, in his H.D.	Book, Duncan likens the self-discovery born of reading as 
revealing and grounded on a hole, an opening, “As if I were a gap, making up 
my self ” (HD	2.6: 28). “Making up” has several connotations—a construc-
tivism or self-fashioning, an imaginative fancy, even a form of drag—all of 
which imply that one cannot re-create oneself in Cold War America without 
an initial surrender and a bit of cross-gendering. The ability of his and Jess’s 
household to render them properly receptive to H.D.’s texts, then, depends 
on the sexually unconventional nature of this domestic-yet-public space, a 
queering of readership that is in no small part imaginable as queer because 
of the supposed gender inversion of male homosexuality, the possibility of 
sexual receptivity, or the prospect of both partners’ sexual versatility. In May 
1960, Duncan forwarded H.D. his long poetic suite “Apprehensions” (Roots	
and	 Branches, 30–43). His struggle in that poem to divorce homosexual 
topicality from a general queering of containment structures leads me to 
conclude that the hole through which “Sagesse” must enter in order to reach 
Duncan’s heart-womb is his anus. Try as he might, homosexuality contains 
his queer and anarchist critique of liberalism.
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apprehending the difficulty of Queering the home front
Each of the five lyric movements constituting the long suite of “Apprehen-
sions,” the first of Duncan’s householder poems inspired by H.D., works 
through different tropes of passivity or receptivity. It begins with a scene 
of receptive readership to divorce such a vulnerable, passive subjectivity 
from sex. The narrator slips into a reverie as he reads a translation of Paul-
Henri Michel’s “Renaissance Cosmologies,” which Duncan carefully notes 
as published in the eighteenth issue of Diogenes. His “mind fell away / or 
disclosed a falling-away,” and he happens upon “an excavation—but a cave-
in of the ground” that—“hiding in showing, or showing in hiding”—reveals 
“a glass or stone, most valuable.” Egoistic agency is immediately troubled. 
This reading figure has no certainty about what his mind “disclosed” to him, 
or even whether that disclosure is truly unconscious (“a falling away”) or 
the product of the unconscious’s assumption of agency (as the subject of the 
transitive verb “disclosed”). The diction augments the indeterminacy about 
who possesses agency and what that agency is. The hole could be an excava-
tion, the product of an active digging; or it could be a “falling-away,” merely 
(“but”) a sinkhole caused by natural forces beyond human control. In a 
third interpretation, this geographical site might possess its own unfathom-
able agency that makes the narrator uncertain as to whether it is disclosing 
(“showing”) or occluding (“hiding”) an object from him.
 These questions about agency raise new ones about epistemology and 
identification, for what is concealed or revealed in or by the hole is left 
ambiguous as well. Although it is deemed “most valuable,” what the nar-
rator discovers is described in an unspecific way as a “glass or stone.” These 
designations could signify either a precious gem or even some material with 
little economic value: a common rock, a piece of costume jewelry, a shard of 
window glass, a fragment of a mirror. If it is just a common thing, then what 
kind of value does it have? Associated with a possible excavation, it might 
have historic or social value. If that excavation is really just a happened-upon 
hole, though, then the basis of all value is entirely subjective, a matter of the 
narrator’s own pronouncements. The will to formulate ethical, social, or any 
other kind of value is thus challenged by the passion that sets the scene. Iron-
ically, the only unambiguous element in the reverie is the narrator’s inability 
to determine what he sees. He glimpses just a reflection, “only a gleam” off 
the object’s surface. This glint, caused by a light source he does not direct, 
prevents him from discovering the identity of the object: “I did not bring 
the matter to light.” Indeed, this “matter”—whether we interpret this word 
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as the actual substance in question (the “glass or stone”) or as a topic of 
poetic discourse—is still in the pit’s dark depths. Consequently, the narrator 
is estranged from rationality’s “Eidos, Idea,” “to which” he notes “we gain 
access through sight.” Since sight “defines the borderlines of the meaning,” 
and since all he sees is an indefinable “gleam,” the narrator who perceived 
these objects is not boxed in by meaning either. Giving himself over to the 
associations spurred by reading, then pursuing new associations evoked by a 
mere reflection off an unclear object rediscovered during a reverie, he is no 
longer bound by the need to throw reason’s revelatory light on everything. 
He seems free of preexisting identity structures.
 Despite the liberties it affords, however, his imagination still operates 
within some bounds. Even in a reverie, he cannot escape the context’s material 
contingencies through which he filters his experience. At first, the narrator 
compares the cave housing the object to a bestial goddess from European 
folklore (a “toad-mother”) and Tiamat, the Babylonian dragon-goddess of 
chaos; however, these initial speculations prove unsatisfactory because, even 
in a state of poetic reverie, he cannot evade the actuality that he is looking 
into a “most real” pit, which could be the “washt out” product of a recent 
rainfall’s erosion of “the shit-yellow clay.” Prompted to abandon his unreal 
and mythological impressions, he reasons that the cave was produced by 
a storm. Such realistic conjecture opens other possibilities, colored by his 
momentary reflection on folkloric figures. He parenthetically wonders about 
the unearthed texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls, “fragments of an old way / stored 
out of sight.” Although this last association seems as digressive and removed 
from the immediate scene as his more fabulous imaginings, his final specula-
tion actually resembles the circumstances of the poem’s composition. H.D.’s 
long poem “Sagesse” was archived in Duncan’s home at that time. Like the 
Dead Sea Scrolls, her text, published in bits and pieces in various magazines 
during H.D.’s lifetime, is a fragmentary narration of “an old way.” Its twenty-
six sections are connected only by the thread of a reading figure’s conscious-
ness, which glides from a present moment when she reads a magazine article 
in The	Listener to remembrances of a male lover code-named Germain to 
childhood memories of reading fairy tales.18 Derived from but independent 
of H.D.’s model, the reverie in “Apprehensions” founds a feminized house-
hold poetic in which reading opens possibilities of a more passionate and 
less egoistic consciousness.
 The narrator muses that the matter he glimpses might be an organism, 
a “living thing,” because he believes it has “moved in the muck.” Organic 
and seemingly animate yet unidentifiable, this “thing” seems to live beyond 
categorization. But a compulsion to identify reasserts itself. Here the decon-
structive element of reading-in-itself comes to an end, and the limits of 
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queering—a social	 type	of deconstruction aiming specifically to undo the 
liberalist citizen-subject—are exposed. The narrator is drawn toward epis-
temological certainties, confronted no longer by some vague and undefined 
“thing” or “gleam” but by his own “soul.” It is through this Freudian Narcissus 
motif that identity generally, and homosexuality specifically, creep into the 
poem. This “soul” is no ethereal thing: it is a projection of his self into what 
had been described earlier as “shit-yellow” clay. This ego-image enthralls 
him and solicits his “rapt” attention in spite, or perhaps because, of its scato-
logical associations. The scene is so perverse that the narrator does not just 
face a mirror image, returning his gaze from beneath him. Instead, it is a 
mise-en-abîme like a Magritte painting: he faces the backside of his double, 
who, like him, is “looking down into the six-foot pit where . . .” (ellipsis in 
original; emphasis added). As in Freud’s classic narrative, the narcissist is 
faced with an unheimlich—an unsettling and, literally, unhomey—image as 
he peers into this improvised gravesite (“a six-foot pit”). In the projection of 
himself below, he recognizes that submission to passions could lead to the 
death of him. Though he is “Fearful,” he is also “rapt” and cannot tear himself 
away.
 This realization is enough to bring an abrupt end to poetry, as is signaled 
when the narrator’s lyric reverie concludes, jarringly, with the line’s sudden 
ellipsis. Yet, both Duncan and his narrator need	this deathly experience to 
further their shared lyric ambitions. When the narrator recovers his tongue, 
he reverts to a speculative frame of mind. These subject-centered ratiocina-
tions begin to articulate a value for the object that lured him to this dis-
turbing vision of himself, face down in the pit. Even when embedded in 
a web of scatological, homosexual, and morbid associations, the narrator 
believes it is “a stone that is most rare.” Although this noncommittal descrip-
tion refuses to peg the object with a fixed identity (it could be either a base 
rock or a valuable gem), it still ascribes some kind of value to it. This “jewel,” 
left behind and “hidden” by another, is the harbinger of a new poetic form. 
Born of external factors (“pressure”) and an internally originating desire 
(“inner fire”), this object—whether a found text, a thing, or an image of 
himself—originates in a process driven by both passivity and activity, self-
dissipating passion and self-assertive agency.
 The generally queer possibilities of being both vulnerable and originary, 
both acted on and acting, however, are undercut by a homosexual allegory. 
In the second movement of “Apprehensions,” Duncan foregrounds the fact 
that he is exploring an alternative poetic tradition. His longed-for “architec-
ture of the sentence” provides a rudimentary structure a poet can inhabit, a 
structure synecdochally presented as “the house and hearth.” For one of the 
first times in his oeuvre, Duncan identifies these domestic terms as “the rude 
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elements of my household.” The construction of that household depends on 
earlier writers’ cultural and discursive production, though. Any deconstruc-
tion is predicated on an identity it seeks to unwrite because a work is pro-
duced through engagements with, and exposure to, external forces. Like the 
object in the pit, they are the results of “pressure” as much as they are of 
“inner fires.” That is to say, they are produced out of material constraints and 
circumstances that come to identify them; they cannot simply grow out of 
a desire to defy categorical logics. A “landscape” is first produced by mem-
bers of an unnamed group (“they”) who have “ploughd the given fields in 
rows, / prose and / versus.” This is no pastoral agricultural scene but a scene 
of conflict and aggression, overwrought with gendered readings enabled by 
a longstanding tradition in which men are figured as the cultivators of a 
feminine landscape. Poetic fields are not sites of lines (verses) but of pro-
saic conflicts (“versus” and “rows,” as when rhymed with “ploughd”). His 
transformative household, then, is built on others’ battles. So, even though it 
grows out of a desire to found a site that is not so egoistic or agentic, it risks 
perpetuating the same sort of subjective antagonisms and defensiveness we 
saw Duncan oppose in Beat writing. He realizes that he cannot wholly dis-
avow such agency, but the result of his inability to evade that pressure means 
that his texts cannot escape the externally originating strictures of identifica-
tion. The “grove” produced by these poetic cultivators inflects (“interpreting 
and / interpreted by”) the queer household Duncan builds at that site; as 
such, a fertile possibility for reimagining poetry anew actually can lapse into 
“a grave expectation.” It does not produce a death of self or death of poetry, 
as Duncan’s narrator originally feared; but it does reproduce a dead end, the 
ineluctable expectation of using poetry to secure a recognizable self and 
social agency. Homosexuality still haunts that gravesite, back where Duncan 
thought he buried it. Identity morbidly lingers where poetry digs a founda-
tion for its vulnerable household.
 Admirably, Duncan chooses not to ignore that haunting gravesite. During 
the suite’s third movement, he delivers a bracketed instruction that directs 
the reader back to the first movement. This signals a recapitulation of the 
narrative of the cave, with all of its excremental, narcissistic, and deathly per-
verse associations. Rewriting that earlier scene, he tries to deal head-on with 
the limits that the patriarchal orders of his historical moment have placed 
on his project. Standing before the pit once more, the narrator now muses 
that what he sees is a paternal figure’s body, imagined as a cross between 
the Freudian primal father torn apart by his progeny and an Osiris figure, 
reconstituted “member by member remember.” An embodied, reproductive 
masculinity has been torn asunder and reconstituted at this hole. Floodwa-
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ters have “passionately dug out / his substance,” though; so all that remains 
are traces of his body’s outline. In order to avoid re-membering masculinity 
by restoring the paternal phallus, the narrator fixates on a particular outline 
in “the bottom” of the cave. He associates it with the missing male body, 
whose present insubstantiality makes it bereft of reproductive associations. 
Looking down at the outline of a figure positioned “head downwards,” the 
narrator can assert: “I have seen the jewel.”
 What had been an elusive object, only an unidentifiable gleam, is now 
definitively identified (“the jewel”). The narrator’s certainty about the iden-
tity of this object ends up defining him, too. In the first movement, he had 
misrecognized it as his own “soul” and, later, as his own double in the six-
foot pit. No longer is he vulnerable to this valuable object, though, because 
it is no longer understood to be an extension of his self. Yet the very dis-
tance put between him and it causes his own identity to emerge all the more 
clearly. Both the jewel and its discoverer are defined by all of the connota-
tions of where it is found, at the pit’s “bottom”: a designation of spatial ori-
entation; a cheeky synonym for the buttocks; gay slang for the passive male 
partner’s position during anal intercourse. In the depths of a six-foot pit, 
found in the outline of a patriarch who is buried upside-down, the “jewel” in 
the “shit-yellow clay” would be the primal father’s anus. This anus supplies 
“the body to my soul,” or reifies the narrator’s identity. This is no heteronor-
mative moment, to be sure, since the narrator’s identity is not the product 
of his interpellation by the patriarch’s phallus (or even the family jewels). 
Nonetheless, Duncan does reproduce conventional identity logics because 
his narrator is interpellated as gay by another synecdoche of the patriarchal 
body, the anus. Thus, homosexuality limits	the poem’s generally deconstruc-
tive possibilities because it keeps in play, rather than queerly deconstructs, 
normative Cold War gender and sexual binaries. Those limits play them-
selves out in the rest of the poem.
 The fourth movement introduces the Lover, the allegorical personifica-
tion of the household’s resident, to account for the association of vulnerable 
passivity with homosexuality. The Lover exclaims that he wakes up from his 
own reverie “a new, a workt figure of joy.” This receptive figure is not merely 
an instrument played on by tradition, like a Stevensian guitar or a Shelleyan 
lyre. His “soul” has been “fingerd” by the night, and this digital penetra-
tion—both metaphysical and physical—has affected the “Spectral images of 
manhood” that “took shape in me” since childhood, a masculinization akin 
to a supernatural gestation. Upon awakening, the Lover directly addresses 
the reader as a potential partner: “I saw in your eyes—sudden, waiting, 
empty—a place I was to fill.” Anuses are replaced with eyes, the seat of epis-
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temology where ideas and identity form. Predicative identification will be 
reworked by future eroticized, mutual submissions as those passive encoun-
ters become further removed from bodies. Given the bibliographic history 
of “Apprehensions,” as a poem that documents H.D.’s influence on Duncan, 
it would seem that the anality experienced earlier by the Lover can be read as 
queer without reducing that queerness to biographical homosexuality. H.D.’s 
writing inverts her, imbues her as a female subject with the masculine ability 
to penetrate Duncan and transform him with her authorial digit. However, 
the Lover’s account of his transformation forecloses possibilities of our sepa-
rating the queer from the homosexual. He explicitly likens the process that 
recreates him to cire	perdue, the making of hollow bronze statuary with wax 
casts. Although what results is a “river of me that flows away, melted from 
cast after cast,” an image suggestive of a continual dissolution of identities, 
the name of the procedure evokes Marcel Proust’s classic about inversion,	À	
la	recherche	du	temps	perdu. The wax then reads as an image of spent ejacu-
late. As the mold of the Lover’s seminal male corpus melts away through 
the heated passion of a homosexual encounter, left in its stead is an ecstatic, 
joyful substitute. But this artful memorialization literally reifies the dissolved 
identity and re-presents the hole and organ that made the queer dissolution 
possible in the first place. We are left with a hollow rectum whose anus pro-
vided the opening through which the other could finger, and thus transform, 
the Lover. The artwork left behind bears the “fingerprint-fine intensions” of 
“the man of the world that is a worker in men” (emphasis added). The other 
man’s “shaping hand” undoes a preexisting masculinity, melting away incul-
cated phantasmic gender ideals; yet he leaves behind markers of his own 
identity and will, his fingerprints and intentions. This displacement of iden-
tity from one male into the interior of another does not deconstruct Cold 
War containment logics so much as queerly reproduce them. Like a forensic 
investigation, inescapable identities—the bases of any liberalist logic—do 
not just constitute what the Lover calls a “previousness to passion”; they are 
also queerly reproduced through one’s vulnerable surrender.
 By the end of the suite, Duncan works through why the queer household 
must be founded on such a homosexual anality. More than a patriarchal or 
heteronormative discursive architecture is to blame. Ultimately, his	 body 
cannot be withdrawn from the context of its historical location and discur-
sive construction. The second part of the final movement reprises the suite’s 
opening scene by introducing receptivity in the context of a narrative about 
reading. What are read this time are Tarot cards, not philosophical treatises. 
Unlike Madam Sosostris and her “wicked pack of cards” in T. S. Eliot’s “The 
Waste Land,” this occultist reading does not divine a possible future (the 
Eliotic fortune of “death by water”) (Collected	Poems, 54). Instead, oddly 
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enough, Duncan’s diviner reveals the	past. As the narrator reads the cards 
with the addressee, he remains open to an external force, “an angel of time” 
whom “we are reading.” In the shadow of that angel and “among his power,” 
reader and narrator-poet “are meeting.” The act of reading, then, demands 
passivity to a masculine force, which opens the possibility for the narrator 
to form a new kind of community with his addressee. Modalities of speech 
and writing produce a “distribution of words” that leaves it up to the emer-
gent community of readers to discern new meanings and possibilities for 
themselves; but Duncan seems dubious that openness to others’ treatment of 
language is sufficient for an unrestrained questioning of identification. Cen-
ters may move, they may be redistributed, but they still function as points 
that organize and set limits to poetic and social meaning. Even if language 
is a material entity that can be manipulated like cards held in one’s hands, 
readers are still compelled to arrive at a single meaning since “There is only 
one event” responsible for linguistic production.
 The final part of the last movement is significantly titled “Close,” and that 
title is itself enclosed by parentheses. Here Duncan seals the container and 
exposes, without qualification, how the poem’s logic has been overdetermined 
by a singular event linking its composition to his own embodied experience. 
Like the bizarre divination of the past read through the Tarot cards, a prose 
account retrospectively gives the entire suite coherence: “March 27th: We 
found after the rains a cave-in along the path near the rosemary and thyme, 
disclosing the pit of an abandoned cess pool.” Included in a line of dated 
prose, the narrator’s reminiscence obviates any of the earlier ambivalences 
about the nature of what he discovered in the pit while daydreaming. With 
this coda, the whole suite is inserted firmly into the realm of fact and bio-
graphical history. Since the simple act of dating “Apprehensions” brings the 
narrator’s persona even closer to the poet’s person, the distance between lyric 
fiction and confessional verse collapses. Even if Duncan’s reader is unaware 
of the unconventionally public artistic and homosexual household he shares 
with Jess, the final anecdote reveals that the poem’s “distribution of words” 
ultimately leads back to, or anticipates, a singular event and material site 
from which we cannot dissociate vulnerability from scatology and anality. 
The very foundation	of Duncan’s household and its queering of liberalism is 
a cesspool, through which his poetic stand-in comes to recognize the valued 
object of his own desire. Although the mainstream might imagine this site 
as metonymically pointing to a particular sort of homosexuality associated 
with abjection and waste, Duncan does queer it as a trace of a (past and 
future) same-sex home and even a queerly anal (rather than phallic) source 
of power and patriarchal resistance. Thus, the poem’s lessons of vulnerability 
and receptivity do help refashion a new poetry continuing, while contesting, 
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a previous line to transform a field aggressively plowed by previous writers, 
and thus “Apprehensions” does challenge containment systems. However, 
the cards Duncan holds—the tropes he deploys and the context in which 
he writes—circumscribe the possibilities for a queer critique of American 
nationalism and liberalism. If the site for the vulnerable household’s foun-
dations is a cesspool, and if its scatological anality is what is valuable, in 
the final analysis his poetic subject remains enclosed in a male homosexual 
frame. The author’s own body proves to be an impervious container, what 
limits readers’ own abilities to passionately queer not just the poetic land-
scape but also the national one.
the Containment of bodies; or, the theoretical 
Limits of vulnerability
Robert Duncan’s work illustrates the value of testing and queering those 
systems of meanings that trap us within containing identity structures. 
His essays point us to the recognition that the interconnection of identifi-
catory rubrics—of the field of social discourses and ideological narratives 
that structure our understandings and experiences of gender, sexuality, 
and nation—can frustrate the systemic logic from which their individual 
meanings and recognizable natures originate. We might even extend this 
coalitional queering logic of similarities to include other primary identity 
categories, such as race and class. Realizing a provisional and alternate uni-
versalism does depend on what Judith Butler calls “a translative project,” 
an attempt to articulate a common language for different groups’ visions 
of social transformation (“Competing Universalities,” 168). Duncan helps 
us envision who the agent of that translative project is, as well as what the 
agency necessary for promoting it looks like. He even anticipates Butler’s 
own claims elsewhere that vulnerability might be the basis if not for a new 
humanism (a possibility she is more wary of than he is), then at least for 
a different idea of ethical encounter and civic responsibility.19 His refusal 
to associate the household—his preferred trope for signifying this univer-
salism—exclusively with either gender or sexuality points to the fact that 
cultural translators who instantiate this democratic effort must divest their 
selves of a liberalist idea of originary agency, and they must resist the temp-
tation to affiliate their selves with one identity group. Instead, they must look 
for some other public and human possibility that encourages intimacies, 
refashions our most familiar and supposedly private sites (our homes), and 
encourages us to move beyond immediate boundaries.
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 Yet, even if such modes of critique move beyond a liberal affirmation 
of identity, our queering of a nation and its population cannot escape our 
own bodies’ material inscriptions in, and our singular experiences’ depen-
dence on, the systems we seek to disrupt. This is the limit of his poetic ethic, 
as exposed in “Apprehensions.” Our primary identities, as Étienne Balibar 
argues, constitute the “kernels of resistance to integration” into a hegemonic, 
exclusive national identity. “The heart of this conscious or unconscious ability 
would seem to be the body or the body image” (We,	the	People	of	Europe? 
28). “Apprehensions” demonstrates that a supposedly more inclusive project 
of queering liberalist logics generally, and Duncan’s Cold War milieu specifi-
cally, is	 likely to find resistance in the source of its own resistant energies: 
the body. Founded on his writing body’s experience of same-sex desire, his 
resistance to identificatory structures cannot help but repeat the norms by 
which homosexuality is recognized. Thus, when Cold War or contemporary 
readers house Duncan’s poem by opening their selves to his text, they are 
also compelled to experience vulnerability in the same way as the persona of 
the narrating householder and the embodied person of the gay author.
 Duncan implicitly teaches us that such limits should be celebrated by 
queer theory. They help answer the nagging question of what’s so “queer” 
about a “queer theory” that disavows the importance of same-sex content 
as either the adequate reason or apt object for analysis. Queerness is not 
just a deconstructive process but an extension	of an identificatory marker 
inscribing our bodies and circumscribing our desires even as it deconstructs 
those limits. We need to struggle to redefine queerness apart from sexual 
identity, inclusively rather than particularly, so as to understand queerness as 
part of a social	field, a means of connection across identity rubrics and a basis 
for similarity rather than a marker of absolute difference. Even when drawing 
figurative alliances in order to “queer” the nation or identity constructs, then, 
homosexuality shadows queer critiques. This occurs in a fashion similar to 
what Butler remarks on when she notes that the disenfranchised subject’s 
“otherness” is the limit that “haunts its [i.e., universalism’s] boundaries, 
and that threatens to enter the speakable through substitutions that cannot 
always be detected” (Undoing	Gender,	191). Elaborating on Butler’s point, 
I would urge us to see that haunting presence as a paradoxically material 
specter since a queer ethic—whether conducted by a critic or an artist—is 
rooted in a struggle with one’s embodied experience of language, norms, 
and social codes. What emerges is a bodily supplement or, in the least, the 
supplement of hegemonic representations of queer bodies. It is that supple-
ment which speaks; and though its speaking distorts some norms, they still 
re-contain many queer projects’ more radical potential. Supplements do not 
just open boundaries, in an absolutely liberating deconstructive move. They 
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can also close boundaries again: a deconstruction of the deconstruction 
caused by the critical body that insists on making its historical experience 
heard. The resultant image of queer commonality thus does not necessarily 
expand the parameters of who may or may not be included in humanity’s 
new cosmopolis. In the case of the production and reception of Duncan’s 
poetry, subjects who are vulnerable enough to household here must be like 
the embodied homosexual male, must accept an ontologically ethical or 
politically civil passivity allegorized as gay anality. This vision introduces a 
form of similarity which insists on a kind of relation that begins to unsettle 
the identity/difference binary, even though it also inherently excludes other 
models—erotic or otherwise—of citizenship.
 Is such a queer ethic always consigned to political failure, then? I do 
not want to dismiss it out of hand. After all, “Apprehensions” does supply 
us another lesson, one much more successfully executed: even	 in	art,	 the	
production	of	a	queer	nation	can	never	be	completed. Even in the space of a 
single poem, Duncan sets out to revise his attempts to queer the American 
household. Revising is not just a rewriting, but a revisiting—a return to one’s 
foundations. Staging that return in the poem, he models the need for a con-
tinual openness and struggle with the “previousness” and “pressure” that 
form us. One must reprise the struggle to achieve a more inclusive univer-
salism and to revise prevailing liberalist understandings of subjectivity and 
agency. One must continually note how and why our deconstructive, resis-
tant efforts keep falling short. It may be impossible to definitively upset those 
primary categories that are violently managed to give the secondary category 
of nation its sense of stability; however, this is no reason to lose hope. Dun-
can’s career attests to a lifetime of provocatively reimagining the possibili-
ties for a queered	nation that transforms our perceptions of a collective life, 
a commonality set apart from the nation-state that uses identity logics to 
manage its citizens’ lives and to curb their freedoms. Politicized aesthetic 
and linguistic processes are always emerging and leaving behind traces of a 
history of change. Today, we might turn to that evidence, like those traces 
Duncan gifts us through his poetry and essays, to uncover their ambitions 
and shortcomings. Instead of denigrating his work for its shortcomings, we 
should value it, as well as the various failures of other resistant artists, who 
remain vulnerable by leaving their unsuccessful attempts in plain view, for us 
to see.
 That self-exposure to criticism is what is most remarkable about “Appre-
hensions.” The poem’s conclusion registers Duncan’s own awareness of the 
incompleteness, contradictions, and weaknesses of his own critical and eth-
ical effort. Following a trajectory from universalist imaginaries (of Meso-
potamian mythology, Renaissance cosmology, etc.) to queer romance (the 
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Lover), the poem ends up returning readers to a site of homosexual abjec-
tion: a cesspool. The normative discourses and traditions limiting Duncan’s 
writing and his critique recur here, nakedly. For that reason, “Apprehen-
sions” is more than a poem that exemplifies how an antiliberalist agency 
is rooted in forms of passion and passivity, in a vulnerability to texts and 
language. It also valuably documents the crucial lesson that we must struggle	
publicly	with	the	socially	and	culturally	derived	limits	to	which	we	are	always	
vulnerable. Moreover, we	must	date	those	struggles—just as Duncan dates his 
poem’s revelatory final episode—in order to locate them in our own personal 
histories, in the histories of our embodied experience. Only in this way can 
we bring private points of consternation, as well as private joys and pleasures, 
into a public milieu. By negotiating the shortcomings of “Apprehensions” 
and other queer projects, we can learn what it takes to continue our work 
of forging political—not just poetical—coalitions between primary identity 
groups, in order to move toward a queered nation and a queered	humanity. 
Our challenges of the identity structures that still reify, bind, and contain our 
bodies, persons, and communities are part of ongoing embodied historical 
struggles with liberalism and its nation-state. 30 July 2005 / 17 August 2007 / 
7 February 2008.
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ecause queer theory draws on concepts of power (Foucault), dif-
férance (Derrida), and desire (Lacan, Deleuze), its critiques of iden-
tity politics and heteronormativity continue a tradition of what 
Louis Althusser famously termed “antihumanist thought.”1 Rather 
than subscribe to a liberalist idea of the person whose dignity and rights 
are determined by an a	priori	human status, a clear identity, and an ability 
to intervene directly in ethicopolitical domains, queer theorists presume 
that other forces—language, discourse, ideology, desire, the unconscious, 
power, history, class, or some combination thereof—mediate social relations 
and shape the impersonal subject. When these concepts are used to further 
a democratic project via narratives about the lack of meaningful identity 
and the liberation discovered in shattering the ego, the resultant theories 
take antihumanist thought to an extreme. Stripped of all personhood and 
most social substance, the queer subject appears to be a lone actor, trangres-
sively opposed to the society that denies her bliss. In contradistinction, the 
field of queer studies tends to reject theory in favor of a more sociological 
approach to identity and community. Yet, it does so because it misconstrues 
theory’s antihumanist premises as only allowing for abstracted, ontological 
work, at the expense of analyses that accommodate very real differences 
affecting socially and culturally distinct experiences of queerness. Models 
of a monolithic queer subject risk racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, gender 
normativity, and classism because they privilege what Hiram Perez calls a 
transparent white subject	(Perez, “You Can Have My Brown Body and Eat It, 
Too!”).2 Although such a metaphysics is undesirable, problems still inhere in 
b
a baroque revolution
Severo Sarduy’s Queer Cosmology
C h a P t E r  
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queer studies’ own adoption of a sociologically informed epistemology that 
stresses identities and communities as they exist. Despite the fact that its pro-
ponents say they offer “the most innovative and risky work on globalization, 
neoliberalism, cultural politics, subjectivity, identity, family, and kinship,” 
queer studies tends to leave unexamined the liberalist tenets framing how 
we understand each of those social elements (David L. Eng, Judith Halber-
stam, and José Estaban Muñoz, What’s	So	Queer, 2). Positivistic treatments 
of identity and community are therefore as unsatisfactory as queer theorists’ 
determination to unravel or jettison those terms.
 There is an alternative, however, and it comes in revisiting antihumanism 
as a theoretic dialogue about ethics and collectivity that originates in, and 
that is responsive to, the exigencies of a particular sociopolitical	milieu. In 
this way, ontology meets sociohistorical realism in a critical fashion. Through 
the Cuban writer, painter, and art critic Severo Sarduy, I offer one narrow 
point of entry into such a rereading. Exiled in Paris from 1960 until his 
death in 1993, Sarduy imagined queerness and commonality as beginning 
in the absence of a national homeland or even of a household, such as the 
one valued by Robert Duncan (chapter 3 above). Rather than a geopolitical 
premise for commonality, he strives to transform language	into an eroticized 
and power-driven space one might inhabit to work through the limits of 
identity and difference. Such an ambition demanded that he undermine the 
propriety and individualism supporting liberalism’s formal fiction, a task for 
which Sarduy depended on his own appropriations of French antihumanism. 
Below I read a brief period in Sarduy’s poetics and poetry—from 1969 to 
1974, from the essays of Escrito	sobre	un	cuerpo	(Written	on	a	Body) through 
the poetry of Big	Bang—as a distinctly postcolonial	and queer	contribution 
to antihumanist discourse. Never did he imagine himself as just applying 
structuralist or poststructuralist thought to his writing. As he put it in a 1991 
interview, “I had to invent another language, a metalanguage in order to 
talk about my work and not fool around, so to speak, with those terms that 
are purely tautological, purely useless with respect to my fiction” (“Mudo 
combate contra el vacío,” 364).3 The resultant “metalanguage” constitutes a 
critical bridge between French theory, a post-Revolutionary Cuban condi-
tion, and a thinking of difference through queer erotics. Sarduy’s project 
furthers our sense of how literature contributes to the cultivation of an eroti-
cism that produces a vulnerable openness to human actors and	impersonal 
forces through one’s body.
 At times the connections Sarduy makes between ontological ethics and 
material realities may seem vague and indistinct, but ultimately those links 
render his queer antihumanism especially important to particular sexual-
ized and geopolitically marked bodies. Concentrating, as I do here, on his 
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interest in embodiment and materiality already runs contrary to how most 
have read him. The majority of critics comment that the baroque is his cen-
tral conceit, and that it culminates in the quintessentially “postmodern” 
concept of the simulacrum, as he develops that concept in the essay col-
lection La	 simulación	 (Simulation,	1982). The few critics who have been 
interested in Sarduy as a queer thinker usually begin with Simulation’s con-
testation of identity structures through the figure of the transvestite and 
through his elaboration on the Lacanian concepts of the gaze and anamor-
phosis. For instance, Ben Sifuentes-Jáuregui has remarked recently that 
Sarduy’s “transvestite narrative defines the homographetic markings in his 
work.” This transgender account supposedly supplies the point from which 
Sarduy engages an unrestrained, queer metonymic play that demonstrates 
the “privileged position that the author enjoys” (Transvestism,	Masculinity,	
and	Latin	American	Literature, 135). Invoking (and misrepresenting) Lee 
Edelman’s concept of homographesis, Sifuentes-Jáuregui erroneously attri-
butes to Sarduy the capacity for an agentic, performative resignification of 
identity scripts.4 The author himself is read as in absolute control of the text. 
By no means are such assessments of a paradoxically sovereign simulation 
new. Long before Simulation appeared, Sarduy was either reproached or 
praised by critics for the seemingly autonomous and transgressive nature of 
his ludic style.5 If queer theory were to settle for such readings, we would 
be using this Cuban forebear simply to reproduce the field’s frequent, prob-
lematic slippage into a metaphysics based on fluid performativity.6 We also 
would end up overlooking Simulation’s thin postmodernism, which Emilio 
Bejel rightly warns evinces Sarduy’s stubborn persistence in trying to over-
come history and the Symbolic despite his own recognition of how those 
forces limit and define his queer body.7
 A careful reading of Simulation that continues where Bejel leaves off 
would reveal that,	even in the late writings’ predominant rhetoric of post-
modern play and its theoretical focus on virtuality and appearance, the body 
actually does function in Sarduy’s thought as a material site, limited and 
affected by social norms. Instead of lost or dissipated, bodies resurface as 
haunting presences that challenge the apparent naturalness of the symbolic 
order, including normative liberalist ideas about agency and will.	Take the 
following passage from Simulation as a case in point: “Relating transvestites’ 
corporal	work	to a simple cosmetic mania, to feminization or homosexuality, 
is simply naïve: these things are nothing more than the apparent borders 
of a limitless metamorphosis, its ‘natural’ screen” (OC 2: 1298; emphasis in 
original). Bodies are the screens, the media on which performativity occurs. 
By rejecting an originary ontology that ties the signifier feminine to a par-
ticular kind of bodily signified, Simulation presages Judith Butler’s argument 
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in Gender	Trouble that “acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires 
create the illusion of an interior and organizing gender core.” For Butler, as 
for Sarduy, drag exemplifies how “the gendered body” actually “has no onto-
logical status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (136). 
Oscar Montero usefully characterizes such a performativity modeled on the 
simulacra of drag as allowing Sarduy to “rescue the banished body, not in 
its specular totality but as a fragment” and as “a by-product, a residue, of 
writing” (“The Signifying Queen,” 170). In Latin American contexts, queer 
subjects “seek fables of origin, on which and against which to write” but 
instead are confronted with “omissions and absences” of bodies marked as 
queer (165). Sarduy’s performativity supplies such origins. At the same time, 
he emphasizes their fabulousness—in both a literal and campy sense—due to 
the fragmentation of bodies and egos. In this way, his emphasis on baroque 
style consciously furthers Lezama’s theorization of that aesthetic style as 
rooted in an ethical appreciation of the fragmentary (chapter 2 above). Even 
more importantly, his predecessor taught him that that ethic is founded on 
how the fragment solicits a mode of passionate, rather than agentic or trans-
gressive,	engagement.
 If we read Sarduy against the grain of his own later rhetoric about “post-
modernism” and “simulation” and “revolution,” we can discover how antihu-
manism paradoxically helps him ethically	rehumanize	the subject by bodily 
locating it in an expansive textual universe that is as material as it is lin-
guistic. His tropings seduce us, invite us not just to read his texts with plea-
sure but also to cruise him. On the scene of the page, we become newly aware 
of our own embodied condition and conscious of our erotic and material ties 
to both the text and the outside world. My unorthodox reading necessitates 
focusing on an earlier moment in Sarduy’s career, when his nonfiction prose 
was less focused on topically queer issues like transvestism and struggled	
more with issues of agency, resistance, and eroticism. His readings of the 
period’s French antihumanist thinkers, who were his friends and teachers, 
are historicized engagements with an intellectual and political phenomenon. 
The recurrent motif of revolution helps situate his oeuvre in a site encap-
sulating the shift in post-1968 French activism and philosophy from polit-
ical radicalism to a reformist ethics.8 Sarduy’s preferred sense of the word 
“revolution” hinges on its secondary meaning: a	turning	of	one	body	around	
another. This astronomical metaphor is politicized insofar as it opens new 
imaginings of home and collectivity. Much gay and lesbian politics, as well as 
queer thought, assumes that disenfranchised subjects desire a place among 
a nation’s citizenry. Sarduy, though, signals that such a home is always an 
imaginary experience for the marginalized, just as it was for him and other 
exiles. When one imagines home, one need not embark on a nostalgic return 
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to what was once known. Instead, one perpetually departs to discover new 
cosmologies where others’ bodies echo one’s self.
the structuralist resignification of “revolution” 
for Postcolonial Writers
Through French theoretical discourse, Sarduy queerly reflects and distorts 
the conventionally humanist precepts governing Latin American ideals of 
independence, as well as North American (and conservative French) liber-
alist ideals of democratic citizenry. Both of these factors had produced an 
incorrigible Cold War drive toward contained nationalism. In his own expe-
rience, post-Revolutionary Cuba, with its totalitarian and repressive and 
bureaucratic administration, was the nightmare reality of such a nationalistic 
attitude. He uses French thought to scrutinize and reveal the flaws of liber-
alist idealizations of the citizen’s dignity, of a national collectivity that reflects 
an undivided social body, and of heroic manhood (particularly as theorized 
and exemplified by Ernesto “Che” Guevara). Contrary to what René Prieto 
has argued, I do not read Sarduy as “caught in the prison of the master texts” 
written by his continental contemporaries (Body	of	Writing, 172). No, his 
project purposefully distorts	both the antihumanism he appropriates and the 
liberalism that philosophy opposed. In this way, he transforms that body of 
critical thought into a nearly unrecognizable theory of eroticized exilic or 
postnational writing, which better reflects the postcolonial roots of his own 
thinking, its Cubanness.
 Rolando Pérez’s admonition is worth repeating: “The failure to take 
Sarduy’s opposition to nationhood seriously is perhaps the worst form of 
betrayal” (“Severo Sarduy,” 131). Sarduy’s interest in originary catastro-
phes and subsequent dispersals—including the loss of a unitary language, 
the proliferation of simulacra, and the cosmological Big Bang theory—are 
metaphorical displacements of the historical event that led to his exile and 
thus motivated his literary production: the Cuban Revolution. Forbidden 
from reentering Cuba after the government refused to renew his passport 
in 1966, charged with treason as early as 1968, and accused of being a CIA 
operative in the 1970s, Sarduy had every reason to be critical of the Cold 
War Cuban state. Roberto González Echevarría has read him as continually 
working through the “catastrophe” of “exile, ex-isle, of leaving the island” to 
work his way back home (La	ruta	de	Severo	Sarduy, 5). Sarduy’s writing does 
register his distance from Cuban historical actualities. Neither realist nor 
positivist, the critique of the nation-state he develops is ontological in nature 
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and is	 informed by French structuralism and ethnology.9 However, rather 
than read him as González Echevarría does, as engaging a parodic and nos-
talgic recovery of his missing geopolitical center, I see Sarduy as using that 
distance to his advantage to comment on modern subjects’ ontological con-
dition as generally exilic. In other words, his particular experience provides 
him with a point from which he expands, even universalizes, a theory of 
subjectivity befitting his postcolonial world. In that expansion from a limited 
sociohistorical critique to an ontological one, Sarduy leaves his ideas open 
enough so that others might find their similarities with his own subjectivity; 
yet, he leaves behind sufficient material traces to make it impossible to forget 
the motivating factors of his project. Instead of going back to Cuba, of con-
tracting to a missing and irrecoverable origin, his work explores how expan-
sion might help him find a home elsewhere.
 The very act of writing that dispersal constitutes a re-visioning of political 
possibility. “El barroco y el neobarroco” (“The Baroque and the Neobaroque,” 
1972), an essay Sarduy wrote for the Mexican collection América	 Latina	
en	 su	 literatura, abruptly closes with the fragmentary phrase: “Baroque of 
the Revolution” (OC	2: 1404). The essay opens as curiously as it ends, with 
Sarduy’s proviso that he is not continuing the tradition of an “irrepress-
ible metonymization” which has rendered the definition of baroque vague. 
Instead, he expresses greater interest in outlining a “restricted” meaning for 
the aesthetic term, one that “reduces it to a precise operative scheme” with 
particular relevance to Latin American arts (OC	2: 1386). He uncharacter-
istically classifies types of baroque writing in such a schematic fashion that 
the essay verges on the boring, a term Sarduy, not so incidentally, uses to 
describe the style.10 A theoretic playfulness, even seductiveness, enters the 
conclusion of the piece, though, where that odd final phrase surfaces. This 
ending supplies “The Baroque and the Neobaroque” with what Sarduy would 
describe two years later in Barroco (Baroque, 1974) as the second center that 
gives the aforementioned style its elliptical structure. “Something is decen-
tered, or even better, duplicates its center, doubles it; now the master-figure 
is no longer the circle with a unique, radiating, luminescent and paternal 
center, but the ellipse which opposes that visible focus with another equally 
functioning one, equally real but obstructed, dead, nocturnal, the blind 
center, the reverse of the Sun’s germinating Yang, the absent” (OC	2: 1223). 
The presumed authority of the center, of the sovereign, is disrupted by a 
second focus that demands equal attention, even if it remains in the master-
signifier’s shadow. The opposition of the circle and ellipse allegorically rep-
resents what Sarduy once called “the underlying battle” of “Western civiliza-
tion” (Interview with González Echevarria, 42). As the preferred style for 
Latin American arts, the baroque and its elliptical revolution does not just 
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overthrow master forms. Rather, it maintains a productive struggle between 
two foci: between a dominant colonizing discourse and an occluded, postco-
lonial one.
 A key contributing factor to the postcolonial resistance of the baroque 
is the style’s eroticism.11 “The baroque space is that of overabundance and 
waste. Contrary to communicative, economic, austere language reduced to 
its functionality—serving as a vehicle for information—baroque language 
indulges itself [se	 complace] in the supplement, in the excess and partial 
loss of its object” (OC	2: 1401). Predicated on a wasteful, even onanistic and 
self-pleasuring, expenditure of words, Sarduy’s baroque is an erotic mode of 
linguistic contact that need not communicate anything. Instead, it heaps sig-
nifier on signifier in an “obsessive repetition of a useless thing,” an excess he 
analogically compares to both Derrida’s supplement and Lacan’s objet	petit	a. 
“This game” discovers and promotes a nonutilitarian and noncommunica-
tive eroticism in its exposure of the artifice of culture, its refusal to partici-
pate in language’s “reproductive elements,” and its pursuit of “waste, in the 
function of pleasure.” Such linguistic play aims for “total rupture at the deno-
tative, direct, and natural level of language—somatic—, like the perversion 
that implicates all metaphor, all figuration” (OC	2: 1402;  emphasis added). 
Although seemingly immaterial language practices are the source and site 
of such erotic play, they really are quite embodied pleasures. Expanding 
on Lacan, however, Sarduy clarifies that such pleasure is not willful trans-
gression but merely “a structural reflection of a desire that cannot reach its 
object.” Moreover, the supplements it disseminates do not clearly articulate 
“the disharmony, the rupture of homogeneity” of a supposedly “absolute” 
logos; they merely expose “the lack that constitutes our epistemic founda-
tion” (OC	2: 1403). Through an ontological, rather than properly political, 
operation, the baroque’s stylized but unwilled proliferation of language to 
interrupt norms has the effect of shifting receptive, embodied subjects’ con-
sciousness.
 The postcolonial force of “The Baroque and the Neobaroque” owes to this 
brief and performative concluding section, this second center, where Sarduy 
is both theoretical and	elliptical. Combining the seemingly irreconcilable 
theories of Lacan and Derrida, his obtuse theorizations fall short of clearly 
communicating his own ideas. More interestingly, this has the effect of frus-
trating his own essay’s earlier, meticulously outlined explanation of how 
other Latin American artists have fabricated baroque styles. Thus, Sarduy 
performatively demonstrates—not just schematically describes—how the 
baroque can be “at times strident, boring, and chaotic” (OC	2: 1404). By 
his essay’s own example, revolution is tied to a textual eroticism, a perfor-
mativity that draws the reader in. It is quite distinct, then, from the agentic 
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voluntarism with which projects of democratic liberation are usually asso-
ciated. Voiced by a Cuban exile, the essay’s final phrase—“Baroque of the 
Revolution”—cannot help being read as a deflating invocation of the fidel-
istas’ (and for his Mexican audience, the Zapatistas’) political cry: ¡Viva	 la	
Revolución! It is a distorting echo. With it, Sarduy renders Latin America and 
its citizen-subjects unrecognizable, for his ideal revolutionary is erotically 
invested, playful, and wasteful. This erotic and passionate subject avoids the 
prerogative of (socialist) realism and testimonio.
 Even when he was involved in the resistive Cuban vanguardist publica-
tions of Ciclón	and Lunes	de	Revolución, he was indifferent to politicized 
radicalism per se.12 Sarduy’s sense of revolution is closer to Michel Foucault’s 
notion that “the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the 
workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent,” 
a praxis of unveiling otherwise hidden mechanisms of power (Foucault and 
Noam Chomsky, The	 Chomsky-Foucault	 Debate	 on	 Human	 Nature, 41). 
Writing is key to that praxis. Tel	Quel	 introduced a brand of antihumanist 
commitment that appealed to the young Cuban exile. In a 1966 interview 
(published only in 1977), Sarduy comments that Philippe Sollers and the	
other authors associated with the journal “rejected [the idea of] literature as 
something backed by ‘what’s said,’ what’s described, the message, etc. They 
do not think, as is very often thought by storytellers from our America, that 
the message is enough for writing well. . . . Later Sollers and his friends came 
to think that writing, even when it seems to say something else, is really 
writing, the first thing it reflects is that, precisely that: the act	of	writing, with 
its own structures and what I believe is its own ontological dimension” (OC	
2: 1809; emphasis in original). As he would note elsewhere around the same 
time, literature is an “an art of tattooing,” “the art of proliferation,” and “the 
language that thinks us” (WB	41, 42). In other words, literature re-marks 
existing bodies (thus causing a loss of “natural” identity), forms new sub-
jects, and makes possible self-reflexive thought. Comprising an ethical prac-
tice, an ascēsis, writing is an alternative mode of social commitment.
 Sarduy’s linking of revolution to writing expands on other Tel	 Quel	
authors’ critiques of Jean-Paul Sartre’s understanding of writing and engage-
ment. In this way, he explores how the second life of existentialist philosophy 
at the heart of postcolonial nationalism limits the possibilities for creating 
new subjects. If we read his baroque aesthetic as he asks us to throughout 
most of his career—that is, as an extension of Lezama’s poetics—and if 
his predecessor’s baroque also draws on María Zambrano’s own contesta-
tions of Sartre’s ideas (chapter 2), then Sarduy ought to be read as using 
a French critical idiom to elaborate a distinctly	Cuban critique of revolu-
tionary existentialism whose emphasis on sovereign action also resonated 
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with a norteamericano	 imperative of liberalist individualism. For an exile 
like Sarduy, Sartre’s name also would have been associated with a betrayal 
of revolutionary possibility. In 1960, the French philosopher awarded Fidel 
Castro a certificate of good conduct, which, in the global South’s eyes, con-
ferred philosophical legitimacy on the Cuban leader’s past as well as future 
policies. According to Jacobo Machover, the memory of this event would 
haunt later generations of Cuban authors. It seemingly authorized Castro’s 
later declarations that Cuban literature must support the Revolution, an edict 
in line with Sartrean notions about realism and positivism as the only truly 
“committed” forms of literary writing (“La memoria frente al poder,” 41). 
Sarduy would hold no truck with such conservative ideas about literature. 
Indeed, the Cuban state would not renew his passport when he terminated 
his medical studies in Europe because the first novel he published in France, 
Gestos	 (1963), was declared “counterrevolutionary.” This refusal effectually 
forced him into exile. Existentialism thus presented more than merely a the-
oretic problem for Sarduy. It also implicitly endorsed a problematic political	
program of agency, sovereignty, and insularity that alienated writers like him 
either from their homelands or, if they capitulated to the state’s prescriptions, 
from their own aesthetic sensibilities.
 Sarduy’s rethinking of existentialism begins with his extension of 
structuralism’s own early opposition to Sartrean notions of the relation 
between writing and political or ethical engagement. Following Jean-Michel 
Rabaté’s lead, we should date the full appropriation of antihumanist thought 
by literary theory to the publication of Roland Barthes’s Writing	Degree	Zero	
(1953), portions of which appeared in journals the same year as the publica-
tion of the essay that spurred it, Sartre’s What	Is	Literature? (1947).13 Barthes 
valued style as a key feature of literature for reasons similar to those cited 
by the existentialist in his devaluation of it. Style is “always secret” and “is 
recollection locked within the body of the writer” (Writing	Degree	Zero, 12). 
Rather than believing that such secrecy and embodiment causes the writer 
to withdraw from politics, however, Barthes argued that style is tied to the 
writer’s singularity. Thus, it causes her to register her individualism in “a 
general choice of tone, of ethos,” that signals how she “commits himself [sic]” 
to the world around her (ibid., 13). Her self enters History (with a capital 
“H”) and her writing assumes a worldly relevance because she makes choices 
while composing, choices that insert her work into a history of literary styles. 
Such decisions implicitly lead to “the affirmation of a certain Good” because 
they perform “an act of historical solidarity” with others’ precedents (ibid., 
14). Style—what is proper to the individual—thus entails a social conscious-
ness. It brings the writer into a historical continuum that challenges tradition 
and demonstrates freedom, albeit a freedom that lasts but “a mere moment” 
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because the individual always contends with the History (capital “H”) that 
co-opts her work and reduces it through socially understandable interpreta-
tions (ibid., 17).
 Modern poetry presents the most stylized language, which asymptotically 
approaches a zero degree of signification.14 Each word is a thing in itself that 
“obscures the relations existing in the world”; its objectivity disrupts all rela-
tional norms. Barthes warns that “these poetic words exclude men: there is 
no humanism of modern poetry” (50). Poetry does not re-present the world 
as humanity defines it: it is a primordial Nature, in which every relational 
potentiality between things is revealed and exemplified by language’s own 
indifferent, inhuman objectivity. Barthes held little hope for writing—espe-
cially modern literary writing—to be political, conventionally speaking. At 
its extreme, zero degree writing would not even be ethical: words’ “violent 
drive toward autonomy destroys any ethical scope” (51). Such a poetic abso-
lute, though, is actually an impossibility that only theory can imagine. If 
this absolute limit is never actualized, even according to Barthes’s own logic, 
then writing is inevitably committed. Although he is caught up in the ethe-
real dream of degree zero, Barthes is well aware that literary writing invari-
ably incorporates the author as an ethical actor, even as a person, into the 
fabric of history. It cannot be helped. The momentary freedom the author’s 
body discovers in writing demonstrates a constrained, yet necessary, soli-
darity with past writers and future readers. That alignment offsets the writ-
er’s ability to disappear into an indifferent, impersonal linguistic order.
 Interested in finding some way of addressing the status of the postrevolu-
tionary Cuban citizen-subject while speaking in a structuralist fashion so as 
to supersede a particular geopolitical context, the young Sarduy was drawn 
to the possibilities of extending Lezama’s antiliberalism through antihuman-
ism’s own critique of existentialism. In a section of Written	on	a	Body	pub-
lished in 1967 in the journal Mundo	Nuevo, he makes the following aside: 
“Writing about the subject	is writing about language, which is to say, thinking 
about the relation or coincidence of the two, knowing that the space of one 
is the space of the other, that language is never (as Sartre believed) just a 
practico-inert	used by the subject to express itself, because, on the contrary, 
the subject is what constitutes language—or, if you prefer, both are illusory” 
(WB	17–18). Here he extends an ongoing critique of Sartrean concepts and 
even anticipates by one year Barthes’s formulation of the subject’s consti-
tution by the act of writing in “The Death of the Author”: “The modern 
scriptor	is born at	the	same	time	as his text; he is not furnished with a being 
which precedes or exceeds his writing, he is not the subject of which his 
book would be the predicate” (Barthes, The	Rustle	of	Language, 52; emphasis 
in original). As Sarduy continues with his analysis of the Marquis de Sade 
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and Georges Bataille and Giancarlo Marmori, he argues that, for centuries, 
modern literatures have investigated ontology through a stylized language 
that aids authors in their inquiries into the nature of “man.” In this tradition, 
“in spite of the resistance they faced man is placed on a plane of literal-
ness previously off limits, thereby formulating that question about his own 
being, about his humanity that is above all the question about the being of 
his writing” (WB	22; emphasis in original; translation emended).15 Through 
their language practices, these authors open routes of ethical inquiry that 
can produce previously unimaginable subjects. Humanist traditions and 
definitions of personhood are consequently thrown into question.
 Alongside the aforementioned notable Europeans, Sarduy adds contem-
porary Latin American writers Julio Cortázar and Salvador Elizondo. This 
new canon establishes Southern literature’s role in the radical reconceptu-
alization of humanity according to an antihumanist ethic realized through 
eroticized stylistic writing, rather than a Sartrean politics realized through 
the person. Implicitly, Sarduy struggles to render the embodied postcolonial 
writer, as well as the bodies her work calls into being, less transparent. Then 
they can be used to revise late modernity’s general ontology. Still enamored 
of a “subject” (albeit an embodied one), though, Sarduy dangerously flirts 
with a structuralist line of thought that threatens to erase the postcolonial 
subject’s visibility and difference. That risk would be remedied in the years 
that followed.
may ’ and sarduy’s distorting turn from revolution 
to revolving bodies
Written	on	the	Body	was published in 1968, the same year that social actions 
erupted in France. Like the structuralism informing that first nonfiction 
project, Sarduy’s poetic was changed by those events. In May and June, Paris 
was immobilized by a general strike. Nonviolent protests and other, more 
violent incidents occurred in the streets. Students took over high schools and 
universities, while workers seized control of factories. Comités	d’action	were 
established to inaugurate self-management and participatory democracies 
in institutions ranging from schools to factories to hospitals. Self-published 
pamphlets called for further actions. Broadsides and posters, as well as graf-
fiti, plastered the walls of buildings declaring a new cultural and political era, 
a time when, as one famous slogan put it, It	is	forbidden	to	forbid. President 
Charles de Gaulle responded by ordering the erection of barricades and the 
deployment of police forces to the Latin Quarter. The National Assembly 
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was dissolved, and de Gaulle ordered new elections for parliamentary rep-
resentatives. In this brief period of insurgency, traditional politics, based 
on a prohibitive law and an economic conservatism, were revealed to be 
insufficient. A change was sought. Another slogan encapsulated this revolu-
tionary moment: Be	realistic,	demand	the	impossible. Inspirited by Situation-
ism’s anarchism, many believed “that a liberated politics could only emerge 
from liberated interpersonal relationships and that structured, impersonal 
political organizations could not respond to the problems of alienation in 
an over-structured society” (Sherry Turkle, Psychoanalytic	Politics, 63). The 
actions registered a discontent with the routes of resistance open to radical 
party politics through such organizations as the PCF (Parti Communiste 
Français). To call May ’68 a cultural revolution misses the point. Culture	
is	 the	 inversion	of	 life, another slogan ran. Clearly, it was imagined as life’s 
revolution.
 Initially, the connections between the political actions and the intellectual 
scene dominated by French structuralism were tenuous at best. Militants 
espoused a liberalist humanism, and, as Sherry Turkle notes, “Structur-
alism was associated with mechanistic determinism” that activists regarded 
“unfavorably” (Psychoanalytic	Politics,	72). Consequently, as the skeptics Luc 
Ferry and Alain Renaut have cynically claimed, it seems that only a “rather 
unlikely blindness,” a willful ignorance of the strikers’ anarchism and volun-
tarism, allowed antihumanists to ally themselves and their theories with the 
May events (French	Philosophy	of	the	Sixties, 32). “How can we view the coex-
istence of this philosophy . . . with a historical movement where the claims 
of the Ego against the System are at the most basic level of conviction?” 
(ibid., 64) Equating the individualist spirit of the resistances with liberalism 
is misguided, however. Julian Bourg, for one, sees May ’68 as evidence of 
the critical disjunction between liberalism and democracy: “In gross terms 
liberalism sees the individual and rights at the heart of political life, and 
democracy focuses on legal and social equality” (From	Revolution	to	Ethics, 
39). This fine distinction causes him to qualify the activists’ individualism as 
an ethical pursuit of collective democratic ends, what we might call a means 
of living	together.16
 After the resistances of May ’68 failed to produce a successful and lasting 
revolution, many became less skeptical about antihumanism. Perhaps, after 
all, it did not simply embrace impersonal institutions and bureaucracy. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, which began to influence Sarduy even earlier, 
was especially important to this general change of attitude. Activists in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s appreciated its “theory of the construction of a 
symbolic order, when language and law enters man” because it “allows for 
no real boundary between self and society: man becomes social with the 
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appropriation of language that constitutes man as a subject” (Turkle, Psycho-
analytic	Politics, 74). Naïve celebrations of complete autonomy, humanistic 
dignity, and liberalist possibility were questionable. The failed “revolution” 
had proven that humanity could not be facilely dissociated from social dis-
courses and institutions. A more nuanced belief in “the power of the word” 
emerged (ibid., 80). That nuance extended from activism into antihumanist 
thought. Rather than wholly dismiss the individual, French theorists’ anti-
liberalist critiques more nakedly reassessed individualism and humanism. 
Language may have limited personhood and agency, but it also produced 
new possibilities for ethically understanding both; and with those possibili-
ties came new political freedoms. Although Sarduy was more inclined to 
parody the Maoism of May ’68 than hop on its bandwagon as other Tel	Quel	
contributors did, his longtime belief in the ethical power of the word now 
had more cultural and political legitimacy. This setting also enabled him 
to cultivate and refine elements of his literary structuralism. Sarduy would 
begin to imagine language as wielding a cosmological force. That is, literary 
writing can create new universes that may be shared between writer and 
readers. Sarduy was still wary of equating such vitalist concerns with a lib-
eralist or existentialist emphasis on the person, rather than an antihumanist 
emphasis on the subject. Yet May ’68 helped illuminate how subjectivity and 
personhood coincide at the site of the body. Sarduy stresses bodies’ materi-
ality	 to account for agency without unduly emphasizing liberalist or exis-
tentialist personhood, all while minding the contextual exigencies and indi-
vidual singularities that compel writing.
 To negotiate this fine line, Sarduy’s post-1968 writing, beginning with 
the extended essay Baroque (1974), thematically concentrates on celestial, 
rather than human, bodies. We can imagine several reasons why he would 
find astronomical figures attractive. For one, their orbital movements add 
a new connotation to the word revolution. Rather than connoting political 
upheaval, the term now primarily signifies the turning of one body around 
another. As he outlines in his opening discussions of the move from Gal-
ileo’s and Copernicus’s centrist models of revolution to Kepler’s elliptical 
one, astronomy helps us see how revolution—in all its senses—experiences 
paradigmatic changes. Also, because cosmology entails concerns with the 
universe, this conceit refigures the universalism condemned by most struc-
turalists and poststructualists. As a postcolonial and queer thinker, out of 
necessity Sarduy is concerned with expanding the parameters of the human 
universe; but he persistently conceives of universality in his preferred onto-
logical terms, rather than in liberalism’s particularistic and humanistic ones. 
The treatise’s last sections move from astronomy to cosmology, as Sarduy 
outlines two contemporary models of the origin of the universe: the theories 
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of the Big Bang (an originary event that produced atomic matter to form a 
continually expanding universe) and the Steady State (matter and energy 
are neither created nor destroyed, merely transformed). From the latter, he 
would go on to develop his more famous “postmodern” theories of simula-
tion in the early 1980s. In the 1970s, though, Sarduy was more concerned 
with the parallels between the elliptical astronomical model informing 
baroque style and the cosmological Big Bang model of material bodies that 
appear, then disappear as they withdraw from their origin.17 Those analogies 
suggest that his embodied ethic sits on the cusp of humanism and antihu-
manism, political revolution and ethical ontology.
 Echoing May ’68 revolutionary rhetoric, Sarduy distorted it enough to 
accommodate his ontological theory. My metaphor of the echo resonates 
with Baroque’s epigraph, where Sarduy redefines retombée—the French 
for landing, rebounding, or falling again—as:	 “achronistic causality, non-
contiguous isomorphism, or a consequence of something that has not even 
been produced, a likeness with something that does not even exist” (OC	
2: 1196). Changes in how people imagine planetary rotation or the begin-
nings of the universe are not chronologically progressive “revolutions” that 
affect only one discourse community.18 Instead, the history of verbal, visual, 
and architectural arts demonstrates stylistic shifts that echo scientific theo-
ries about the universe, and vice versa.19 Neither is originary; only analo-
gies exist between roughly contemporaneous discourses. These epistemo-
logical similarities reveal a way of thinking shared across different fields of 
experience. They even show how power operates in a fashion that can be 
ontologically generalized to establish similarities between different institu-
tions and contexts during a historical epoch. If the world of art echoes the 
world of astronomy, it is not such a logical leap to assert that a postcolonial 
revolution might echo the recent French one. As the arc of his astronomical 
and aesthetic discussions highlights, though, such echoing does not merely 
reproduce or transplant ideas or praxes. This retombée of analogous ideas 
in unrelated discourses and fields distorts both foci just enough in order to 
reveal their differences.
 Sarduy subjected his own work to this same displacing and supplemen-
tary logic. Part Five of Baroque reproduces the earlier “The Baroque and the 
Neobaroque”’s conclusion, in its entirety. By titling this section “Supplement,” 
Sarduy does more than indicate that it is an appendix. He also invokes Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstructive theory and calls on his readers to use it to connect 
his two texts while deconstructively ascertaining their differences. Thus con-
temporary Latin American literature, which was the explicit focus of his ear-
lier essay, is related to his present consideration of European baroque art and 
the discoveries of baroque astronomy. In this fashion, Baroque instantiates 
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an echo that distorts the geopolitical limits of the first text: the postcolonial 
specificity of his earlier discussion of an aesthetic style is now ontologically 
abstracted. That universalism—rooted in a materiality—also implicitly sig-
nals a need to consider spatial and temporal forms of particularity, context, 
situation, location. On the one hand, this move seems to let Sarduy irrespon-
sibly skirt issues of identity by concentrating on material bodies and general 
models that are ineffective for postcolonial thought. On the other hand, it 
also lets him gesture toward the idea that universalism need not promote 
only the primacy of a metaphysical and transparent (North American or 
European, white, straight, bourgeois) subject.
 Another effect is registered in this distortion of his earlier work. As we 
have already seen, “The Baroque and the Neobaroque” appropriates Derrida’s 
concept of the supplement and aligns it with Lacan’s objet	petit	a. This con-
figuration refigures the supplement as the site at which eroticism enters the 
scene of writing. When that earlier discussion of eroticism, revolution, and 
supplementarity later supplements a cosmological and aesthetic discussion 
meant to trope a French revolutionary ethic, the revolving bodies in Sarduy’s 
oblique narrative about postcolonial universalism via Baroque’s discussion 
of astronomy and cosmology	is transfigured into an ethical narrative about 
the resistive force of eroticized	bodies. Literature provides a revolutionary 
and eroticized universe lying beyond the looking glass; it is a supplement, 
or an alternate ontology, that lets us see our bodies and social lives differ-
ently. Writing is a mode of commitment that queers the common, so as to 
render humanity more perversely different though not necessarily inhuman. 
Antihumanism is important insofar as it indicates that the queerness of this 
transformative process is detached from sexual identity and community, as 
they’re known. But personal elements do creep back in because two bodies, 
two persons, are involved in a codependent relationship, a turning about one 
another, which resignifies and distorts revolution, collectivity, and person-
hood. The full implications of that distortion can only be fully appreciated if 
we read Baroque as Sarduy’s performative echo and expansion of yet another 
origin: the post-’68 queer and ethical turn of his structuralist mentor, Roland 
Barthes.
the Pleasure of the text author’s body
In	a	 late	 interview,	Sarduy	maintained	that	homosexuality	 is	 just	a	matter	
of	“personal	 taste”	and	so	should	not	be	associated	with	“any	special	con-
notation	or	 value,	 either	positive	or	negative.”	He	 regarded	 it	 as	neither	 a	
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“subversion”	nor	“a	virtue”	(“Una	autobiografía	pulverizada,”	38).	Given	his	
antihumanist	and	antiexisentialist	leanings,	his	refusal	to	politically	identify	
as	gay	and	his	resistance	to	the	idea	of	the	inherently	transgressive	nature	of	
homosexuality	are	not	surprising.	What	is	striking,	though,	is	his	persistent	
characterization	of	writing	as	subversive,	transgressive,	and	revolutionary—
terms	 that	do	 resonate	with	 the	 rhetoric	of	 the	gay	 revolutionary	politics	
that	emerged	in	France	alongside	the	antipsychiatric	movement	in	the	early	
1970s.	The	principles	of	that	sexual	movement	are	perhaps	best	known	from	
Guy	Hocquenghem’s	Homosexual Desire (1972),	 a	 lengthy	manifesto	 for	
the	Front	Homosexuel	d’Action	Révolutionnaire	 (FHAR).	Reading	 sexual	
politics	 through	Gilles	Deleuze	 and	Félix	Guattari’s	Anti-Oedipus (1972),	
Hocquenghem	upholds	male	same-sex	practices—particularly	anal	sex—as	
transgressing	phallocentrism:	“Only	the	phallus	dispenses	identity;	any	social	
use	of	the	anus,	apart	from	its	sublimated	use,	creates	the	risk	of	a	 loss	of	
identity.	Seen	from	behind	we	are	all	women	[i.e.,	subjects	who	lack	a	proper	
‘personhood’	since	they	are	lacking	access	to	the	identity-granting	phallus];	
the	anus	does	not	practice	sexual	discrimination”	(Homosexual Desire, 101).	
Anality	 supposedly	 leads	 to	 revolutionary	universality,	but	Hocquenghem	
problematically	relies	on	a	homosexual	identity	defined	and	circumscribed	
by	 heteronormative	 ideologies.	 Consequently,	 even	 he	 is	more	 reformist	
than	revolutionary.20
	 A	 more	 astute	 reader	 of	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 than	 Hocquenghem,	
Sarduy	would	have	 recognized	 that	 their	 idea	of	 revolution	 actually	 con-
sists	of	something	other	than	the	liberation	of	the	individual	or	an	identity	
group.	Instead,	Anti-Oedipus	promotes	the	liberation	of	desire,	which	is	oth-
erwise	contained	by	a	liberal	idealization	of	personhood.	Such	an	impersonal	
revolution	 inheres	 in	 the	 libidinally	driven	production	of	 language	 and	a	
“deterritorialization”	of	extant	sociocultural	codes.21	Sarduy’s	fellow	Tel Quel 
contributor	Julia	Kristeva	positively	appraised	Deleuze	and	Guattari	in	Revo-
lution in Poetic Language	(1974),	applauding	their	idea	of	the	unconscious’s	
revolutionary	 force	but	 criticizing	 their	 social	 theory	 as	overly	dependent	
on	 literary	 examples.	What	 is	needed,	 she	 argues,	 is	 a	 literary	 theory	dis-
tinct	from	politics:	“The	text	is	a	practice	that	could	be	compared	to	political	
revolution:	 the	one	brings	 about	 in	 the	 subject	what	 the	other	 introduces	
into	society”	(17).	Texts	are	revolutionary	only	 insofar	as	 they	 introduce	a	
different	 experience	of	desire	 to	disrupt	 social	norms	and	 train,	 and	 thus	
subjectivate,	new	revolutionary	subjects.	Rather	than	subscribe	to	any	belief	
that	writing	could	liberate	homosexuals,	Sarduy,	like	Kristeva,	was	interested	
in	literature’s	liberation	of	desire.	Writing	might	act	as	an	impersonal	force	
to	facilitate	queer	subjectivation.	Insofar	as	his	hypothetical	writer	is	a	“sub-
ject”	rather	than	a	“person,”	and	insofar	as	his	likening	of	human	bodies	to	
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astronomical	ones	 seems	 to	 strip	 them	down	 to	 their	ontological	 founda-
tions,	 Sarduy	 could	be	 called	 an	 antihumanist.	Yet	 even	 though	he	 favors	
“impersonal”	concepts	like	eroticism	and	pleasure	over	a	“personal”	rhetoric	
of	sexual	identity,	the	distinction	is	difficult	to	sustain.	Both	the	impersonal	
and	the	personal	intersect	at	the	site	of	the	body,	to	which	Sarduy	does	not	
hesitate	to	call	our	attention.	At	once	private	and	public,	person	and	subject,	
the	written	 re-presentation	of	 the	writer’s	body	 causes	 readers	 to	 rethink	
prevalent	liberal	and	liberalist	attitudes.	Writing	ushers	in	the	emergent	sin-
gularity	of	the	author	who,	despite	actual	physical	absence,	becomes	virtu-
ally	present	through	the	text.	Readers,	seductively	enticed	by	the	text,	help	
along	this	process	of	realizing	 the	writer’s	body	by	engaging	 the	writing.22	
Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	human	element,	 an	amorous intimacy,	 accompa-
nying	the	impersonal	erotics	of	writing	and	reading.	A	curious	combination	
of	humanism	and	antihumanism,	this	intimacy	is	the	unintended	strength	
of	Sarduy’s	queer	ethic.	We	might	call	it	his	ethicopolitical	unconscious,	an	
unarticulated	link	supplementing	the	resistant	French	political	climate.
	 That	 link	 surfaces	 immediately	 in	Baroque,	 with	 Sarduy’s	 naming	 of	
Roland	Barthes	as	 its	dedicatee	(OC 2:	1196).	 Jacques	Lacan	 imagined	his	
subject	as	a	perversion	of	the	Cartesian	cogito:	“I	am	not	wherever	I	am	the	
plaything	of	my	thought;	I	think	of	what	I	am	where	I	do	not	think	to	think”	
(Écrits,	 168).	 Similarly,	 the	Cuban	 insists	 that	 the	baroque	 subject	“is	not	
where	 it	 is	 expected—in	 the	 site	where	 an	 I	 visibly	 governs	 the	discourse	
that	 is	 enunciated—but	 there	where	no	one	knows	 to	 look	 for	 it—under	
the	 elided	 signifier	 that	 the	 I	 believes	 to	have	 expelled,	 in	 that	 I	 believed	
to	be	 expelled”	 (OC 2:	 1237).23	 In	Baroque,	Barthes’s	name	 is	 that	 elided	
signifier.	Together,	he	 and	Sarduy	make	up	“the	 subject	 in	 its	 constitutive	
division,”	 the	Lacanian	 split	 subject	 that	 emerges	with	 the	 reversal	of	 the	
ego’s	repressions	and	suppressions	of	otherness	(OC 2:	1237).	Sarduy	thus	
literalizes	Charles	Baudelaire’s	dictum	that	the	reader	is	the	author’s	double,	
an	embodied	 similarity	 (mon sembable).	Unlike	Baudelaire’s	 frère,	 though,	
Barthes	supplies	a	queer	charge.	As	D.	A.	Miller	argues,	the	queerness	of	his	
own	writing	 resides	 in	 its	dual	performance	of	“sublimating	gay	 content”	
and	“undoing	the	sublimation”	through	form.	So,	queerness	for	Barthes	 is	
less	a	matter	of	 identificatory	practices	 than	the	stylized	production	of	an	
eroticized	“paradigm”	(Bringing Out Roland Barthes,	 27).	 If	Lezama	gifted	
Sarduy	a	model	for	the	Latin	American	baroque	as	a	committed	postcolonial	
resistance	to	existentialism	and liberalism,	then	Barthes	helped	him	link	the	
eroticism	of	that	style	to	a	queer	ethic.24
	 In	light	of	what	Sarduy	writes	about	baroque	astronomy	and	art	as	organ-
ized	around	the	elliptical	figuration	of	two	foci,	one	of	which	partially	sup-
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presses,	occults,	or	 represses	 the	other,	 the	essay’s	dedication	obliges	us	 to	
read	his	relation	to	Barthes	in	the	following	way:	the	supposedly	sovereign	
author	is	doubled	in	the	suppressed	figure	of	the	reader.	The	suppression	of	
his	presence	as	the	essay’s	second	center	is	not	an	erasure.	Sarduy’s	specifica-
tion	of	Barthes	as	his	intended	audience	makes	Baroque’s	argument	all	the	
more	elliptical.	His	name	forces	us	to	displace	the	author’s	authority,	to	read	
Sarduy’s	tenets	about	the	revolutionary	eroticism	of	baroque writing	against	
themselves.	After	May	 ’68,	 affected	by	 the	 revolutionaries’	 rhetoric	of	 lib-
eralist	and	personal	politics	but	unwilling	to	surrender	antihumanist	ideas	
about	structures	and	systems,	Barthes	had	opened	a	space	for	thinking	criti-
cally	 about	 the	personal	 and	 intimate	 experience	 complementing	writing:	
reading.	This	shift	in	emphasis	from	authorship	to	reception	marks	what	I	
see	as	his	personally	vested	turn	from	a	scientistic,	impersonal	structuralism	
to	 a	 curious	blend	of	 antihumanism	and	humanistic	hermeneutics,	 all	 in	
order	to	appeal	more	to	audiences	in	the	wake	of	’68.25	In	“Writing	Reading”	
(1970),	Barthes	complains	that	“we	have	been	overly	interested	in	the	author	
and	insufficiently	in	the	reader.	.	.	.	We	try	to	establish	what the author meant,	
and	 not	 at	 all	what the reader understands”	 (The Rustle of Language,	 30;	
emphasis	in	original).	Such	understanding	could	not	be	wholly	systematized	
because	of	individual	readers’	idiosyncrasies.	He	does	develop	an	account	of	
how	reading,	as an embodied experience,	 still	can	be	thought	ontologically,	
however.	“To	read	is	to	make	our	body work	.	.	.	at	the	invitation	of	the	text’s	
signs”	(ibid.;	emphasis	in	original).	Thus,	through	the	bodywork	of	reading,	
Barthes	ethicizes	and	somewhat	personalizes	antihumanism.	This	personal-
ization	provides	the	back	door	through	which	the	underlying	vulnerability	
of	antihumanist	thought	enters.
	 Addressing	 the	Big	Bang	and	 the	Steady	State	 in	Baroque,	 Sarduy	elab-
orates	how	 these	 cosmological	 theories	 elucidate	“an	 instantaneous	 event,	
without	origin	or	any	trace:	the	springing	forth	[surgimiento]	of	the	body,	
immediate	 disappearance”	 (OC 2:	 1241).	 Bodies	 are	 now	 imaginable	 as	
simply	happening	and,	in	time,	disappearing.	From	the	time	of	their	eventful	
emergence,	 the	distance	between	heavenly	bodies	widens.	“The	universe	 is	
dilated:	its	bodies	are	separating	[se separan],	fleeing	from	one	another”	(OC 
2:	1245).	This	separation	is	at	once	willful	and	inevitable:	the	reflexive	verb	
structure	of	se separan and	the	bodies’	flight	from	one	another	suggest	that	
they	 themselves	 are	 responsible	 for	 enacting	 this	 distancing;	 yet,	 because	
cosmological	expansion	is	a	force,	it	cannot	be	willfully	initiated.	Paradoxi-
cally,	thanks	to	that	distancing,	long	after	their	disappearance	celestial	bodies	
are	still	present.	After	all,	even	long-dead	stars	are	virtually	present	since	they	
continue	to	be	visible.	Moreover,	the	light	that	belatedly	arrives	from	stars	is	
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not	just	the	evidence	of	their	having	existed	in	the	past;	for	the	viewer,	that	
light	 is	 a	quantum	body	doubling	 for	 the	heavenly	bodies’	 existence,	 even	
after	their	deaths.	If	contemporary	cosmology	offers	an	analogy	that	illumi-
nates	how	bodies	are	imagined	to	function	in	other	fields,	Sarduy	implicitly	
uses	his	narrative	about	 the	stars	and	the	universe	 to	spur	a	rethinking	of	
how	bodies	are	also	virtually	present	in	writing.	Similar	to	the	way	light	func-
tions	as	a	quantum	medium	attesting	 to	 the	author’s	existence	or	having-
existed,	a	literary	text	acts	as	the	evidentiary	light	signaling	the	presence	of	
the	author	whom	structuralism	had	declared	dead.	It	ties	us,	the	readers,	to	
the	writing	body	 long	after	 the	 author	has	disappeared	 from	 the	 scene	of	
writing.	Through	the	word	we	share,	we	restore	body	and	life.
	 If	Baroque	 is	read	as	an	echo	or	retombée of	Barthes,	the	dedicatee	who	
embodies	the	other	center	lurking	in	the	shadows	and	around	whom	Sarduy’s	
thought	elliptically	revolves,	then	it	is	possible	to	see	how	Sarduy’s	analogy	
about	the	tie	between	the	reader	and	the	author’s	quasi-stellar	and	virtual	
presence	is	implicitly	suffused	with	a	queer	eroticism.	In	The Pleasure of the 
Text (1973),	which	 appeared	 one	 year	 before	Baroque,	 Barthes	mentions	
Sarduy’s	novel	Cobra	as	exemplary	of	the	dynamic	whereby	literary	pleasure 
is	 transformed	 into	bliss	 (8).	Pleasure	 connotes	 an	 erotic	 relation	between	
reader	and	text	(or	writer	and	text),	in	which	just	enough	contact	with	cul-
ture	 and	conventions	 remains	 so	 that	 the	 experience	 can	be	described.	 In	
contrast,	bliss	is	akin	to	a	Lacanian	idea	of	jouissance,	an	ecstatic	loss	of	self.	
It	 is	wholly	 atopic	 and	asocial,	 experienced	 in	 solitude.	 It	 results	 from	an	
intransitive	literary	use	of	language,	an	encounter	occurring	entirely	in	the	
present	and	outside	cultural	or	narrative	conventions.	In	brief,	“Pleasure	can	
be	 expressed	 in	words,	bliss	 cannot”	 (ibid.,	 21).	Pleasure	 can	be	 critically	
described,	but	bliss	can	only	be	experienced.	At	most,	it	can	be	simulated	for	
others.	The	distinction	between	pleasure	and	bliss	is	not	a	matter	of	abso-
lutes,	however.	Barthes	 admits	 from	 the	very	 start	 that,	“terminologically,	
there	 is	a	vacillation”	and	“a	margin	of	 indecision”	between	the	 two:	“The	
distinction	will	not	be	 the	source	of	absolute	classifications,	 the	paradigm	
will	falter,	the	meaning	will	be	precarious,	revocable,	reversible,	the	discourse	
incomplete”	 (ibid.,	 4).	Even	 though	Barthes	plays	with	a	Lacanian	 idea	of	
jouissance,	he	does	not	celebrate	total	self-dissolution.	Instead,	he	establishes	
an	 ethical	 compromise	between	 the	 antihumanist	 impersonality	of	desire	
and	the	humanist	intimacies	of	erotic	attachment.26
	 The	only	distinction	 that	matters	 is	not	 the	one	between	pleasure and	
bliss,	 but	what	divides	both	 from	more	banal	 textual	 encounters.	Barthes	
addresses	some	unnamed	nonliterary	author	whose	unstimulating	work	he	
is	reading:	“For	you	I	am	neither	a	body	nor	even	an	object	.	.	.	but	merely	
a	field,	a	vessel	for	expansion.	It	can	be	said	that	after	all	you	have	written	
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   134 11/13/2008   12:52:21 PM
A  b A r o Q u e  r e v o L u t I o n  1 
this	 text	quite	apart	 from	bliss;	and	this	prattling	text	 is	 then	a	 frigid	text,	
as	any	demand	is	frigid	until	desire,	until	neurosis	forms	in	it”	(ibid.,	5).	In	
contrast	 to	 such	“prattling”	 and	“frigid”	ventures,	 stylized	 literary	writing	
evinces	both	bliss	and	pleasure.	Barthes	enjoys	reading	such	literature—texts	
like	Sarduy’s	Cobra—because	they	restore	his	body	to	the	scene	of	reading;	
and	they	do	so	by	heightening	his	sense	of	the	writer’s	embodied	pleasurable	
or	blissful	 experience.	The	 joy	 an	 author	 evidently	has	had	while	writing	
reassures	Barthes	that	he,	as	a	reader,	exists	as	either	a	body	or	an	object	of	
desire.	The	writer	writes	 for	him,	 to	him.	Such	 textual	pleasure	brings	 to	
our	 attention	 the	 fact	 that	we	 cannot	know	our	bodies	 in	 an	unmediated	
fashion.	To	know	ourselves,	we	first	must	become	 conscious	of	 our	 rela-
tions	to	others’	bodies	and	their	experiences	of	pleasure	and	bliss.	As	Barthes	
puts	 it,	“The	pleasure	of	 the	 text	 is	 that	moment	when	my	body	pursues	
its	own	ideas—for	my	body does	not	have	the	same	ideas	I	do”	(ibid.,	17).	
Taking	advantage	of	this	statement’s	ambiguity,	an	uncertainty	that	leaves	it	
unresolved	whether	Barthes	is	speaking	as	a	reader	or	a	writer	here	(he	oscil-
lates	between	both	positions	 throughout	 the	book),	 I	 argue	 that	pleasure	
disrupts	liberalist	conventions	of	identity	and	personhood	for	both readers 
and writers.	It	causes	one	to	think	multiply:	as	an	embodied	“I,”	reading	(or	
writing)	alone,	as	well	as	a	body	intrinsically	linked	to	the	alien	one	of	the	
writer	(or	reader).	In	literary	joys	and	pleasures,	the	self	is	split,	expansive,	
extensive	beyond	 its	 own	corporeal	 shell.	But	because	 such	pleasure	pre-
serves	the	other’s	objectivity	and	difference,	it	is	an	expansive	pleasure	that	
does	not	colonize.
	 When	the	textual	encounter	causes	the	split	between	cogito and	body,	one	
finds	one’s	 self	 subject	 to	 the	 text,	 to	 language,	 and	 to	 the	other	body	 at	
the	 end	of	 the	 line.	Here	 a	 strange	humanism—or,	 at	 least	 a	 sense	of	 the	
encounter’s	humanness—creeps	back	into	Barthes’s	antihumanist	narrative	
(if	it	ever	really	left).	It	eroticizes,	almost	sexualizes,	the	encounter.	Writing	
in	pleasure	 also	“guarantee[s]”	 a	 reader’s	pleasure;	 it	necessitates	 that	 the	
author	pursue	the	audience,	as	one	would	pursue	a	john	for	anonymous	sex.	
As	Barthes	writes:	“I	must	seek	out	this	reader	(must	‘cruise’	him)	without 
knowing where he is.	A	site	of	bliss	is	then	created.	It	is	not	the	reader’s	‘person’	
that	is	necessary	to	me,	it	is	this	site:	the	possibility	of	a	dialectics	of	desire,	of	
an	unpredictability of	bliss”	(ibid.,	4;	emphasis	in	original).	Notwithstanding	
his	reversion	to	gay	male	slang	(cruising),	Barthes	is	not	narrating	the	plea-
sures	of	the	text	as	a	product	of	his	own	homosexual	orientation.	However,	
a	personal	 element	 is	 still	 at	 play	 in	 this	 eroticism.	 It	 is not, however, the 
typically liberalist “human” person who is integral, independent, identifiable; 
instead Barthes offers a	personhood reconfigured.
	 Toward	the	end	of	The Pleasure of the Text,	Barthes	explains	that	his	theory	
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of	reading	and	its	eroticism	is	part	of	“a	theory	of	the	materialist	subject,”	
which	brings	materialism	back	to	its	most	foundational	unit:	the	body	(61).	
The	desired	“site”	 supplied	by	 a	 literary	 text	between	 the	 reader’s	 and	 the	
writer’s	bodies	is	the	materialization	of	the	bond	and the	distance	between	
them.	Thus,	 the	 text	 supplies	 a	 space,	 a	universe,	 they	might	 coinhabit,	 if	
only	virtually.	This	is	the	locus	of	a	peculiar	condition,	what	Barthes	calls	“a	
drift,	something	both	revolutionary	and	asocial,	and	it	cannot	be	taken	over	
by	any	collectivity,	any	mentality,	any	ideolect”	(ibid.,	23;	emphasis	added).	
Despite	his	insistence	on	bliss	and	pleasure’s	“asocial”	nature,	the	materiality	
of	this	bond	and	this	drift	figure	an	intensely	intimate	form	of	sociality,	one	
that	 is	“asocial”	only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	different	 from	conventional	 commu-
nality.	Occurring	in	each	other’s	absence,	but	predicated	on	the	founding	of	
an	alternate	 space	where	humanity	 and	commonality	might	be	 redefined,	
this	relation	moves	Barthes’s	thought	toward	a	thought-provoking	paradox:	
a	new	sort	of	love	growing	out	of	an	impersonal	vulnerability.	That	vulner-
ability	 comes	 in	 imagining	 another’s	 embodied	desire	 for	one’s	 self.	 Such	
imagining	renders	one’s	own	self	unrecognizable.	We	never	know	how	we	
look	in	our	lovers’	eyes.	The	new	humans,	readers	or	writers,	produced	out	
of	such	intimacy	are	always	different	from	their	selves.	They	are	split	by	the	
others	to	whom	they	are	pleasurably	linked	by	a	text	and	to	whom	they	must	
remain	open	and	potentially	vulnerable.	Barthes	reads	Sarduy	in	this	fashion,	
and	Sarduy	 reads	Barthes	 in	 this	way,	 too.	When	we	 restore	 this	 elliptical	
intimacy	between	them,	and	when	we	let	The Pleasure of the Text revolve	out	
of	the	shadow	Baroque 	casts	on	it,	the	planetary	bodies	of	Sarduy’s	postcolo-
nial	antihumanism	are	infused	with	a	rather	queer	eroticism	and	a	strangely	
human	vulnerability.
beginning a Queer universe, with a bang
What	 are	only	 echoes	 and	 traces	 in	Baroque	 of	 the	 author’s	 vulnerability,	
the	intimate	and	pleasurable	link	to	others,	surface	as	explicit	tropes	in	Sar-
duy’s	poetry.	Little	has	been	written	about	his	verse,	in	spite	of	his	insistence	
that	poetry	is	the	first	of	his	arts	and	“the	generator	of	everything”	(“Mudo	
combate,”	365).	Perhaps	critics	avoid	it	precisely	because	it	demonstrates	a	
lyric	sensibility	that	calls	attention	to	the	embodied	authorial	presence	that	
we	presume,	 in	 good	antihumanist	 fashion,	 is	dead.	While	 railing	 against	
Romantic	lyricism,	especially	as	it	was	rewarded	in	communist	Cuba,	Sarduy	
wrote	 to	Manuel	Díaz	Martínez	 that	“in	 the	center	of	a	society	structured	
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around	the	notion	of	‘unity,’	of	a	monolithic thought,”	poetry presented	“the	
only	transgression”	(Cartas, 41;	emphasis	in	original).	Disruptive	of	conven-
tions	and	staid	ideas,	it	alone	exposes	the	power	of	the	word.	Yet	his	sense	of	
poetry’s	uniquely	transgressive	powers	qualifies	what	“transgression,”	or	rev-
olution,	actually	entails.	Not	to	be	confused	with	the	act	of	an	existentialist	
or	with	romantic	self-expression,	poetry	is	a	stylized	action	that	heightens	
readers’	 awareness	of	 their	 intimate	 relations	 to	 the	author	who	addresses	
them.27
 Big Bang	(1974)—the	companion	volume	to	Baroque—mixes	lyric	with	
concrete	 poetry	 and	 heteroglossic	 forms.	 This	 combination	 foregrounds	
the	transformative	nature	of	intimacy	while	calling	attention	to	language’s	
mediation	of	eroticism.	The	page	supplies	a	material	universe,	where	reader	
and	writer	cruise	one	another	and	find	a	new	home.	This	 textual	 space	 is	
governed	by	a	new	sense	of	universalism	that	can	accommodate	each	party’s	
corporeal	 singularity.	The	volume	 is	divided	 into	 four	 sections.	Flamenco	
consists	of	what	could	be	described	as	objectivist	poems	that	simulate	dance	
movements	by	 repeating	architectural	 tropes,	and	stock	phrases	 to	under-
score	the	relation	between	space,	the	writing	body,	and	the	text.	Mood Indigo	
gathers	 concrete	poems	printed	 in	 a	block	 font	 reminiscent	of	newspaper	
headline	type.	Each	shares	the	title	of	a	Duke	Ellington	song	(“Moon	Mist,”	
“Echoes	of	Harlem,”	“Mood	Indigo,”	“The	Mooche”)	and	together	they	pay	
homage	 to	 the	 departed	Afro-Cuban	 singer	 and	 guitarist	 Beny	Moré.	 By	
connecting	Ellington	to	Moré,	Sarduy	implicitly	imagines	art	as	forming	a	
bridge	between	North	and	South,	even	though	the	Cuban	musician	actually	
had	cut	his	ties	with	his	North	American	record	label	RCA	and	did	not	leave	
the	 island	or	his	people	after	 the	Revolution.	This	section	features	writing	
as	constituting	a	body	whose	racialization	helps	give	body	to	the	reader	as	
well	(“the	music	the	page	:	black	layers”;	“a	map	your	black	body”;	“the	face	
a	text	/	written	with	gypsum	/	ebony”)	(OC 1:	153,	152,	161).	Reading	is	like	
dancing.	As	readers	are	 led	by	 the	poems	through	the	volume,	 they	simu-
late	the	author’s	“ESPIRAL	NEGRA”	(OC 1:	158–59),	his	concrete	poetry’s	
representation	of	black	music’s	transnational	movements	between	Harlem,	
Havana,	Río,	Paris,	and	Africa.	The	next	section	of	Big Bang,	which	I	analyze	
below,	is	a	long,	multipart	poem	that	lends	the	entire	volume	its	title.	Otros 
poemas	 closes	 the	collection	with	 lyrics	written	 in	 Indonesia.	Here	Sarduy	
thematically	 connects	 East	 and	West	with	 topics	 ranging	 from	 cinematic	
representation	(part	1),	to	reminiscences	of	Cuba	(“Sexteto	habanero”),	to	
the	 visual	 arts	 (“Páginas	 en	blanco	 [Cuadros	de	Franz	Kline],”	“Pavo	 real	
de	Carlo	Crivelli,”	“Cubos	de	Larry	Bell”),	 to	traditional	Indonesian	dance	
(“Ketjak”).
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	 Connecting	 East	 and	West,	North	 and	 South,	while	 urging	 readers	 to	
interact	bodily	with	his	 texts,	Big Bang clearly	has	 a	 cosmopolitan	vision.	
Key	 to	 that	 vision	 is	 the	 intimate	 link	 forged	between	 reader	 and	author.	
“Ketjak,”	which	finishes	 the	 entire	 volume,	puts	 it	most	nakedly:	“I	 teach	
you	how	to	dance.	I	take	you	close	to	me.	Close	to	my	body.	/	I	model	arms	
and	fingers	for	you.	Fingers	for	feet.	[Te modelo brazos y dedos. Los dedos de 
los pies.]	/	Follow	me.	Skin	against	skin.	Touch	my	black	skin”	(OC 1:	196).	
We	are	seduced	to	come	into	contact	with	Sarduy’s	own	queer	multiracial	
(Afro-Cuban,	Sino-Cuban,	and	criollo)	body,	via	his	text.	His	lyric	anamor-
phically	distorts	body	images	and	forces	us	to	correlate	the	digits	with	which	
he	embraces	us	(fingers)	with	those	on	which	we	dance	(toes).	Our	rendez-
vous	with	him	occurs	through	a	close	attention	to	another	sort	of	foot,	then,	
the	metrical	feet	constituting	both	poetic	lines	and	musical	phrases.	In	the	
absence	of	 Sarduy’s	 actual	body,	his	darkened	 skin	 is	 re-presented	by	 the	
black	 type	whose	 foot	drives	us	and	mediates	his	caresses.	This	dance	 is	a	
cooperative	effort,	even	if	one	partner—the	author—inevitably	must	 lead.	
Sarduy’s	verb	modelar (“te	modelo	brazos	y	dedos”)	has	a	double	sense: this	
literary	dance,	 this	 intimate	 form	of	 reading	and	moving	with	his	poems,	
simultaneously	models	 what	 a	 body	 can	 be	 and	 forms	 or	 shapes readers’	
bodies	anew.	“The	page	and,	above	all,	the	poem	are,	for	me,	like	bodies	in	
space,”	Sarduy	would	note	later	about	Big Bang.	“They	begin	with	an	initial	
explosion	of	a	primitive	verbal	atom,	which	does	not	yet	actually	exist	and	
will	continue	to	expand”	(“Severo	Sarduy,”	21).	Conceived	as	a	cosmological	
explosion	and	structured	 like	a	dance,	 these	poems	reimagine	 intimacy	 to	
move	both	reader	and	writer	across	a	recognizable	globe,	into	new	worldly	
spaces.
	 It	 is	 the	 eponymous	 third	 section	of	 the	 collection,	 though,	 that	 con-
cretely	 establishes	 the	 echo	 between	 Baroque’s	 cosmological	 theory	 and	
this	volume.	In	the	long	poem	“Big	Bang” (OC 1:	164–75),	ethico-aesthetic	
theory	becomes	poetic	praxis.	Originally	published	by	Fata	Morgana	Press	as	
a	chapbook	with	facing	French	translations	(1973),	the	seventeen-part	poem	
features	a	 lyric	 eroticism	 that	disrupts	 scientific	narratives	about	heavenly	
bodies	 and	 cosmological	 beginnings.28	 Thus,	 Sarduy	 reminds	 his	 readers	
of	the	ability	of	poetry	to	generate	a	new	sociopolitical	universe	by	bodily	
provoking	new	intimacies.	The	constitutive	sections	alternate	between	brief	
explanations	 of	 cosmological	 and	 astronomical	 concepts	 (Big	 Bang,	 red	
giants,	white	dwarfs),	lyrics	(typographically	set	in	italics),	combinations	of	
the	two	(verse	following	astronomical	exposition),	and	uncaptioned	repro-
ductions	of	graphs	 from	the	French	 scientific	 journal	La Recherche.	Much	
like	T.	S.	Eliot	in	The Waste Land,	Sarduy	closes	the	section	with	a	citation	of	
his	sources.	Sarduy	leaves	many	traces	of	his	body	in	the	poem,	and	his	cita-
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tional	strategies	alert	us	to	his	efforts	to	craft	a	narrative	out	of	his	passions,	
readings,	and	imaginings.	In	Barthesian	fashion,	then,	Sarduy	strives	to	sty-
listically	lay	bare,	to	materialize,	the	pleasure	he	takes	in	recounting	theories	
about	the	universe’s	origins	and	its	astronomical	bodies.	This	pleasure	may	
produce	a	fragmentation,	but,	unlike	Eliotic	modernists,	he	does	not	yearn	
to	shore	up	the	pieces	and	secure	a	unified	self.	Instead,	he	capitalizes	on	the	
foundational	premise	of	 the	Big	Bang	 theory:	“The	universe	 is	 expanding	
(OC 1:	165).	Like	celestial	bodies,	Sarduy	exists	in	a	dilating	space	and	time,	
constantly	expanding	beyond	his	own	boundaries.	Decentered	by	a	constant	
distancing	from	his	origin,	he	nonetheless	remains	materially	and	lyrically	
connected	with	the	other,	the	“you”	[tú]	he	informally	addresses.
	 The	first	of	these	lyrics	surfaces	as	the	second	half	of	“Isomorphism,”	the	
third	canto	of	“Big	Bang.”	The	piece	begins	with	a	prose	paragraph	that	con-
tinues	 the	colloquial	prose	accounts	of	 the	Big	Bang	 theory	 that	make	up	
the	first	two	sections.	The	astrophysicist	Allan	R.	Sandage	is	noted	to	have	
attested	 that,	 in	 June	1966,	 the	Mount	Palomar	observatory	witnessed	 the	
explosion	of	a	quasar,	an	extremely	bright	quasi-stellar	object.	This	discovery	
added	new	knowledge	about	that	type	of	celestial	body,	which	had	only	been	
discovered	 and	 classified	 three	 years	 earlier.	As	 Sarduy	 recounts,	 Sandage	
theorized	 that,	 given	 the	Earth’s	 light	 years	of	distance	 from	 the	 star,	 the	
event	of	the	explosion	actually	could	have	happened	billions	of	years	earlier,	
shortly	after	the	“initial	explosion”	with	which	the	universe	was	born.	The	
section’s	title	suggests	that	this	astronomical	narrative	exists	in	an	isomor-
phic	relation	to	the	lyric	that	immediately	follows.	If	that	is	true,	one	would	
expect	the	complementary	verse	to	shed	light	on	how	universes	begin	out	of	
explosions;	however,	the	lyric	has	nothing	to	do	with	stars.	Instead,	it	depicts	
a	cruising	encounter	 in	 the	Moroccan	baths	of	 the	Hotel	de	 la	Confianza.	
The	setting	is	luridly	described	with	earthy,	not	celestial,	tones.	A	“mustard	
cone”	of	light	from	a	“stained	chandelier”	casts	the	“shadow	of	the	shower	
pipe”	on	a	nearby	“reddened	wall,”	as	desert	sands	batter	the	windowpanes.	
In	a	parenthetical	aside,	our	attention	is	directed	“Outside.”	Random	details	
are	disclosed	about	 the	world	 just	beyond	 the	baths’	walls:	 sandals	 tossed	
aside,	the	sound	of	a	radio,	whirlwinds.	Inside,	a	naked	water-bearer	appears.	
The	reader	finds	himself	folded	into	the	poem’s	scene	of	action:	he	is	ren-
dered	male	by	the	narrator	and	is	directly	addressed	with	the	familiar	“tú.”	
“You”	push	small	containers	of	“putrid	water”	to	the	ground,	thus	breaking	
them,	while	“you”	draw	out	“your”	cock	and	squeeze	it.	While	“you”	are	mas-
turbating	 to	 the	 sight	of	 the	naked	visitor,	 you	“stain”	 your	 genitals	with	
“saffron”	from	your	hands.	A	rather	anticlimactic	microscale	version	of	the	
Big	Bang	happens.	“Cum	[La leche]	on	the	wall,	dense	point,	white	sign	that	
spreads	[se dilata].”	After	“you”	gather	your	djellaba,	presumably	to	cover	up,	
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we	hear	a	simple	but	cryptic	statement,	all	the	more	unintelligible	because	
it	lacks	quotation	marks	or	an	explicit	attribution	to	a	particular	speaker:	“I,	
the	impermeable.”	A	final	aside	quickly	returns	us	to	the	world	beyond:	an	
overheard	film	dialogue,	a	blinking	neon	sign	(Luxor),	the	subway.	A	closing	
notation	 locates	 the	 lyric	 as	 composed	between	 the	 sites	narrated	 in	 each	
of	 the	 two	parenthetical	 asides	 that	 send	us	“Outside”	 the	baths:	Tiznet /	
Barbès-Rochechouart.
	 On	 the	 surface,	 the	 lyric	 component	 of	“Isomorphism”	 appears	 to	 be	
an	unremarkable	narration	of	public	 sex	 and	 sexual	 tourism.	Ultimately,	
though,	the	text	resists	such	reductions.	Much	like	the	astronomers	who	wit-
ness	a	quasar’s	explosion	billions	of	years	after	it	occurred,	Sarduy’s	reader	is	
brought	into	proximity	with	what	is	now	absent:	the	writer’s	past	encounter	
with	a	Moroccan	water-bearer.	We	share	his	position,	inhabiting	his	memory	
of	his	experience	in	the	Tiznet	baths	as	we	identify—admittedly,	somewhat	
forcibly—with	 the	 second	person	“you”	who	 jerks	off	while	 gazing	 at	 the	
object	of	his	desire.	The	final	aside	draws	our	attention	to	yet	another	time	
and	place	from	which	we	are	removed,	that	of	Sarduy’s	writing	in	view	of	
the	Barbès-Rochechouart	stop	of	the	Paris	Metro.	Space	and	time	have	both	
dilated,	much	like	the	ejaculate	on	the	wall.	In	this	“dense	point”	of	lyric—a	
seamy,	but	bright,	spot	in	“Big	Bang”—boundaries	are	crossed,	on	multiple	
levels.	 Through	 the	mnemonic	 peregrinations	 of	 an	 individual	 writer,	 a	
North	African	periphery	becomes	a	train	stop	in	the	European	metropole.	
Sex—particularly,	the	supposedly	private	and	solitary	act	of	masturbation—
is	now	part	of	 the	baths’	public	 space	 and	 involves	more	 than	one	body.	
Reader	blurs	into	writer;	the	latter’s	erotic	past	informs	the	reader’s	present	
textual	experience.
	 But	that	cryptic	statement,	attributed	to	no	one—“I,	the	impermeable”—
haunts	the	scene.	Perhaps	the	narrator	states	it,	but	it	could	also	be	victori-
ously	pronounced	by	the	Moroccan	water-bearer,	the	one	who	provokes,	but	
is	untouched	and	not	soaked	by,	the	poet-narrator’s	onanistic	pleasures.	In	
this	ambiguity,	Sarduy	reminds	us	that,	like	the	Moroccan,	he	is	also	a	post-
colonial	subject.	Their	similarity	is	reinforced	by	the	fact	that,	in	reading	the	
poem,	we	gaze	like	sexual	tourists	on	Sarduy	touching	himself,	a	gaze	akin	to	
his	own	as	he	watches	the	naked	water-bearer.	This	declaration	of	imperme-
ability—voiced	by	either	or	both	of	 these	postcolonial	 subjects—however,	
is	not	to	be	confused	with	a	claim	of	independence.	As	is	illustrated	by	the	
asides	 linking	 the	 events	 in	 the	baths	 to	 the	world	beyond	 their	walls,	no	
boundary	 is	wholly	 invulnerable	 to	crossing	and	penetration.	At	 the	same	
time	that	someone—Sarduy,	Moroccan,	or	both—claims	that	he	is	not	pen-
etrated	by	 a	 colonizing	gaze,	 the	poem	encourages	us	 to	 trespass	bound-
aries	and	collapse	the	distance	between	inside	and	outside,	North	Africa	and	
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Paris,	self	and	other.	As	voyeurs	of	Sarduy’s	past	erotic	transgressions,	we	are	
erotically	bound	to	him.	Our	reading	pleasure	hinges	on	the	mîse-en-abyme	
structure	of	 the	 lyric	 scene,	which	calls	on	us	 to	find	our	“identities”	 in	a	
dilating,	extensive	fashion.	Just	as	he	is	like	the	object	of	his	own	desire,	just	
as	he	is	the	Moroccan’s	double,	we,	too,	are	forced—even	at	the	level	of	the	
poem’s	 second-person	address—to	 see	our	 selves	as Sarduy.	The	 resultant	
sharing	of	a	body	between	the	reader	and	the	writer	opens	a	new	universe	
that	challenges	conventions	of	identity	and	difference.
	 Most	importantly,	this	blurring	of	subject	boundaries,	this	critique	of	the	
mechanisms	of	 identity	 that	 support	colonial	 inequities,	occurs	 through	a	
queer	encounter.	It	is	not	queer	because	it	is	same-sex;	rather,	its	queerness	
owes	to	its	autoerotic	nature:	we are compelled into a new relation with our-
selves by confronting our desire for the other; there we find a desire for our selves 
to	be	other.	Identity	shades	into	difference,	and	an	episteme	of	similarity—
mediated	by	the	written	word—emerges.	It	is	not	incidental	that	geopolitical	
zones	collapse	into	one	another	as	identities	and	discrete	subjects	blur.	Nor	
is	it	incidental	that	all	this	is	read	in	a	splatter	of	cum,	a	perverse	writing	on	
the	wall.	Depicted	in	Cuban	slang,	the	semen	is	similar	to	female	emissions,	
to	milk	 (la	 leche).	Androgynous,	 this	nonheteronormative	 and	nonrepro-
ductive	ejaculate	creates	a	new	universe,	produced	in	a	miniature	explosion	
resulting	 from	an	 encounter	with	 self	 and	difference.	Reading	 about	 that	
sordid	spreading	of	milky	semen	after	three	prose	pieces	about	the	Big	Bang	
and	the	expansion	of	the	universe,	we	cannot	help	hearing	an	echo	in	the	
description	of	the	emissions	the	name	of	that	galaxy	we	call	home,	the	Milky	
Way	(la Vía Lactea).	The	cum	is	the	evidentiary	trace	of	a	world	where	cor-
respondence	and	simultaneity	between	supposed	opposites	exist.	A	simula-
crum	of	the	actual	expansion	of	the	universe	and	of	that	perverse	ejacula-
tory	writing,	“Isomorphism”	mediates	 the	production	of	a	universe	where	
we	fully	understand	what	it	means	for	bodies	to	be	“fleeing	/	to	the	borders	/	
of	space,”	as	Sarduy	puts	it	in	“Oriente/Occidente,”	the	final	part	of	the	poem	
“Big	Bang.”	Other	borders—geopolitical,	 subjective,	 and	 ideological—are	
incidental.	 Liberalist	 Cold	War	 logics	 of	 identification,	 nationalism,	 and	
containment	are	all	undone	by	the	eroticism	of	the	literary	encounter.
	 The	virtual	nature	of	writing	materially	unsettles	the	reader	as	well	as	the	
author,	and	that	disruption	drives	future	encounters.	It	is	the	pleasure	of	the	
text	that	we	long	for.	The	twelfth	part	of	“Big	Bang,”	the	lyric	canto	“Cuerpo	
divino”	(“Heavenly	Body”), invites	the	blurring	of	the	boundaries	between	
Sarduy	 and	 his	 readers’	 bodies.	He	 remarks	 that	 he	 feels	“The	weight	 of	
your	body	/	on	my	body	/	skin	suture	coded.”	Language	binds	reader	to	lyri-
cist,	suturing	us	with	a	code	written	on	both	our	bodies.	But	this	soldering	
code	weighs	heavily	on	Sarduy,	burdensomely	 reminding	him	of	his	own	
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materiality	so	that	it	is	not	so	easy	for	him	to	disappear.	We	are	zipped	up	
back-to-back,	“vertebra	between	vertebra.”	His	body	presses	 against	ours,	
too,	a	reminder	of	our	own	materiality.	This	suture	is	less	a	burden	or	a	dis-
comfort	than	an	immobilizing	stitch	designed	to	promote	a	healing.	Think	
of	it	as	language’s	cosmetic	surgery	to	improve	our	embodied	condition,	to	
redistribute	the	weight	we	otherwise	would	have	to	bear	alone	and	in	isola-
tion.	The	suture	(sutura)	of	our	bodies	rewrites	tomes	about	erotic	unions	
(the	Kama Sutra).	Though	we	are	stitched	back-to-back,	together	we	form	
a	heavenly	body	with	no	backs.	Although	the	union	is	not	 like	that	of	 the	
copulative	beast	with	two	backs,	Sarduy	and	his	reader	reciprocally	penetrate	
each	other,	“entering”	one	another	“greased”	as	if	engaging	in	anal	sex.	This	
impossible	buggery,	zipping	ourselves	up	with	him	in	our	mutual	reading	
and	writing,	signals	the	coming	of	a	new	world.	With	this	union,	“volumes	
are	being	articulated.”	We	come	to	inhabit	Sarduy	(he	contains	multitudes),	
or	 he	 inhabits	 us,	 or	 together	 we	 share	 a	 universe	 with	 him	 inside	 our	
respective	 realities.	However	we	 imagine	 this	 cohabitation,	 these	 volumi-
nous	expanses	usher	in	a	cosmopolis	where	“unos	en	otros	/	unos	en	otros.”	
This	repeated	(or	echoed)	phrase	 is	 literally	rendered	as	“some	in	others	 /	
some	 in	others.”	Sarduy’s	 exact	wording	 reminds	us,	 though,	 that	 the	col-
lective	“some”	always	consists	of	multiple	individuals,	several	unos or	many	
ones.	(He	could	have	simply	written	algunos en otros,	which	would	have	lost	
the	connotation	that	one	always	comprises	several.)	In	our	multiplicity,	we	
are	entangled;	we	recombine	to	form	a	new	body	extensive	with	the	other	
with	whom	we	are	similar-yet-different.	In	this	commonal	condition	we	are	
queerly	vulnerable.
	 Lyric	ushers	in	a	new,	expansive	universe	apart	from	the	contained	one	
imagined	by	a	Cold	War	liberalism.	No	longer	does	intersubjective	distance	
signify	a	gulf,	identity’s	unsurpassable	boundary	between	individuals.	Here	
vulnerability	facilitates	 intimate	connections	in	spite	of	material	distances,	
an	eroticizing	 invocation	of	bodies	 and	differences	 to	accompany	us.	And	
poetry	 is	 that	discourse	which	best	 realizes	 that	pleasurable,	queer	 lesson.	
As	Sarduy	imagines	in	the	conclusion	of	“Heavenly	Bodies,”	that	universe-
begetting	union	may	be	 impermanent,	 a	 short	 flash	 of	 ejaculatory	“bril-
liance”	that	trails	down	the	wall,	like	“dead	stars	falling,”	to	the	bedclothes’	
funereal	“marble.”	Nonetheless,	that	passionate	connection	still	pleasurably	
engenders	 an	 ethical	universe	queerer	 than	 the	one	 that	 either	 Sarduy	or	
we	have	ever	lived	in,	off	the	page.	It	supplies	the	poetic	space	where	we’re	
free	to	pursue	those	echoes	that	let	us	experience	the	joy	of	being	expansive,	
extensive,	and	similar	yet	wholly	individual.
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wo concepts have recurred throughout this book: queerness	and cos-
mopolitanism. Many now find them unsatisfactory buzzwords, rather 
than viable critical or theoretical concepts, because of their vague-
ness and imprecision. In Queering	Cold	War	Poetry	 I have worked 
toward a definition of the first—queerness—by associating it with a resistant 
yet vulnerable subjective attitude. In the process, a working definition of the 
second term—cosmopolitanism—has implicitly emerged as an effect	of that 
attitude. We might say that cosmopolitanism	 is	 the	horizon	of	 vulnerability	
that	grows	out	of	poetic	and	queer	resistances	to	the	constructions	by	modern	
biopolitics	of	liberalist	individualism	and	nationalism. Poetry constructs and 
inhabits its own world republic, as Pascale Casanova calls it. That cosmopol-
itan space is structured by the nationalistic political world’s actualities and 
power dynamics, yet it provides enough autonomy for authors and readers 
to more freely reimagine restrictive definitions of nationhood and the pre-
dominant ethos	of each writer’s respective polis. The poets discussed here—
Wallace Stevens, José Lezama Lima, Robert Duncan, and Severo Sarduy—
achieve that end by working against the same ontological foundations. Their 
expressions of vulnerability and a poetic cosmopolitanism are quite varied, 
though, because liberalism itself, as an ontological or formalist ideal, is 
articulated differently in particular historical and social contexts. Stevens’s 
hemispheric ideas about cosmopolitanism are very much a product of his 
time and his national setting, and they differ significantly from Lezama’s, 
Rodríguez Feo’s, and the other origenistas’ ideas about it. That difference is 
due to the fact that, unlike the norteamericano’s narcissistic conception of 
extending one’s self into the world, their antinationalist postcolonial project 
t
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depends on founding a global community of friends through a technology of 
reading world literatures. Similarly, Sarduy’s qualifiedly antihumanist ideas 
about queerness, or what he terms “desire,” are significantly different from 
Duncan’s more humanistic ones about what he calls “love.” The differences 
between their projects are due to more than Sarduy’s struggling with (a for-
eign) structuralist theory in rethinking social relationality outside the terms 
of national citizenry. They are also due, in no small part, to the fact that 
his exilic life led him to be critical of liberalism’s romantic foundations in 
a way different from what Duncan, the archetypal householder, could be. 
Read together, then, these poets’ writings offer only a small sampling of ways 
of imagining how vulnerability might help the contemporary reader reach 
toward more cosmopolitan horizons, beyond the containing logics of late 
modernity and its entrenched need for the security of identity and clear-cut 
difference.
 What is not coincidental, however, is the fact that these writers’ poetic 
investigations of the limits of modern nationalism are accompanied by 
notions of various forms of vulnerability which give rise to pleasure, eroti-
cism, attraction, and joy. Edward Said reminds us that literature affords 
readers opportunities to move beyond the boundaries of their respective 
homelands into foreign spaces and pasts. By moving into the “provisional 
homes” provided by texts, the reader can enter “that precarious exilic realm” 
where one can “truly grasp the difficulty of what cannot be grasped and 
then go forth to try anyway” (Said, Humanism	and	Democratic	Criticism, 
144).1 In this displaced terrain of reading, our private lives are a bit shaken 
up because literature uses language as a tool to model an understanding of 
agency—namely, that one acts only after being acted on—at odds with the 
(limitedly) sovereign one imagined by biopolitical, liberalist paradigms. 
Thus, the reader awakens, joyfully, to the sense that it is possible to live dif-
ferently, in ways that deepen our attachments to others without normalizing 
our behavior. With that discovery, we move beyond the constraints not only 
of the modern rational subject but also of collective national forms that over-
emphasize security to ensure that populations remain easily managed and 
governed.
 Poetry, that most unlikely of discourses, thus allows us to circumvent the 
classic means by which cosmopolitanism is usually imagined as a form of 
stability and peace. As Immanuel Kant originally postulated in “Idea for a 
Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent” (1784), cosmopolitanism is 
the rationalistic goal of humanity’s evolution toward “a cosmopolitical state 
of public security” that uses the middle ground of culture and law to create 
an artificial “concord” (Basic	Writings, 128, 123). His better known treatise 
“Toward a Perpetual Peace” (1795) specifies that this development, though 
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occurring through cultural means, is both teleological and natural: “Nature’s 
mechanical course evidently reveals a teleology: to produce harmony from 
the very disharmony of men even against their will” (ibid., 450). Although 
Kant interestingly resignifies volition, and also blurs the lines between 
nature and culture in a way that would appeal to all four poets I have studied 
here, his secure and harmonious vision of cosmopolitanism is quite unlike 
the queer ethic we have been exploring. Experimentation and openness to 
change, rather than conformity and ensuring the security of the self-same, 
are to be pursued. Since life’s unforeseeable disruptions must be valued, a 
perpetual process—rather than a perpetual peace—is most desirable. Holding 
out for a static “peace” only promotes an ideologically motivated illusion 
whereby particular parties and biopolitical logics govern our lives according 
to a	priori rationalities that preserve an inflexible state and a sociocultural 
status quo.
 At the heart of a dynamic in which individuals’ lyric encounters supply 
the gateway for rethinking the nationalist and popular parameters circum-
scribing life is difference. Moreover, that difference traverses identity and 
points to the perpetual division and multiplication of the self. It compels 
us to find resemblances, similarities that invite us to be reflexive about our 
selves. This reflexivity is not a process of finding out who we are but instead 
is one in which we discover what we can do. What potentials can we realize 
when we recombine with others, in unexpected fashions? Where this differ-
ence resides, at the center of this process of perpetual discovery, is the body. 
One of the general difficulties of addressing the nature of cosmopolitanism 
is due to a recurrent failure to take notice of how our singular embodied 
living mediates our experience of a common condition. In this way, the sort 
of cosmopolitan difference I am gesturing toward here bears similarities to 
how Gilles Deleuze reads Spinoza’s concept of common	notions, particularly 
those of the “less universal” kind that realize “a similarity of composition 
between bodies that directly agree, and this from their own viewpoint[s]” 
(Expressionism	in	Philosophy, 276). Deleuze urges us to realize that when we 
think of commonality “we must begin from the least universal,” our singular 
embodied experiences. “When we encounter a body that agrees with our 
own, when we experience a joyful passive affection, we are induced to form 
the idea of what is common to that body and our own” (282). That is to say, 
passivity—what I have called vulnerability—produces joys that compel us to 
think differently about how we can connect to, and are already connected 
to, others. This is a different kind of reason, one predicated on a desire that 
comes to be rationalized: “Desires of reason thus replace irrational desires” 
(284) This is a different kind of action, one predicated on passion: “There 
is a whole learning process involved in common notions, in our becoming	
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active” (288; emphasis in original). With such an affirmation of joy at the 
center of cosmopolitan thinking, the desiring discovery of new commonali-
ties does seem quite queer indeed.
 Because the body is the specific site of that singular perspective from 
which common notions are realized, we should hesitate to associate a Deleu-
zian or Spinozan idea of cosmopolitanism with a celebration of abstract 
networked societies.2 All of the body’s relations, including the actualities of 
the nation-state, form an assemblage that contributes to the formation of a 
cosmopolitan perspective that frames interpretations of any vulnerable and 
passionate experience of queerness, whether it occurs in the street or on the 
page. As Pheng Cheah reminds us, the freedom engendered by a so-called 
postnational spirit is actually a product of “an interminable negotiation with 
and responsibility to the forces that give us ourselves instead of the tran-
scendence of the given” (Inhuman	Conditions, 79).3 The Deleuzian premise 
that any ethic is based on what a body can do necessitates an account of the 
material limits constituting and situating that body. Manuel DeLanda, for 
one, has argued that such a material and posthumanist rendition of social 
assemblages necessitates moving past models of social constructivism: “Lan-
guage should be moved away from the core of the matter, a place that it 
has wrongly occupied for many decades” (A	New	Philosophy	of	Society, 16). 
However, the cases of Stevens, Lezama, Duncan, and Sarduy indicate that 
language	itself	is	a	material that not only constructs us but also poses neces-
sary limits mediating our embodied relations. In many ways, it will always 
be “the core of the matter.” Lyric, and one might imagine other verbal arts, 
provide further material for embodied negotiations with language and ideas 
so as to move toward a freer, less nationally and egoistically constricted, con-
dition. Thus, the queer cosmopolitan ethic that I am elaborating here is, at 
the heart of it, always a cultural	project. Contrary to the Kantian assertions 
of some, culture does not just bring about the consolidation of cosmopolitan 
norms.4 Rather, it furthers a project wherein, according to	Paul Gilroy, we 
attain a degree of “self-knowledge . . . acquired through the proximity to 
strangers.” Culture supplies the mediated forms through which we achieve 
such proximity. Thus it is a necessary tool in “the principled and methodical 
cultivation of a degree of estrangement from one’s own culture and history” 
(Postcolonial	Melancholy, 67).
 If estrangement is an underlying queer objective for much modern art, 
then it is already far removed from the classically humanist project that 
liberals like Kwame Anthony Appiah imagine when they characterize art 
as encouraging a mode of “connection not through	identity but despite	dif-
ference” (Cosmopolitanism, 135; emphasis in original). Modern poetries, in 
their queering of ethical modalities, supply models of a cosmopolitan vision 
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that account for the situated and ecological nature of subjects’ relations with 
an inhuman world, a world that is material because of both linguistic rep-
resentation and political and economic institutions. Bodies function as the 
boundary where one comes into contact with that world; through them, dif-
ference is inevitably introduced. So, Appiah is right in saying that art does 
not work by encouraging connection “through identity,” but it is a more pre-
carious situation than trying to connect to others “despite	difference.” Indeed, 
the lyric arts encourage us to connect through	difference, to struggle with the 
mediations that ultimately make us strangers even to ourselves. The pursuit 
of self-estrangement in the name of growing closer to others is an ethical 
strategy for realizing what Gilroy provocatively calls a “systematic form of 
disloyalty to our own local civilization” (Postcolonial	Melancholy, 71). If we 
are good ethicists, we risk being read as bad humans. We set out to betray the 
identitarian logic that forecloses possible actions and imaginable collectives 
because it favors the security of the known. Through a never-ending process 
of opening to others in order to rearticulate, reflexively, our selves and our 
relations, however, we might offer a broadened account of what humanity 
is and, perhaps more importantly, what humanity can do. Experience, not 
essence or existence, is the new ontological foundation of such an ethic.5
 Because I see myself as working outside postcolonial studies, I cannot 
speak responsibly to how this connection between cosmopolitanism	 and 
queerness might change that critical discourse. However, I will close by 
pointing to how it can begin to expand the critical horizons of queer theory. 
Most significantly, if our cosmopolitan potential always entails a negotiation 
of our embodied experience of national living, we will be heartened to learn 
that the idea of the queer	nation, one of our most resistant tropes in queer 
activism, has a great deal of potential. We have gone about imagining its 
character all wrong, however, because we presume a transformation based 
on our identifiable difference as	queers. Queer nationalism tends to be read 
as: a “camp counternationality” that resignifies commercial mainstream cul-
ture (Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman, “Queer Nationality,” 214); an 
ontological plateau in which coming out into a sexual and gender minority 
community lets individuals realize particular practices and create an “ethical 
agency” that is “lived and acted beyond the community, carried into the larger 
world as ethics” (Mark Blasius, Gay	and	Lesbian	Politics, 203); a resistance 
to a “normalized homoeroticism” that strives “not for a simplistic rejection 
of publicity dynamics as they are currently constituted [in sexual minority 
communities], but rather for progressive ethical and political reworkings 
of them” so as to reconfigure, through a trickle-down effect, other public 
institutions, the civil sphere, and markets (Eric O. Clarke, Virtuous	Vice, 
30–31, 170); and even the desired milieu of a queer “stranger” whose more 
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passionate mode of citizenship “requires [of the heterosexual majority] an 
active encounter with difference and a willingness to understand differences 
as fruitful and enhancing rather than as threats to bodily, social, or political 
integrity” (Shane Phelan, Sexual	Strangers, 147). Such imaginings presume 
that an a	priori queerness, cultivated in a community set apart from the rest,	
introduces a transformative radical difference into the general national con-
sciousness.
 In many ways, such conceptualizations of queer nationalism paradoxi-
cally begin with a mode of recognition that, as Alexander García Düttmann 
has argued, obstructs the ethical change or social justice pursued by their 
advocates.6 Fallacious identitarian premises implicitly endorse the liberalist 
condition and the liberal state to which we are tied. “The vast infrastruc-
ture of voluntarist culture—from churches to twelve-step programs—inter-
prets itself through an identitarian discourse to which [the] queer is rap-
idly becoming assimilated,” Michael Warner warns. He goes on to add, 
“The state also contributes more directly to the intelligibility of queerness. 
The modern state claims to be the agency of our wills and the site of our 
reason; that’s why it works so well with a culture of voluntarism” (Publics	
and	Counterpublics, 214). Because of this situation, Warner “distrust[s]” the 
“metanarrative of queer theory” as “a fundamental critique of liberal indi-
vidualism, where the latter is understood as a belief in voluntarism and 
the ego-integrated self ” (ibid., 219). The general claim of queer theory that 
it opposes strong individualism is impossible to sustain because it cannot 
extricate itself from the voluntarism supported by both the state and society. 
Even though Warner titles his essay “Something Queer about the Nation-
State,” his chief concern might really be said to be that there is something 
“nation-state” about “the queer.” If the stranger is not truly strange, or if 
the queer is not really unexpected and eventful, the queer cannot realize 
the very transformation of social consciousness that the stranger promises. 
Instead, the field promulgates a critical discourse suspiciously reminiscent 
of the sorts of social “conversation” esteemed by more liberal figures like 
Appiah. Not to be confused with the communicative rationality found in 
theories of deliberative democracy, “Conversation doesn’t have to lead to 
consensus about anything, especially not values.” It does have some poten-
tial for dissensus, but, as Appiah helps us see, conversations really are not 
all that queer or eventful. Rather, it renders difference habitual: “It’s enough 
that it helps people get used to one another” (Cosmopolitanism, 20). Queer 
theorists’ own conversations about queer nationalism really only habituate 
the general national public to identity-based differences, as Warner fears.
 If transformation is to occur, it must do so through continuing	struggles	
with established parameters of identity and nationhood. In some way, each 
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of the poets featured in Queering	Cold	War	Poetry	gives us an admittedly 
unsatisfactory answer to the dilemma we face. Lezama remains stubbornly 
secret. Stevens persistently clings to an imperialist and narcissistic world-
view, despite his protestations otherwise. Duncan was unable to make even 
a gay household seem something other than normal without resorting to 
scatology. Sarduy hyperbolically claimed the disappearance of his body and 
buried the human intimacies of his project in obtuse echoes of others’ work. 
At the core of each supposed failure, though, is a conflict cutting across an 
embodied subject who remains vulnerable to the very biopolitical proscrip-
tions and prescriptions contested by his poetic. In their work, then, nation-
alism is very much present and is even queer. But each of their respective 
failures is itself an indicator of a difference that has emerged in the uneasy 
and insecure process of contention. I have brought these differences to light 
to help us see each project as even less secure, less integral than the authors 
themselves believed. Even these writers who were so conscious of the neces-
sity of vulnerability, dependency, openness, connectedness, similarity-in-
difference—even they were tempted to shore up their identities and to nar-
rate their successes. So, even if they expressly acknowledged a universal or 
cosmopolitan vision from time to time, that vision very much remains on 
the horizon. It is up to us to be open enough to the traces of themselves they 
left behind so that we might find our own deconstructive agency for con-
tinuously drawing closer to some queerer cosmopolitan possibility. Perhaps 
someday that vision will be actualized in material institutions of politics and 
economy. Until then, though, we can realistically labor to make a cosmopoli-
tanism grounded in difference part of at least one small facet of our material 
lives: a function of the language in which we imagine, share, and, indeed, 
live.
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Prologue
 1. See S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human	Security	and	 the	U.N.:	A	
Critical	History, especially 61–138, 202–24.
 2. As I detail in the introduction, liberalism	is central to my understanding of security, 
too. My inclusion of Cuban authors in this study is not paradoxical, though. I derive my defi-
nition of liberalism from a Foucauldian approach to operations of biopower and the man-
agement of populations, not from a political economic framework. The distinctions between 
the political forms of U.S. “liberalism” and Cuban “communism” are also not as clear-cut as 
they initially seem. Before and after the 1959 Revolution, Cuba had a changing relationship 
to American liberal ideals. Many conservative U.S.	liberals (i.e., liberals who opposed com-
munism and socialism as suppressions of democratic individualism) supported Fidel Castro 
between 1956 and 1958 because of his heroic image (Van Gosse, Where	the	Boys	Are:	Cuba,	
Cold	War	America,	and	the	Making	of	a	New	Left, 60–135). Similar support came from both 
politically and culturally conservative papers such as the Chicago	Tribune, Coronet, Look, 
Time, Life, and U.S.	News	and	World	Report. These media outlets contributed to a public dis-
course that paradoxically equated Cuban populist resistance with a North American strong 
individualism. Thus, prior to the establishment of a socialist government (later declared 
communist), the U.S. mainstream perpetuated a paradoxical romance of the anti-American 
revolution against Fulgencio Batista. That romance even inspired conservatives to become 
“Yankee fidelistas” and fight alongside the same Castro who also was admired by the New 
Left for embodying an ethos of personal politics. Unfathomably, American liberalism—in 
both its conservative and liberal/New Left varieties—resonates with the distinctively Cuban 
ideal of the communist hero.
 3. For other work on the neoliberal privatization and mainstreaming of the gay and les-
bian movement, see Rosemary Hennessy, Profit	and	Pleasure:	Sexual	Identities	in	Late	Capi-
talism; Urvashi Vaid, Virtual	Equality:	The	Mainstreaming	of	Gay	and	Lesbian	Liberation; 
Leslie Feinberg, Trans	Liberation:	Beyond	Pink	and	Blue; Samuel R. Delany, Times	Square	
Red,	Times	Square	Blue; Alexandra Chasin, Selling	Out:	The	Gay	and	Lesbian	Movement	Goes	
to	Market; Richard Goldstein, The	Attack	Queers:	Liberal	Society	and	the	Gay	Right; and Paul 
Robinson, Queer	Wars:	The	New	Gay	Right	and	Its	Critics.
n o t E s
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 4. For ACT UP’s mission, see the website for the NYC branch (http://www.actupny.
org) and its Oral History Project (http://www.actuporalhistory.org). One could criticize U.S. 
chapters of ACT UP for their largelyAmerican, even local, focus. A French chapter does exist 
in Paris. It is still quite active, whereas many American chapters are less so now. (See: http://
www.actupparis.org.) Consequently, its actions have not fostered enough of a conscious-
ness of the uneven developments of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the resources allotted 
to globally address the crisis. In any cultural ecology, accounts of differences are necessary 
for imagining ethical and politically viable programs to redress those conditions that affect 
seropositive subjects globally. For a critical account of the unequal discursive conditioning 
of HIV/AIDS worldwide, see Cindy Patton, Globalizing	AIDS.
 5. For critical accounts of Queer Nation’s resistance to queer citizens’ economic and 
political exclusion by reimagining the nation as a cultural, rather than state, entity, see 
Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman, “Queer Nationality,” and Henry Abelove, Deep	
Gossip, 29–41.
 6. The CLAGS participants upheld a classically humanist sense of coalitional politics. In 
contrast, the idea of commonality I outline in chapter 1 would be called “posthumanist” by 
theorists. Both are cognizant of an inherent ecological relationality, but I would differentiate 
a humanist politics as more invested in the human citizen-subject’s ability to act as a civic 
agent. A posthumanist ecological model would also	account for the roles of “inhuman” fac-
tors—such as discourses, language, desire, even nature—in the shaping and conditioning of 
possibilities for political resistance. For a posthumanist ecological model, see Félix Guattari, 
The	Three	Ecologies.
 7. I want to thank Belkin Gonzalez and Patricia Meona-Picado for this eloquent and 
concise formulation of queer politics’ changing historical relationship to vulnerability.
 8. See Judith Butler, Excitable	Speech:	A	Politics	of	the	Performative; The	Psychic	Life	of	
Power:	Theories	in	Subjection; Precarious	Life:	The	Powers	of	Mourning	and	Violence, espe-
cially 128–51; Giving	an	Account	of	Oneself. Below I explicitly and implicitly address these 
texts.
introduction
 1. On the politics and “cost” of Foucault’s philosophy of power, read as a continuing into 
his philosophy of biopolitics, see Jefffrey T. Nealon, Foucault	beyond	Foucault:	Power	and	
Its	 Intensifications	 since	1984.	For Foucault’s key discussions of biopower, biopolitics, and 
governmentality, see The	History	of	Sexuality,	An	Introduction,	volume	1,	133–59; “Society	
Must	Be	Defended”:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France, 239–63; the essays “Governmentality,” 
“‘Omnes	et	Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” “The Subject and Power,” and 
“The Risks of Security,” in Essential	Works, 3: 201–22, 298–325, 326–48, and 365–81; “The 
Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Essential	Works, 1: 281–301; 
and Security,	Territory,	Population:	Lectures	at	 the	Collège	de	France,	1977–1978.  See also 
Naissance	de	 la	biopolitique:	Cours	au	Collège	de	France,	 1978–1979, where Foucault dis-
cusses the relationship of liberalism to neoliberal economics.
 2. For a brief example where sovereignty is discussed as part of biopolitics, see Foucault, 
Security,	Territory,	Population, 23. Roberto Esposito explores this relation in great depth, 
and he characterizes it as “a copresence of opposing vectors superimposed in a threshold of 
originary indistinction” (Bíos:	Biopolitics	and	Philosophy,	40). The translation of his crucial 
contribution to this discussion was made available only as this book was going to press, so I 
do not treat it in detail here.
 3. See Agamben, Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life, esp. 119–80, passim.
 4. For accounts in queer theory that correlate biopolitics to Homeland Security, see 
Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist	 Assemblages:	 Homonationalism	 in	 Queer	 Times; “Abu Ghraib: 
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Arguing against Exceptionalism”; “On Torture: Abu Ghraib”; and Puar and Amit S. Rai, 
“Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots.” Also 
pertinent to my discussion of Foucault in relationship to security and risk is Randy Martin, 
An	Empire	of	Indifference:	American	War	and	the	Financial	Logic	of	Risk	Management.
 5. In Foucault’s account, capital and resources, rather than people, move through popu-
lations. Consequently, his ideas of movement are quite distinct from the nomadic circula-
tions imagined by Gilles Deleuze. This tension is registered in Deleuze’s Foucault	(esp. 23–44, 
70–93), in which he forcibly imagines power operating through a disciplinary apparatus that 
neglects Foucault’s late turn to biopolitics and governmentality. In the future, it would serve 
queer theory well to read Deleuze in tandem with Foucault. This would let us more produc-
tively rethink the former’s attempts to explain modalities of resistance through Deleuze’s 
metaphors of traversal, the diagrammatic, and topography in his reading of Foucault. Those 
figures correspond with Deleuze’s better-known concepts of nomadism, lines of flight, and 
deterritorialization.
 6. I am also working with, but establishing a strong distinction from, Noberto Bobbio’s 
understanding of liberalism as “a particular conception of the state” with “limited powers 
and functions” (Liberalism	and	Democracy,	1). This kind of state-form establishes a social 
contract based on an unquestioned “imaginary reconstruction of a presumed original state 
of man” as free and sovereign (ibid., 6). As I detail below, my conceptualization of liberalism 
does not tie it to a specific state or economic form; however, we must criticize its mythifica-
tion of individualism as an absolute sovereignty. We can do so by investigating how liber-
alism is articulated, in particular epochs, by state, economic, and other institutions.
 7. On the difference between comprehensive and political liberalisms, see Rawls, 
Political	Liberalism, xxvii–xxx, xl–lxii, 37–46. Historicity is the fundamental element dis-
tinguishing the two. Contrary to his own intentions of elaborating how a public consensus 
necessary for meting out political justice changes over time, however, Rawls’s concentration 
on political liberalism is not as historical as he makes it out to be. Because he works with the 
transgenerational democratic principles of equality and liberty, he problematically glosses 
the exclusivist nature of the common language established by these constant “principles” 
and “ideals” (liii). Particular, incommensurable perspectives are sacrificed to establish a 
consensus. Furthermore, procedural debate presumes a shared standard of rationality that 
lets citizens perceive “one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over 
generations” (xliv). A rationalistic imperative actually limits procedural debate by instituting 
moralistic, transcendent norms that must be legible across generations. Individuals “know” 
they are free if they subscribe to an unthreatening normative paradigm evacuated of pas-
sions. Rather than critically reading and historicizing civic debates’ premises (liberalism	can	
“become”	because	it	is	in	a	historically	dynamic	relationship	with	commonality), Rawls only 
superficially isolates some of its ontological dimensions in order to let others remain unex-
amined (liberalism	“is”).
 8. Kwame Anthony Appiah reads Mill this way in The	Ethics	of	Identity, esp. 1–35 and 
141–65.
 9. My	critical	 turn	 toward	ontology engages a methodological strategy that Foucault 
likens to modern thought’s own potential to move past a classically categorical logic of iden-
tity and difference by engaging “a dialectical interplay and an ontology without metaphysics” 
(The	Order	of	Things:	An	Archaeology	of	 the	Human	Sciences, 340). For Foucault, putting 
ontology back into history allows us to think the subject in the absence of the human person. 
For me, though, this methodology is less a part of an antihumanist project and more a means 
of facilitating a critique of humanism’s exclusionary premises. Rather than say there are no 
persons bearing their own agency, we must inquire as to what forces determine who and 
what count as human or as citizens in particular moments. Here I am working with Jacques 
Rancière’s theorization of the count	in Disagreement:	Politics	and	Philosophy.	A supposedly 
democratic consensus is monitored by “a count whose complexities may mask a funda-
mental miscount” that is corrected only when the excluded raise their voices to call attention 
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to a social order’s contingencies (6). A politics inheres in “a multiplicity of speech events” 
(37) in which a collective (or, as Rancière terms it, a “world,” 42) voices its dispute with a 
dominant order (or “world”). What is more, that political “disorder” entails a troping of the 
language structuring a dominant political paradigm. “The modern political animal is first a 
literary animal, caught in the circuit of a literariness that undoes the relationships between 
the order of words and the order of bodies that determine the place of each” (37). As I argue 
below, lyric is such a literary form through which a politicized disorder between words and 
bodies, order and disorder, transpires. For Rancière’s work on lyric as a political form, see 
The	Flesh	of	Words:	The	Politics	of	Writing, 9–40.
 10. Connolly delineates a third category: civic liberalism (or, liberal communitarianism). 
He aligns this form with identity politics and multiculturalism, which are based on exclu-
sions made in the interest of a so-called “common good” (see Identity/Difference, 87–92). I 
am glossing over this category because I feel that, if we read his liberal individualism more 
closely in light of Foucault’s notions about the population, it is difficult to distinguish lib-
eral communitarianism from liberal individualism. Both are premised on exceptions (the 
liberal individualism of some is secured by excluding others from the social order), and 
both render the individual’s sovereignty a function of the population’s common will (which 
secures its status as “common” via normalizing apparatuses).
 11. Foucault reminds us that statistics, that mechanism instrumental to governmentali-
ty’s biopolitical management of populations, precisely means “science of the state” (Security,	
Territory,	Population,	101).
 12. Dewey’s historicized and politically motivated treatment of the tension between 
collectivity and individualism warrants more attention than it has received. For key works 
constituting that phase of his interwar thought, see Individualism	Old	and	New	(1930), Lib-
eralism	and	Social	Action	(1935), and Freedom	and	Culture	(1939).
 13. The coexistence of liberalism and commonality are articulated in a manner aptly 
described by Chantal Mouffe as both paradoxical and antagonistic (The	Democratic	Paradox,	
especially 1–16, 99–105). A liberal grammar of equality and liberty exists alongside a hier-
archy that stabilizes liberties and thus limits freedoms. A rhetoric of freedom impossibly 
coexists with neoliberalism’s reinforcement of an antagonistic pluralism that determines 
what identity groups are most entitled to the rights measuring such individual equality. 
Thinking through other facets of the democratic paradox depends, in part, on examining 
other moments’ articulations of aporetic dynamics.
 14. Eric Paras’s discussion of the “strong subject” (Foucault	2.0:	Beyond	Power	and	Knowl-
edge, 101–23) opens a useful way of thinking about ascesis that relates to what I imagine 
for queer theorists’ ethical relationship to crisis. His account pertains to Foucault’s critical 
relationship to but continuing involvement with liberal politics, and I find it useful for cor-
recting others’ uncritical appropriations of Foucault for their own liberal projects (see, for 
example, Kwame Anthony Appiah, The	Ethics	of	Identity,	especially 1–35). One can develop 
a politicized ethic that lets one work more freely in a liberalist system, without merely repro-
ducing its transcendent, exclusivist categories.
 15. Thomas Keenan (Fables	 of	 Responsibility:	 Aberrations	 and	 Predicaments	 in	 Ethics	
and	Politics, 27–42) expresses a similar view of ethics as originating in the interruption of 
an unknown that threatens the individual’s coherence. For Badiou, that change-incurring 
alterity is a singular “event” to which one becomes a subject by remaining faithful to it. In 
contrast, Keenan’s subject is produced out of a negotiation of conflicting calls.
 16. See Badiou, Manifesto	for	Philosophy, esp. 79–88.
 17. Despite queer theorists’ and activists’ attraction to revolutionary models, historically 
in the United States the connection between revolution and queerness has been tendentious 
at best. A famous case in point: Huey Newton, the Black Panthers’ Minister of Defense, 
urged his brethren to overcome “personal opinions and insecurities” about gay and women’s 
liberation movements. While laudably calling for a coalition between racial and sexual poli-
tics, Newton’s public letter actually tempers one form of violence by urging his fellow revolu-
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tionaries to shore up some of their defenses, in the name of sympathy. Rather than giving in 
to “our first instinct” of “want[ing] to hit the homosexual in the mouth because we’re afraid 
we might be homosexual,” he instead directs his audience to “gain security in ourselves” so as 
to generate the appropriate “respect and feelings for all oppressed people” (“Manifesto,” 89). 
In the final analysis, the revolutionaries’ own security was to be ensured. A coalition based 
on such security, articulated through a rhetoric of tolerance, only preserves a	priori defini-
tions and thus is limited in its ethicopolitical potential.
  This limit is an effect of the surprisingly disciplined nature of revolutionary articu-
lations of desire. When reassessing Newton’s seductiveness, Robert Reid-Pharr notes that 
“revolutionary desire is not undisciplined. On the contrary, the revolution enforces a nar-
rative of desire that ultimately denies the realities of individuals involved in their blind pur-
suits of pleasure” (Once	You	Go	Black:	Choice,	Desire,	and	the	Black	American	Intellectual, 
141). In this case, queerness is devalued and disciplined so as to promote a revolutionary 
idea of blackness. That racial ideal is tied to a mythologized tradition borne by an ahistori-
cized body that maintains ages-old dichotomies such as straight and gay, black and white. 
Reid-Pharr tries to rescue Newton, though: “I would argue that his willingness to address 
topics as seemingly out of character for a black nationalist leader as sexual liberation and 
gay rights acts itself as evidence of a will to break the hold that the logic of black historical 
and cultural profundity holds within the American imagination” (144). I am not convinced 
of this conclusion, though. Newton expressly articulates his desire to link black and sexual 
and gender revolutionaries so as to defensively maintain a secure sense of (reproductive) 
blackness. The narrative of what is “acceptable” for black nationalism may be changed, but 
the identitarian and liberalist logics underlying it remain untouched.
 18. For a sampling of key texts from this archive, see: Valerie Solanas, The	S.C.U.M.	Man-
ifesto; Martha Shelley, “Gay Is Good”; Charlotte Bunch, “Lesbians in Revolt”; Seymour Krim, 
“Revolt of the Homosexual”; and Charley Shively, “Indiscriminate Promiscuity as an Act of 
Revolution.”
 19. For critical responses to Edelman, see John Brenkman, “Queer Post-Politics” and 
“Politics, Mortal and Natal: An Arendtian Rejoinder,” and the position papers by Robert L. 
Caserio, Judith Halberstam, José Esteban Muñoz, and Tim Dean constituting “The Antiso-
cial Thesis in Queer Theory.” Edelman’s own responses to each are published at the end of 
this dossier of position papers, too.
 20. See Douglas Crimp, AIDS:	Cultural	Analysis,	Cultural	Activism, and Melancholia	and	
Moralism:	Essays	on	AIDS	and	Queer	Politics; Cindy Patton, Inventing	AIDS; and Paula A. 
Treichler, How	to	Have	Theory	in	an	Epidemic.
 21. Many theorists imagine that queer subjects illustrate an ontological condition of 
vulnerability because they live in proximity to an outside force (power, desire, the death 
drive, the Real, jouissance, attraction, hegemonic narratives) beyond one’s control. However, 
because this attitude often produces a disruption that affirms identity-based difference even 
as it opposes the rhetoric and logics of community, queer theory often comes dangerously 
close to reproducing, rather than challenging, the biopolitical liberalist logic of a seemingly 
autonomous openness to risk-taking (as elucidated by critics such as Martin; see note 4). For 
a representation of queer theories that walk a fine line between vulnerable passion and the 
affirmation of an identity-based difference, see Leo Bersani, “Is the Rectum a Grave?” and 
Homos; Tim Dean, Beyond	Sexuality; Jonathan Dollimore, Sex,	Literature,	and	Censorship; 
Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Sexuality as Risk: Psychoanalysis Metapragmatically”; and John Paul 
Ricco, The	Logic	of	the	Lure. Other queer studies more responsibly consider the realities of 
loss, injury, and shame without deploying a rhetoric of risk. However, they frequently evince 
an identity-based communitarian impulse, rather than what I call a similarity-based idea 
of commonality-in-difference. They use either shame or injury to remedy the exclusions 
brought about by the standards defining present minority communities or implicitly (and, 
in some cases, explicitly) express a romanticized yearning for impossible communities. A 
small sampling of work in this vein includes Heather Love, Feeling	Backward:	Loss	and	the	
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Politics	of	Queer	History; Kathryn Bond Stockton, Beautiful	Bottom,	Beautiful	Shame:	Where	
“Black”	Meets	“Queer”; Judith Halberstam, In	a	Queer	Time	and	Place:	Transgender	Bodies,	
Subcultural	Lives; José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications:	Queers	of	Color	and	 the	Perfor-
mance	of	Politics; and Christopher Nealon, Foundlings:	Lesbian	and	Gay	Historical	Emotion	
before	Stonewall. I do not treat vulnerability as a trauma to be worked through or as what 
sets queerness absolutely apart from heteronormativity. Instead, I see it as articulated in 
some subjects’ specific material experiences, which do result from their differences from the 
norm, but as ultimately supplying the basis for a more universalizing possibility. In this way, 
my theorization is closest to Judith Butler’s (especially in Undoing	Gender), but with signifi-
cant caveats that I elaborate below.
 22. Winnubst concentrates on liberalism’s classic political form, as first articulated by 
John Locke. As such, it promotes what she calls the neutral individual’s “phallicized white-
ness.” She uses an alternative idea of sovereignty modeled by Georges Bataille and his phi-
losophy of the accursed share to counter such exclusivist forms of liberalist privacy.
 23. Harper still holds out for a transformative social agency discovered by queer subjects 
who “seize and interpret the meanings of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in a way that enhances, rather 
than hinders, our free subjectivity” (Private	Affairs, 82). Although the redefinition of the 
public–private divide may not transpire through an agentic seizure of opportunities as easily 
as he implies, it is worth noting that shifts of power in liberalism’s biopolitical order are 
owing to the two spheres’ relatively uncontrollable and fluctuating division.
 24. In Giving	 an	Account	 of	Oneself, Butler also notes the corporeality of this condi-
tion, but she ends up foregrounding rhetoric, or what she repeatedly terms the “structure 
of address.” In Undoing	Gender (esp. 17–39), she primarily concentrates on embodiment 
and so gives a fuller account of a “condition of primary vulnerability” (24). My work here 
tries to make more of an explicit connection between these two modes of embodied and 
linguistic vulnerabilities. Butler does not explicitly formulate them as analogous modes; 
however, because she treats them separately she does end up aligning language’s improper 
qualities more with an epistemological and ethical enterprise than a civic one. These should 
not be treated as separate projects, though: the epistemological, ethical, ontological, and 
civic dimensions of these inquiries are interrelated. In the midst of those connections, the 
line between theoretic subject and civic person are blurred. We are thus called on to refor-
mulate queer theory’s antihumanist foundations.
 25. Deleuze’s reading of Whitman focuses on how an American whole (a “web of vari-
able relations” that preserves the integrity of each of its constituent parts; Essays	Critical	and	
Clinical, 60) arises from the combinative fragments of relations between individuals, groups, 
and histories. “Relations are not internal to a Whole; rather the Whole is derived from the 
external relations of a given moment, and varies with them” (59). Individuals are not atom-
istic and self-contained Wholes, but only approximations of such. Resemblance arises from 
their various, fragmentary, contingent senses of self, which derive from their relations with 
others.
 26. Butler has developed her recent thinking about responsibility largely in light of her 
sense of the precariousness of life and the necessity of risk. For her, an ethical stance entails 
questioning the norms of social recognition, of subjecting one’s self to impersonal stan-
dards and an impersonal language that challenges our egos’ self-containment and integrity. 
It “involves putting oneself at risk, imperiling the very possibility of being recognized by 
others” (Giving	an	Account	of	Oneself, 23). Butler uses vulnerability as a conceptual fulcrum 
to shift our political sensibilities about nationalism, gender definition, or embodied life from 
an immobilizing melancholic frame to one that allows for hope and healing by permitting 
the mourning of injury and losses. “Perhaps . . . one mourns when one accepts that by the 
loss one undergoes one will be changed, possibly for ever. Perhaps mourning has to do with 
agreeing to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a transforma-
tion) the full result of which one cannot know in advance” (Precarious	Life, 21; emphasis in 
original; repeated virtually verbatim in relation to transgender politics in Undoing	Gender, 
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18). The gravitas of mourning is itself a first step in reclaiming hope. It historically connects 
us to a past that is lost and to a future potentiality that comes from working through that 
loss. As I elucidate below, however, we need not associate vulnerability only with mourning 
to critically appreciate certain forms of this fundamentally ontological condition.
 27. On courage and the risk of the polis, see also Arendt, The	Human	Condition, 28–37.
 28. Badiou’s theory of the joyful nature of poetry differs from mine insofar as he sees 
the poem as a threshold or a Heideggerian opening. For him, poetry merely “waits”; it does 
not think actively of (and thus enact) the future (The Century, 21–22). But if poetry is truly 
active, and if that activity is the reason for its joy, we ought to remember that it is composed	
by an embodied subject. Badiou’s metaphysics disembodies poetry and renders it an ahistor-
ical text that only welcomes history when it eventually arrives. While it might not manifest a 
direct action, a poem, as I see it, does not merely wait. Its action, as I detail below, is a kind of 
seduction. Through the text, the author calls us to receive and complete what (and who) the 
poem voices.
 29. To this extent, I imagine queer theory’s ethical project as proceeding along the lines 
of a Foucauldian archaeology. In that methodology, texts from various discursive archives 
provide a “positivity” that “defines a field in which formal identities, thematic continuities, 
translations of concepts, and polemical interchanges may be deployed.” Historical work is 
based on an analysis of what is “given” and of “things actually said” (Foucault, The	Archae-
ology	of	Knowledge, 127). That is to say, we work with a legible discursive field from the 
past; but our textually mediated engagements with that past bear the potential to unsettle 
our selves, as historical actors. In How	to	Do	the	History	of	Homosexuality	(1–23), David M. 
Halperin outlines a similar Foucauldian methodology as crucial for escaping the tautology 
of much post-Stonewall gay and lesbian historiography. Maintaining such archaeological 
dimensions that contribute to what Halperin (after Foucault) terms “a history of the present” 
is key for preserving the ethicality of our work.
 30. For a different formulation of such incommunicative articulations (as socially origi-
nating “lines of flight” and “expression machines,” rather than Adorno’s immanent encroach-
ment of a Hegelian world spirit), see Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka:	Toward	a	Minor	Litera-
ture, esp. 28–42.
 31. Although I disagree with his assessment that Wallace Stevens and other high mod-
ernists endorsed a conservatively liberalist ideal of privacy, Joseph Harrington’s reading of 
some lyricists as asserting the need for their work to be read as forms of public discourse, 
rather than as private expression, is worthwhile. Interestingly, he also notes that the public 
nature of lyric comprises the poet’s “ethical duty toward an audience, or anyone else” (Poetry	
and	the	Public, 13).
 32. In Giving	an	Account	of	Oneself	(30–40), Judith Butler makes a similar move in rela-
tion to Cavarero but does so by emphasizing the risky vulnerability that subjects assume in 
their struggles for recognition with linguistic norms. Like Cavarero, Alphonso Lingis posits 
a similarly othering mode of intersubjective contact that begins with the voice. While his 
model allows for one’s own voice to introduce a continual, repeated disruption of selfhood, 
that disruption ironically introduces some coherence and renarrativization. One might think 
of it as shifting strategies for aesthetically fashioning one’s self by, as Lingis terms it, honoring	
one’s word (The	First	Person	Singular, 37–44). The risks attending one’s living encounters 
with others, the inherent violence of that contact (by encountering what he terms their inte-
rior “visionary space”), and their challenges to the narrative one honors about one’s self risk 
sliding into dishonor and, ultimately, death.
 33. Mladen Dolar illuminates possibilities for thinking of the text as a third body. 
Revising Lacan’s concept of extimacy, he theorizes the object voice as “the pivotal point pre-
cisely at the intersection of presence and absence” through which one “recogniz[es] oneself 
as the addressee of the voice of the Other,” but “at the same time . . . inherently lacks and 
disrupts any notion of a full presence” (A	Voice	and	Nothing	More, 55). This voice functions 
“as an [assumption of] authority over the Other and as an exposure to the Other, an appeal, 
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a plea, an attempt to bend the Other. It cuts directly into the interior, so much so that the 
very status of the exterior becomes uncertain, and it discloses the interior, so much so that 
the very supposition of an interior depends on the voice. So both hearing and emitting a 
voice present an excess, a surplus of authority on the one hand and a surplus of exposure 
on the other” (80–81). Through this mediating voice or virtual body, one is brought outside 
one’s self and into relation with the Lacanian Other, thus complicating the divisions between 
public and private, exterior and interior, submission and sovereignty.
Chapter one
 1. Perhaps that career division overstates Stevens’s early aestheticism. As James Lon-
genbach (Wallace	 Stevens:	The	 Plain	 Sense	 of	Things, 41–82) details, that volume’s later 
poems—including “The Death of a Soldier” and “Sunday Morning”—respond to an interwar 
condition, but their “ambitions [are] circumscribed” because of Stevens’s “awareness of the 
frightful unreality that may arise from a poetry that tries to be political” (63).
 2. For his complete discussion, see Alan Filreis, Modernism	from	Right	to	Left, 12–45.
 3. For excellent readings of Stevens’s ethical reflections on various sociopolitical con-
cerns, see Angus J. Cleghorn, Wallace	Stevens’s	Poetics:	The	Neglected	Rhetoric, and Jacque-
line Vaught Brogan, The	Violence	Within,	 the	Violence	Without:	Wallace	 Stevens	 and	 the	
Emergence	of	a	Revolutionary	Poetics.
 4. I do not have the space to do so here, but reappraising Stevens’s investment in, and 
critique of, liberalism could be more thoroughly historicized as engaging Dewey’s rethinking 
of democratic individualism in the 1930s (see introduction, n. 12). Dewey and Stevens pub-
lished in the same magazines, including The	Partisan	Review	and The	New	Republic; and 
the poet found the philosopher’s work “valuable,” as he wrote Henry Church in 1941 (LWS	
441).
 5. I am thinking specifically of a 1949 letter to José Rodríguez Feo where Stevens 
remarks that “one is always desperately in need of the fellowship of one’s own kind” as well 
as “the fellowship of the landsman and compatriot” (SM 165). The question remains, though, 
whether he easily equated that “kind” with “compatriots.” What is evident is Stevens’s ambiv-
alent	relationship to his affective connections with the U.S. people. He both longs for his 
“kind,” yet is critical of settling for the sort of security provided by the steadfastly liberalist 
nationalism of the Cold War.
 6. The few other existing investigations of the exchange between Stevens and Rodríguez 
Feo focus on the letters’ “camp” and gender elements (David R. Jarraway, “‘Creatures of 
the Rainbow’: Wallace Stevens, Mark Doty, and the Poetics of Androgyny”); its imperialist 
asymmetries (Roberto Ignacio Díaz, “Wallace Stevens y el discurso en la Habana: Palabras 
de José Rodriguez Feo”); or the poet’s criticism of the young editor’s indiscriminate reading 
of other national literatures (Alan Filreis, Wallace	Stevens	and	the	Actual	World, esp. 187–
206).
 7. I am not suggesting that Stevens was a queer subject or even that he was politically 
or culturally a homophile. (Quite the opposite is true: he tended to be paranoid about the 
effeminacy of queer men, including Rodríguez Feo.) However, there are affinities between 
his ethical reappraisal of liberalism and queer writers’ resistances that highlight similarity, 
commonality, and even cosmopolitanism. I am not alone in sensing the “queerness” of his 
project. Jarraway (Going	the	Distance:	Dissident	Subjectivity	in	Modernist	American	Litera-
ture, 1–17), for one, has made explicit links between an idea of “distancing” (i.e., the subject’s 
internal division) in Stevens’s work and some queer theories. His concept of distancing is 
akin to the effects of resemblance explored here; however, I read Stevens as less interested 
in the subject’s internal division than in the subject’s relation and connection. The queerness 
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of this dynamic is owed to the embodied nature of relationality and its resultant eroticism, 
what Stevens calls “pleasure.”
 8. See Eric Keenaghan, “A Virile Poet in the Borderlands: Wallace Stevens’ Reimagining 
of Race and Masculinity.”
 9. In chapter 2, I discuss the Platt Amendment more. For the text of the Jones-Shafroth 
Act, including articles added with the Nationality Law (1940) and later emendations (1950), 
see <http://www.lexjuris.com/LEXLEX/lexotras/lexactajones.htm>. Accessed July 23, 2007.
 10. See Frederick R. Pike, FDR’s	Good	Neighbor	Policy:	 Sixty	Years	 of	Generally	Gentle	
Chaos, 11–38.
 11. On nativism as the drive to cement essentialist identifications in interwar American 
literature, see Walter Benn Michaels, Our	America:	Nativism,	Modernism,	and	Pluralism. 
During the interwar period, pluralist thought had an ambivalent relationship to nativist pol-
icies; often both reinforced liberalist ideologies of privatization and personal autonomy. For 
example, see Everett Helmut Akam’s discussion of John Collier and the Indian New Deal of 
1934 in Transnational	America:	Cultural	Pluralist	Thought	in	the	Twentieth	Century, 126–28. 
For an account of how that ambivalence was worked through by American intellectuals in 
the 1940s and 1950s in order to address the realities of international markets and the inad-
equacies of domestic cultural pluralism, see David W. Noble, Death	of	a	Nation:	American	
Culture	and	the	End	of	Exceptionalism. Stevens’s later career is marked by the influence of 
earlier pluralist thought and its ambivalences, while demonstrating his own commitment to 
reassessing American exceptionalism.
 12. See also Benjamin D. Rhodes, United	States	Foreign	Policy	 in	 the	 Interwar	Period,	
1918–1941:	The	Golden	Age	of	American	Diplomatic	and	Military	Complacency, 123–24.
 13. See Bryce Wood, The	Making	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy, 118–55.
 14. See Bryce Wood, The	Dismantling	of	the	Good	Neighbor	Policy,	191–209.
 15. On the conservatism of Cold War liberalism, particularly in regard to its consoli-
dation of heteronormative and nationally exceptionalist ideologies, see Robert J. Corber, 
Homosexuality	in	Cold	War	America:	Resistance	and	the	Crisis	of	Masculinity, 160–89, and 
In	the	Name	of	National	Security:	Hitchcock,	Homophobia,	and	the	Political	Construction	of	
Gender	in	Postwar	America, 19–55.
 16. The Good Neighbor Policy promoted a dependence sustaining the singular differ-
ences between North and South; ultimately, though, the resultant diplomatic model was 
conservative. It reinforced national asymmetries based on a persistent faith in cultural 
purism, security, and U.S. exceptionalism. Pike criticizes the policy’s merits, based on FDR’s 
personal antipathy toward Latin America (FDR’s	 Good	Neighbor	 Policy, 216–26). As he 
argues, FDR used the hemispheric model to win credibility from the European nations on 
whom he focused his diplomatic attentions and energies. However, he does not note that 
this pan-American enterprise is also motivated by a nationalism common to FDR’s policy of 
nonintervention and Herbert Hoover’s earlier, more openly conservative presumption of the 
superiority of U.S. political and cultural systems.
 17. Badiou’s model of a poetic disruption of the “we” hinges on his opposition of the “elo-
quence” of St. John Perse to the murmuring of Paul Celan (see The	Century, 90–97). Stevens’s 
lyric falls closer to Perse’s style than Celan’s, but our American also importantly avoids the 
sort of “nihilistic epic” evident in the former’s oeuvre. Significantly, Stevens models the sort 
of lyric thinking Badiou is interested in, even if this poet avoids the avant-garde ruptures the 
philosopher esteems in figures like Celan, Bertolt Brecht, Samuel Beckett, and Osip Mandel-
stam.
 18. Perhaps Rodríguez Feo was drawn to Stevens’s phrase	 “the major men” because 
he believed it specifically addressed the gendered and sexualized	dimensions of national 
belonging. After all, in the same paragraph in which he asks Stevens about the meaning of 
the major man, he proceeds to complain about Ernest Hemingway’s machismo. Although 
Rodríguez Feo brings Stevens’s attention to the trope, his hints about possibly queer content 
did not register.
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 19. See Eric Keenaghan, “Wallace Stevens’ Influence on the Construction of Gay Mascu-
linity by the Cuban Origenes Group.”
 20. This suggests a difference that distinguishes Stevens’s project of reordering the world 
from much interwar American aestheticism. Russ Castronovo reads the cultural and phil-
osophical proponents of aestheticism between roughly 1890 and 1930 as metaphorically 
substituting the order of culture for the anarchy and violence of politics. At one point, he 
draws on Foucault to note that a more ethical “aesthetics of existence” could develop an 
aesthetic practice that does not “aestheticize life but rather politicizes it by revealing the 
subject as ethically—but not morally—situated among others” (Beautiful	Democracy:	Aes-
thetics	and	Anarchy	in	a	Global	Era, 59). Castronovo’s implicit point about politicized art’s 
preservation and cultivation of violence and disorder puts into relief the ethicopolitical 
dimensions of Stevens’s project (which deems both chaos and	order necessary). Moreover, 
Stevens’s example shows that in this late modernist moment a transformative aesthetics of 
existence was imagined as including, not precluding, metaphorical strategies. Metaphor is 
(dis)figuration, rather than mere substitution and beautification.
 21. Pressing the point, Stevens can be said to cling too much to an idea of “private resem-
blance” here. If perceptual proclivities are bodily and social, the resemblances a poet dis-
covers are never	truly private. Acknowledging this lack of privacy and proprietorship would 
complicate his reproductive metaphor (“the mind begets”). This presents a cautionary lesson 
for any theorizing out of poetry: Stevens provides a point from which we can begin to think 
about similarity, not an ethical template we should adopt without revision or criticism.
 22. For Deleuze on “the middle,” see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A	Thousand	Pla-
teaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia, 3–25, 492–99, and Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 
Dialogues, 36–76.
 23. In chapter 2, I discuss a key essay from Orígenes	where Lezama explicitly mentions 
the centrality of Stevens’s influence. In my analysis of Duncan in chapter 3, I do not go 
into any depth about similar influences. This is largely because his critical prose does not 
focus on Stevens, though he did regard him as one of his “masters” (alongside Gertrude 
Stein, H.D., Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Laura Riding Jackson). Much like 
Stevens, Duncan rejected group identification on the grounds that it separated the writer 
from the rest of human commonality. While his anarchism is not exclusively influenced by 
Stevens, Duncan found in Stevens’s work a useful model for an individualized poetic oppo-
sition to a	priori communities and identity groups. Stevens’s thematic emphasis on poetic 
freedom as deriving from reading and reflection also resound in Duncan’s poetics of deriva-
tion (from his readings of others) and rewriting (from rereading his own previous work). 
The centrality of reading to both may result from the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson 
that they share. Duncan pays explicit homage to Stevens in one late text: “Structure	of	Rime	
XXVIII In Memoriam Wallace Stevens” (Ground	Work, 60). Significantly, this poem singles 
out “Desire” and “Imagination”—two Stevensian tropes—as the means of resisting the impe-
rialist and nationalist effects of the Vietnam War on identity.
 24. If we accept Edward Said’s classic definition of literary imperialism as perpetuating 
a representational logic “which not only misrepresented them [i.e., colonized peoples] but 
assumed they were unable to read and respond directly” (Culture	and	Imperialism,	31), Ste-
vens is not a hard-and-fast imperialist. After all, he did respect the origenistas’ intellectual 
and aesthetic integrity. Despite Stevens’s requests for “little vistas” of Cuba, Rodríguez Feo 
also never saw Stevens as an imperialist. Instead, the editor openly accused others, such as 
Charles Henri Ford, of “that stupid, tourist-exotic vision of our tropics” and “the silliest, 
most unintelligent bit of Americana” (SM	60). In contrast, he singled out Stevens as “an 
almost legendary amigo of us Cuban writers” (SM	190).
 25. In my study of Lezama (chapter 2), it becomes clear why Stevens’s presumption that 
the Cubans are not concerned with nationalism and the state actually misses the mark. His 
conclusion also ignores all the other global contributors to Orígenes. Given that he himself 
published in the magazine, this is a remarkably strange oversight. Setting these criticisms 
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aside, though, Stevens’s comment still can help refine our understanding of his poetic ethic.
 26. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined	Communities:	Reflections	on	the	Origin	and	Spread	
of	Nationalism.
Chapter two
 1. All translations from the Spanish are mine, unless otherwise noted. Here I have trans-
lated the title of Lezama’s essay with the English preposition “about” to capture his diction’s 
spatial dimensions. Alrededor	signifies the direction of an approach, or proximity, but one 
still remains on the outskirts of one’s destination.
 2. The core members of Orígenes consisted of poets (Lezama, Baquero, Gaztelu, Piñera, 
Solís, Justo Rodríguez, Fina García Marruz, Cintio Vitier, Eliseo Diego, Octavio Smith, 
Lorenzo García Vega); painters (Mariano Rodríguez, René Portocarrero); musicians (Julián 
Orbón, José Ardévol); and other writers (Rodríguez Feo, Bella García Marruz, Agustín Pí). 
Later issues of the publication involved younger poets, such as Roberto Fernández Retamar 
and Fayad Jamís.
 3. Unruh’s subscription to conventionally existentialist ideas about vanguardist resis-
tance is evident in that she gives some attention to the minoristas but ignores the origenistas	
altogether.
 4. James Buckwalter-Arias addresses how some contemporary Cuban authors glorify 
the origenistas	as pre-Revolutionary predecessors. Many regard Lezama and the rest of the 
Orígenes	group as using art to realize “the highest expression of true, individual liberty,” an 
alternative to the later Revolution’s recasting of liberty “in explicitly collective terms” that is 
believed to be still capable of resisting the global market (“Reinscribing the Aesthetic: Cuban 
Narrative and Post-Soviet Cultural Politics,” 364). In contrast, my project unsettles such an 
easy attribution of individualism to the origenistas, who were known for their emphasis on 
amistad or “friendship.” Such an amicable—indeed, amorous—model can resignify both 
resistance and collectivity without reading their aesthetic in overly individualizing, tran-
scendental terms.
 5. Gustavo Pérez Firmat’s “The Strut of the Centipede: José Lezama Lima and New World 
Exceptionalism” is one of the few pieces about how Lezama’s poetic connects Northern and	
Southern identities.
 6. The Platt Amendment is transcribed in full at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/
1901platt.html. Last accessed 8 January 2008.
 7. Since the Missouri Compromise (1820) and the annexation debates before the Eman-
cipation Proclamation (1862), the United States had desired to possess Cuba. Those debates 
heated up again during the colony’s first attempt to win independence from Spain (the Ten 
Years’ War, 1868–78) and before the War of Independence (1895–98).
 8. The Cuban Colonization Company’s ads to attract prospective settlers are reproduced 
by Louis A. Pérez, On	Becoming	Cuban, 112–13.
 9. Rojas specifies that Cuba’s political Right identified with the liberalist imperative of 
an individualistic pursuit of happiness, and the Left pursued liberalist independence through 
a collective form of nationalistic sovereignty.
 10. For Nuez’s complete discussion of “confrontation,” “reproduction,” and “appropria-
tion,” see La	balsa	perpetua, 21–40.
 11. One of Lezama’s more famous poems is “Para llegar a Montego	Bay” (Orígenes	35, 
1954; reprinted in Dador, 1960). Julio Cortázar’s essay “Para llegar a Lezama Lima” (“To 
Reach Lezama Lima,” 1967) plays on the poem’s title, as does the origenista	Cintio Vitier’s late 
essay collection Para	llegar	a	Orígenes (1994). Neither deals with the trope of approaching	as 
I do here, as ultimately maintaining	distances rather than achieving a goal because the telos 
itself is the limit, a pure impossibility.
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 12. Elsewhere Lezama names that arche-image the imago, thus distinguishing the desired 
image from what is produced by poetic metaphors. An image (imagen)	 is thus only the 
approximation or fragmented re-presentation of the imago’s	ultimately unknowable telos. 
See “Introducción a un sistema poético” (“Introduction to a Poetic System”; Orígenes	36, 
1954), in TH 9–36.
 13. See de Man, “The Epistemology of Metaphor,” in Aesthetic	Ideology, 34–50.
 14. This is not to say that metaphysics always precludes social ethics. Emilio Bejel (José	
Lezama	Lima:	Poet	of	the	Image, esp. 16–69, 124–47) offers an excellent reading that con-
nects the metaphysical and postcolonial dimensions of Lezama’s poetic. Brett Levinson (Sec-
ondary	Moderns:	Mimesis,	History,	and	Revolution	in	Lezama	Lima’s	“American	Expression,” 
esp. 159–81) supplies a strong postcolonial account of Lezama’s critical engagement with 
Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics. Neither connects postcolonial and queer critique, 
though. I facilitate that link here by focusing on less-discussed essays that work through the 
principles outlined in their shared primary text, Lezama’s well-known “Introduction to a 
Poetic System.”
 15. For another reading of Zambrano on the “pre-natal” nation’s innocence and Lezama’s 
secret, see Carlós Barbáchano, “La Cuba secreta o la íntima historia de un encuentro inacab-
able.”
 16. For her full discussion, see Zambrano, Persona	y	democracia, 162–65. Not inciden-
tally, she  theorizes that individuals experience overlapping forms of temporality (esp. 11–25, 
59–92). Because love, family, and commonality are experienced in different temporal regis-
ters, what is called “history” should be seen as just one kind of temporality. This notion of 
different experiences of time resonates with Lezama’s distinction in “The Dignity of Poetry” 
between historical and poematic time. If read in light of Zambrano’s philosophy in Persona	y	
democracia, which appeared at about the same time, his elaboration of two forms of tempo-
rality can be read as overlapping	and mutually	affecting	one	another.
 17. Despite their ontological vocabulary, Lezama’s and Zambrano’s opposition to Sartre is 
distinct from that posed by Martin Heidegger in the form of the ecstatic metaphysics elabo-
rated in “Letter on Humanism.”
 18. See Barthes, Writing	Degree	Zero, 9–18. In his response to Sartre, Barthes argues that 
“style is never anything but metaphor, that is, equivalence of the author’s literary intention 
and carnal structure. . . . So that style is always a secret; but the occult aspect of its implica-
tions does not arise from the mobile and ever-provisional nature of language; its secret is 
recollection locked within the body of the writer” (12). His concern with the writer’s body 
and its secretive nature connects Lezama’s poetic to Severo Sarduy’s, who was influenced by 
Barthes and his differences from Sartrean existentialism (as I discuss in chapter 4).
 19. The little magazines published either separately or jointly by Lezama, Gatzelu, and 
Baquero prior to Orígenes	were: Verbum	 (1937), Espuela	 de	 Plata	 (1939–41), Clavileño	
(1941–43), Nadie	Parecía	(1942–44), and Poeta	(1942–43).
 20. José Quiroga (Cuban	Palimpsests, 25–50) argues that such an idea of the “redeeming 
force of history” continues to be important to the post-Revolutionary Cuban state. It rewrites 
history in terms of “a cohesive set of symbols geared toward a future teleology,” a mythopoeic 
symbolization overwriting the actualities of cultural fragmentation in order to generate a 
false sense of security in the present order (4).
 21. In The	American	Expression, Lezama describes Eliot as “essentially pessimistic and 
crepuscular,” settling only “to repeat” old narratives because “he believes that the ancient 
masters cannot be surpassed.” In contrast, a baroque use of myth and history more optimis-
tically strives to create something new by recombining old materials. “Everything will have 
to be reconstructed, invented anew, and the old myths, upon reappearing, will offer us their 
conjurations and enigmas with an unfamiliar face” (EA	286).
 22. This point is made all the more poignant by the fact that the poetry collection where 
this essay originally appeared was sponsored by the Cuban government, published by the 
Council of National Culture, only six years after the Revolution. It is quite powerful that 
n o t e S  t o  c h A P t e r  t W o 1 
Keenaghan_final4print.indb   162 11/13/2008   12:52:26 PM
Lezama’s piece surreptitiously undermines the state’s official hermeneutic strategy and 
instantiates an antinationalistic ethic by implicitly encouraging Cuban readers’ sympathetic 
identification with Columbus, the preeminent colonizer.
 23. Cinito Vitier (Para	llegar	a	Origenes, 18–34) narrates the politicized shift in Lezama’s 
poetics differently. He reads The	American	Expression as beginning to promote Lezama’s idea 
of “the image as creator of fact” (29). This change in Lezama’s poetic supposedly responds to 
the “full insurrectional struggle against Batista” (29). Vitier’s full response to Lezama consti-
tutes part of his lectures at Havana’s Lyceum, Lo	cubano	en	la	poesía	(The	Cuban	in	Poetry).
 24. Martin Jay (“Scopic Regimes of Modernity,” in Force	Fields:	Between	Intellectual	His-
tory	and	Cultural	Critique, 114–33) similarly argues that the Enlightenment de-eroticized 
relationality by introducing distances between self and other. As he argues, baroque aes-
thetics seek to restore intimate points of contact to rectify that situation.
 25. In “Discurso origenista y Cuba postsoviética,” James Buckwalter-Arias warns against 
such approaches to Lezama’s work, especially by post-Soviet Cuban gay writers. Willful mis-
readings reduce Lezama to a homosexual martyr persecuted by a homophobic totalitarian 
system and are used to endorse market logics and identity politics. Ironically, he has become 
an icon, rather than a critic, of liberalism.
 26. “It is not only identifications across	definitional lines that can evoke or support or 
even require complex and particular narrative explanation; rather, the same is equally true of 
any person’s identification with her or his ‘own’ gender, class, race, sexuality, nation” (Sedg-
wick, Epistemology	of	the	Closet, 60–61).
 27. Quiroga distinguishes between silence and the secret in his analysis of another ori-
genista, Virgilio Piñera. The secret refuses disclosure, but silence—the one associated with 
Piñera—entails a “coding [that] calls attention to itself: it plays with the full spectacle of the 
disclosure” (Tropics	of	Desire,	103). I would argue that that sort of seduction flirts with iden-
tity and thus begs to be deciphered in a liberalist manner. This befits Piñera, who left Orígenes	
to found Ciclón	with Rodríguez Feo so as to explore more overtly queer, resistant expressions 
in art.
Chapter three
 1. Allan Antliff (Anarchy	and	Art:	From	the	Paris	Commune	to	the	Fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall, 
113–32) gives a good historical account that reads Duncan’s early essay on sexuality, as well 
as an attack on the gay poet Charles Henri Ford’s surrealist magazine View, as part of his 
anticapitalism and anarchism.
 2. Ekbert Faas (Young	Robert	Duncan:	Portrait	 of	 the	Poet	 as	Homosexual	 in	 Society, 
146–60) provides an overview of the composition, publication, and reception of “The Homo-
sexual in Society.”
 3. See Alexander Berkman, What	Is	Anarchism? and Emma Goldman, Anarchism	and	
Other	Essays.
 4. In his edition of A	Selected	Prose,	Robert J. Bertholf published the expanded 1959 ver-
sion of Duncan’s “The Homosexual in Society.” This version includes an “Introduction” and 
a “Reflections 1959” conclusion that frames the 1944 original. Duncan also included addi-
tional footnotes that provide running commentary, as a kind of palimpsest, about the context 
and ideas prompting the essay fifteen years earlier.
 5. For example, in the first edition of Leaves	of	Grass	(1855), Whitman introduces his 
poetic persona as “Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos.” In the fourth 
edition (1865), he amends the potentially exclusivist nature of this self-introduction by drop-
ping the masculinist identification with the “roughs” and the nationalist one with “America”: 
“Walt Whitman, a kosmos, of Manhattan the son” (For the two versions, see the Norton 
Critical Edition, 52).
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 6. Levertov complained of the hypocrisy of Duncan’s disapproval of her politicized 
antiwar poetry by pointing to “Up Rising” (see LRD 664–86). Although he portrayed it as 
an apolitical piece, the poem’s bibliographic history does suggest otherwise. “Up Rising” was 
solicited by Levertov for a 1965 issue of the liberal periodical The	Nation, and the next year 
Duncan included it in Of	 the	War,	a small chapbook locally distributed by the Berkeley-
based Oyez Press. The national reader would not be able to dissociate “Up Rising” from The	
Nation’s antiwar articles and editorials. In fact, the poem was singled out as exemplary for its 
antiwar position in its readers’ letters (LRD	515). Of	the	War’s local readers arrived at sim-
ilar conclusions. Although the metaphysics of his poetic can be read in the chapbook’s title, 
which is akin to that of an eighteenth-century philosophical treatise, his ontological perspec-
tive is in tension with the visceral cover image: a negative exposure of a body dragged behind 
a tank. That image would have been read by many in the Bay Area—the hub of U.S. antiwar 
activism—as a clear indictment of Vietnam War atrocities. As Duncan recounts, Robin Blaser, 
for one, found “Up Rising” and the rest of the chapbook to be politically didactic “examples 
of bad verse and the public corruption of my talents” (LRD	573). Elsewhere (“The Queerness 
of Poetic Action during Vietnam”) I consider the political dimensions of his Vietnam-era 
poetic as encompassing a critique of the biopolitical state rather than a protest of the war, a 
subtle distinction.
 7. For a historical overview of the ideological policing of American sexual mores during 
the Cold War, see John D’Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate	Matters:	A	History	of	
Sexuality	in	America, 284–95.
 8. Michael Warner (The	Trouble	with	Normal:	Sex,	Politics,	and	the	Ethics	of	Queer	Life, 
52–61) argues against the idea that sexual normalcy rests on a distinction between “statistical 
norms” and “evaluative norms,” or between statistical means and standards of judgment.
 9. Because homosexuality was increasingly equated with communism, the Mattachine 
Society (1950–61) dissociated its homophile politics from the Communist Party in 1953. The 
organization was restructured so that it was no longer based on a “secret society” model like 
the American Communist Party, and its members moved from radicalism toward assimila-
tive politics stressing the normalcy, respectability, and patriotism of gays and lesbians. On the 
links between the Communist Party and the Mattachine Society, see John D’Emilio, Sexual	
Politics,	 Sexual	Communities:	The	Making	of	 a	Homosexual	Minority	 in	 the	United	States,	
1940–1970, 57–91. On the Mattachine Society’s rhetoric about national integrity to promote 
a moderate liberal agenda, see Joan Meyerowitz, “Sex, Gender, and the Cold War Language of 
Reform.”
 10. I borrow the distinction between “American” and “Americanism” from Philip Wander 
(“Political Rhetoric and the Un-American Tradition”), who identifies the Cold War as an ide-
ological struggle between these two concepts of nationhood. Political progressives promoted 
an ideal of “American” culture that ensures civil liberties and individual rights not limited to 
the nation-state. The more conservative ideologies of “Americanism,” however, were based on 
nationalistic loyalty to a bounded geopolitical entity. Factions supporting an “Americanist” 
worldview constituted a cultural and political hegemony during the Cold War.
 11. Duncan does not believe that modern poetry creates neat correspondences between 
the author’s sex and the text’s “gender.” The desire to eliminate “feminine” excesses, such as 
sentimentality or lyricism, is not unique to male poets. “Even for women, areas of poetic 
feeling must contend with limits that social attitudes would set within the psyche itself against 
womanish excess” (HD	2.9: 80). Male authors can also exhibit “feminine” flights of fancy, 
such as the unicorn in Williams’s Paterson	V or the Aesopian ant in Pound’s Pisan	Cantos. 
But because he presents such sentimental moments in male-authored texts as exceptions, and 
because he discusses female poets such as Edith Sitwell or H.D. as more consistently exem-
plifying sentimental poetics, he does seem to unconsciously conflate sex and gender in a way 
that reinforces how bodies pose limits to his deconstructive project.
 12. For an overview of gender ideologies, countercultural resistance to the Cold War con-
sensus, and homosexual opposition to popular culture’s normalizing ideologies of “virility,” 
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see Robert J. Corber, Homosexuality	in	Cold	War	America:	Resistance	and	the	Crisis	of	Mascu-
linity, 1–54.
 13. Ginsberg inscribed Duncan’s personal copy of Howl with the following: “FOR [sic] 
Robert Duncan in the hope that Howl seems more gracious—mellow—a lament to him as 
time goes by; or that it drops out of my own affection in the Future” (reproduced in Matt 
Theado, The	Beats:	A	Literary	Reference, 242). As Theado notes, the inscription “suggests that 
the poem was a cause for disagreement between Ginsberg and his fellow poet Duncan.” In an 
interview from the mid-1970s, Duncan reveals that gender and sexuality were at the center 
of that disagreement. Howl	exhibited a “pan-sexuality [which] directly came in conflict with 
my very strong sense of Apollonian dedications. I mean, strong enough for a householder 
. . . I found it very threatening.” Sexuality would become less threatening if writers were to 
give it “boundaries and various centers.” Such “an architecture” would not contain desire but 
would provide a public structure and visible core missing in work by gay writers like Gins-
berg and Burroughs, who try to escape the problem of masculine agency by “melting down, 
or breaking down, and wanting to disappear” (Duncan in Faas, Towards	a	New	American	
Poetics:	Essays	and	Interviews,	Charles	Olson,	Robert	Duncan,	Gary	Snyder,	Robert	Creeley,	
Robert	Bly,	Allen	Ginsberg, 66).
 14. Hereafter I do not note Duncan’s idiosyncratic phonetic spellings of past participles 
with [sic]. His usual pattern is an elision of the “e” or switching the “ed” to a “t.”
 15. Robert J. Bertholf (“The Concert: Robert Duncan and Writing out of Painting,” 67–68, 
89) has paid the most attention to Duncan’s household trope. He remarks that the house-
hold establishes a sanctuary apart from politics, but I read it as politically deconstructing 
Cold War distinctions between public and private, work and home. Sherman Paul (The	Lost	
America	of	Love,	169–276) reads love as central to Duncan’s politics, but he oddly ends up 
reading the household trope as a mythopoetic and ahistorical means of arriving at that poli-
tics.
 16. Elsewhere (“Jack Spicer’s Pricks and Cocksuckers: Translating Homosexuality into 
Visibility”) I have written about Spicer’s poetics as extending homosexual visibility beyond 
private coteries.
 17. Peter O’Leary’s Gnostic	Contagion:	Robert	Duncan	and	the	Poetry	of	Illness provides 
a strong account of H.D.’s correspondence with Duncan and of the resultant influence of 
her poetics. However, O’Leary tends to normalize the exchange by insisting on a Freudian 
oedipality that positions H.D. as mother, Freud as father, and Duncan as child (53). I read 
Duncan’s engagement with Freud and psychosexual identity structures as much more con-
tentious, as is exemplified in one poem he sent H.D., “Apprehensions” (discussed below).
 18. See “Sagesse” in H.D., Hermetic	Definition, 57–84.
 19. See Butler, Precarious	Life:	The	Powers	of	Mourning	and	Violence, 19–49.
Chapter four
 1. See Althusser, For	Marx (esp. 221–47), and “The Humanist Controversy” (in The	
Humanist	Controversy	and	Other	Writings, 220–305).
 2. A handful of crucial texts arguing for the need of queer theory to address intersection-
ality, identity, and community include: David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban 
Muñoz, eds., What’s	So	Queer	about	Queer	Studies	Now?; Roderick A. Ferguson, Aberrations	
in	Black:	Toward	a	Queer	of	Color	Critique; Dwight A. McBride, Why	I	Hate	Abercrombie	and	
Fitch:	Essays	on	Race	and	Sexuality; E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson, Black	Queer	
Studies:	A	Critical	Anthology; and Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist	Assemblages:	Homonationalism	in	
Queer	Times.
 3. All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
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 4. See Edelman, Homographesis:	Essay	in	Gay	Literary	and	Cultural	Theory, 3–23.
 5. For a classic early critique of Sarduy, see Jean Franco, “The Crisis of the Liberal Imagi-
nation and the Utopia of Writing.” For praise, see Adriana Méndez Rodenas, Severo	Sarduy:	
El	neobarroco	de	la	transgresión, esp. 137–48.
 6. On the queer theory and performativity’s metaphysics, see Brad Epps, “The Fetish of 
Fluidity.”
 7. See Bejel, Gay	Cuban	Nation, 128–39.
 8. See Julian Bourg, From	Revolution	 to	 Ethics:	May	 1968	 and	Contemporary	 French	
Thought.
 9. See González Echevarría, La	ruta	de	Severo	Sarduy, 40–42.
 10. Sarduy posits that the baroque exemplifies two qualities (artifice	and parody). Each is 
produced by one of several writing strategies: substitution,	proliferation,	condensation, inter-
textuality	(consisting of citation	or reminiscence), intratextuality	(consisting of phonetic	gram-
mars, semic	 grammars, or syntagmatic	 grammars). He illustrates his discussion with brief 
examples from several Southern authors, visual artists, filmmakers, and musicians.
 11. In many ways, Sarduy’s neobaroque, with its emphasis on the proliferation of frag-
ments and partial objects (as I discuss below), is closer to Lezama’s baroque than he admits. 
In “The Baroque and the Neobaroque,” he argues that Lezama’s baroque—like any version 
of this aesthetic—is eroticized, but how he characterizes that eroticization points to a dif-
ferent way of understanding Lezama’s secret than what I outline above (chapter 2). Sarduy 
writes that his predecessor’s baroque is based on a metaphorical substitution that “expels 
the ‘normal’ from the [linguistic] function, and puts in its place another that is totally for-
eign [ajeno], which has the effect of eroticizing the entire work” (OC	2: 1388). Eroticization 
remains tied to a metaphysic that privileges the author as the one who knows the truth. 
(In my reading of Lezama, no one knows a truth since the “image” where the truth resides 
compels the continuing production of fragments.) As Sarduy imagines it, his own preferred 
neobaroque style is not so metaphysical even if it is still difficult. Rather than promoting 
obscurity through substitution, it is elliptical. Thus it generates a metonymic proliferation 
that produces a desire like Lacan’s or partial objects like Deleuze and Guattari’s.
 12. See Manuel Díaz Martínez’s introduction, “Siempre como siempre,” to Sarduy, Cartas, 
14–15.
 13. See Jean-Michel Rabaté, The	Future	of	Theory, 10, 71–77. Both Barthes’s and Sartre’s 
books have sections titled “What Is Writing?” and Barthes implicitly responds to Sartre 
though he never mentions him by name. See Susan Sontag’s preface to Barthes, Writing	
Degree	Zero, vii–xxi.
 14. In a graduate course discussion on Barthes and modernist lyric, my student Michael 
Jonik first used the sharp geometric metaphor of the asymptote to describe this configura-
tion.
 15. Carol Maier’s translation reads: “ . . . in spite of our resistance we are beginning to 
explore a plane of literalness previously off limits, formulating the question about our own 
being, about our humanity	that first and foremost questions the being of our writing” (WB	
22). Sarduy’s original reads: “ . . . a pesar de sus resistencias, el hombre se adentra en el plano 
de la literalidad que hasta ahora se había vedado, formulando esa pregunta sobre su propio 
ser, sobre su humanidad	que es ante todo la del ser de su escritura” (OC	2: 1137). The pri-
mary difference is that Maier’s first person plural version (“we” and “our”) of the original 
third person “el hombre” (man) and “su” (his/her) misses Sarduy’s point about writing’s 
impersonality, about the author’s disappearance as a person. In typical antihumanist fashion, 
his depiction of writing here challenges presumptions about “man” and “humanity.” It even 
questions who “we” are.
 16. As Robert Duncan’s poetic (chapter 3 above) suggests, anarchistic and liberalist indi-
vidualism are distinct. The first intrinsically ties the individual to a commonality, while the 
latter exists in an aporetic relationship with it (see the introduction). Theorizing anarchistic 
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individualism is beyond the scope of the present project but may be integral for furthering 
queer theory’s and critical theory’s examinations of individualism, freedom, and collectivity.
 17. A fact not to be overlooked: Sarduy’s obsession with the Big Bang—a theory of origins 
(in Spanish, orígenes)—also coincides with his return to Lezama’s work. Because he values 
the origenista’s theorization of the baroque, he tempers his youthful dismissal of Orígenes and 
his early adoption of an identity- and agency-based transgression when he was associated 
with Rodríguez Feo and Piñera’s vanguard publication Ciclón.
 18. Sarduy’s Foucauldian epistemic model challenges prevalent ideas about another sense 
of “revolution” in the 1960s: the scientific. Thomas Kuhn’s The	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolu-
tions (1962) popularized a revolutionary model to explain major epistemological shifts as 
occurring exclusively in scientific communities through discoverers’ individual genius.
 19. In Baroque, Sarduy explains historical models of planetary rotation alongside analo-
gous developments in the arts. The classicism of painters such as el Cigoli, Raphael, and Tasso 
reproduces the geo- and heliocentric astonomical models of Galileo and Copernicus, each of 
whom centers systems through a single heavenly body (Earth or Sun). In contrast, works by 
baroque visual artists such as Caravaggio and Velázquez, and poets such as Góngora, deploy 
two centers. Thus, they mirror the elliptical orbits originally theorized by Kepler.
 20. Bourg (From	Revolution	to	Ethics, 179–203) reads Hocquenghem and the FHAR as 
revolutionary and opposes their political stance to the period’s more reformist French femi-
nism. What I regard as his reformism anticipates later French writers’ liberalism, which often 
causes them to criticize gay antihumanists, particularly Foucault, for failing to affirm the 
importance of identity for sexual minorities (see Didier Eribon, Insult	and	the	Making	of	the	
Gay	Self). Keith Harvey (Intercultural	Movements:	American	Gay	in	French	Translation, 25–
91) depicts the FHAR and later French gay activism as having a vexed relationship to liberal 
ideals of identity-based politics, regardless of any revolutionary cant. In the 1970s, French gay 
politics struggled with liberal conceptions of self and community, particularly as they were 
articulated by a foreign minority cultural imaginary that he calls “the American gay.” Harvey 
(55–58) singles out Hocquenghem and the FHAR as militating against a ghettoizing impulse 
in the American gay scene, an impulse Hocquenghem and others read as camp. Effeminacy, 
Harvey argues, was rejected by prominent branches of French gay politics because it was 
“associat[ed] with American cultural otherness” (including capitalism and liberalist ideals of 
personhood, privacy, and egoism). “At the same time,” he continues, “effeminacy ‘breaks out’ 
in discourses which reject the American model with force precisely for its lack	of effeminacy” 
because of the association of the American gay male with a sense of insulated, liberal person-
hood (ibid., 90; emphasis in original). Suspicious of both an American liberalism and the 
FHAR’s minority politics, Sarduy, whom Harvey does not mention or analyze, embraces both 
the feminine and camp to an almost hyperbolic extreme. They are part of his queer ethical 
strategy of disputing any conceptualization of sexual minority identity, not an unconscious 
effect of rejecting just a U.S. model. Although much has been written about the transgressive 
nature of his tropes of femininity and transvestism, a thoroughly historicized account of 
Sarduy’s queer ethic in relationship to French gay politics remains to be written.
 21. Deleuze and Guattari (Anti-Oedipus, 346–50) explicitly tie such an idea of revolution 
to the failures of a liberal sexual politics: “No ‘gay liberation movement’ is possible as long 
as homosexuality is caught up in a relation of exclusive disjunction with heterosexuality, a 
relation that ascribes them both to a common Oedipal and castrating stock, charged with 
ensuring only their differentiation in two noncommunicating series, instead of bringing to 
light their reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the decoded flows of 
desire. . . . In short, sexual repression, more insistent than ever, will survive all the publica-
tions, demonstrations, emancipations, and protests concerning the liberty of sexual objects, 
sources, and aims, as long as sexuality is kept—consciously or not—within narcissistic, 
Oedipal, and castrating co-ordinates that are enough to ensure the triumph of the most rig-
orous censors” (ibid., 350–51).
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 22. Alicia Rivero-Potter (Autor/Lector:	Huidobro,	Borges,	Fuentes	y	Sarduy, 100–17) is one 
of the few critics who suggest that Sarduy generally privileges readers more than authors, 
especially since his fiction rejects transcendent authorship and has lacunae that allow readers 
interpretive freedom that effectually makes them co-authors. Due to the erotic relation 
between author and reader, my reading pushes “co-authoring” in a different direction.
 23. It is worth noting that Barthes echoes this passage by Lacan in Roland	Barthes	by	
Roland	Barthes	(1975, 168), one year after Sarduy invokes it in Baroque.
 24. Sarduy plays Barthes and Lezama off one another to make the queerness of literary 
eroticism more visible, even	more physical. His French and Cuban mentors’ names appear 
together in the 1968 essay “Dispersion/False Notes (Homage to Lezama Lima),” which echoes 
the language of Writing	Degree	Zero	while commenting on his Cuban forebear’s baroque 
poetic. Lezama’s image provokes an “expression” and “discovery” that “cause enjoyment” by 
revealing “the potential multiplicity of its realities” (WB	72). “The poet’s role is to discover 
those potentialities, make them visible, reflect them in the concavity of language, and even 
use them to displace the truth	of written History” (WB	72–73; emphasis in original). Pleasure 
disrupts history as it is conventionally known and narrated. Thus it provides proof of the 
writer’s commitment. The “word” of Sarduy’s baroque poet is revolutionary because it “has 
been freed of all transitive ballast, of that about	.	.	.	which is the injury inflicted by informa-
tion, by its morality, and has thus been restored to its fundamental eroticism, to its truth” 
(WB	72). Here Sarduy invokes Barthes’s notion of intransitive writing from “To Write: An 
Intransitive Verb?” (1966). According to Barthes, writing is produced by a scriptor, the sub-
ject “constituted as immediately contemporary with the writing,” rather than by an author 
who stands outside the text to deliver some message through it (The	Rustle	of	Language, 19). 
In a review of Sarduy’s Cobra	(“The Baroque Side,” 1966),	Barthes reads the neobaroque style 
of that novel as a reminder that “besides cases of transitive or ethical [meaning, “moralistic”] 
communication . . . there is a pleasure of language, of similar fabric, similar silk as erotic 
pleasure, and that this pleasure of language is its truth” (ibid.,	233). In Sarduy’s hands, the 
baroque is not just similar to eroticism; rather, it is an unadulterated form of pleasure. He 
runs with Barthes’s ideas and would use the erotic nature of writing to strengthen the link 
between a Cuban baroque tradition and his queer ethic.
 25. Because of their disavowal of structuralism, Barthes felt “rejected by the students, 
whose cause he supported almost instinctively” (Louis-Jean Calvet, Roland	Barthes:	A	Biog-
raphy, 163). He took umbrage at the facts that students packed halls to hear Sartre lecture, 
and that they attacked Barthes for offering a seminar to study the student movement’s use 
of verbal language. He wanted to preserve his theory’s antiexistentialist integrity, yet he also 
wished to appeal to the student movement by offering structuralism as a compatible ideo-
logical critique. On Barthes’s relationship to May ’68 and later gay politics, see Calvet, Roland	
Barthes, 163–86.
 26. For other passages drawing a strong distinction between bliss	 and pleasure, see 
Barthes, Pleasure	of	the	Text, 14, 39, and 52–53.
 27. Throughout his career, Sarduy was not remiss at deploying traditional Cuban lyric 
forms such as sons	and décimas. Privileging style and its pleasures over the clear commu-
nication of a message, traditional forms actually work against the same humanist tenets of 
existentialism and liberalism that alienated him from his homeland.
 28. For an analysis of how the first edition of the poem “Big Bang” mirrors French and 
Spanish, as well as scientific and poetic discourses, see Jacinto Fombona Iribarren, “La poé-
tica ‘cuántica’ de Severo Sarduy: Una lectura de Big	Bang.” On “Big Bang”’s exemplification 
of the poetic theorized in Baroque, see Perla Rozencvaig, “El Big Bang de Severo Sarduy o la 
explosión poética.” The reprint edition from which I cite does not reproduce the French ver-
sions of Sarduy’s texts or the chapbook’s five original illustrations of “machines” by Ramón 
Alejandro.
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Epilogue
 1. Said’s turn to philology to articulate his politicized ethic is heartening, but I take issue 
with his equation of reading’s passionate openness with the opportunity “to put oneself in 
the author’s position sympathetically” (Humanism	and	Democratic	Criticism, 62). Such sym-
pathy unwittingly ends up endorsing liberalism’s sharp divide between identity and differ-
ence because the reader ultimately sits in judgment over the text in order to utilize it as 
a subjective tool. Consequently, the logic of similarity that Said approximates is quite dis-
tinct from my own. His hopeful desire for literature’s ability to elicit sympathies and resolve 
identity-based crises implicitly signals his hope for a marked, identifiable end to the sort 
of vulnerability necessary to produce a continual, dynamic queering of life and nation. For 
more on my distrust of sympathy as an ethical hermeneutic strategy, see my essay “Reading 
Emerson in Other Times: On a Politics of Solitude and an Ethics of Risk.”
 2. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire	and Multitude:	War	and	Democracy	in	
the	Age	of	Empire.
	 3.	On	the	persistence	of	the	state	in	cosmopolitical	paradigms,	see	also	Bonnie	Honig,	
“Another	Cosmopolitanism?	Law	and	Politics	in	the	New	Europe.”
	 4.	 See	Jeremy	Waldron,	“Cosmopolitan	Norms.”
	 5.	 I	make	this	large	claim	knowing	full	well	that	“experience”	itself	has	historically	been	
a	slippery	and	multivalent	term	(see	Martin	Jay,	Songs of Experience).	Recuperating	different	
manifestations	and	representations	of	vulnerability,	though,	may	go	far	in	defining	an	ethical	
and	ontological	reimagining	of	experience	befitting	our	contemporary	moment.
	 6.	 “Whoever	demands	recognition	has	already	arrived	at	his	destination,	is	already	where	
he	still	has	 to	get	 to;	he	does	not	require	 the	recognition	he	demands.	His	polemical	pre-
sumptuousness	consists	in	the	fact	that	he,	the	one	who	wishes	to	be	recognized,	transforms	
the	others,	the	ones	who	are	meant	to	recognize	him,	into	those	who	have	to	be	recognized.	
Thus	the	roles,	functions,	and	positions	become	involved	in	an	uninterrupted	and	uncon-
trollable	exchange.	Ultimately	one	cannot	decide	who	it	is	that	is	supposed	to	be	recognized	
here	and	now,	and	who	it	is	that	is	recognizing	the	other	here	and	now”	(García	Düttmann,	
Between Cultures: Tensions in the Struggle for Recognition,	111).	Ethical	work	does	not	neces-
sarily	proceed	if	one	speaks	from	an	identifiable	point	of	difference.	When	a	confrontational	
speech	act	such	as	ACT	UP’s	famous	slogan	(We’re here, we’re queer, so get used to it)	enters	
a	general	public,	its	queer	difference	is	immediately	domesticated	and	nullified	because	its	
meaning	is	readily	interpretable.	When	the	general	public	hears	the	slogan,	it	recognizes	the	
enunciator	as	representing	an	identifiable	entity—“the queer.”	This	 identification	dulls	the	
rhetorical	force	of	what	García	Düttmann	calls	the	slogan’s	“caesura	loaded	with	tension,”	its	
ethical	suspension	of	social	logics	(ibid.,	114).
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